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Abstract
This work aims at explaining the events of the Egyptian Question through the tools 
o f balance o f power theory. It is the main hypothesis o f this work that the Egyptian 
Question affected the balance of power in Europe, i.e. Equilibrium, and therefore, was 
subjected to the mechanics o f balance of power. It is further believed that the reactions of 
the major European powers were in full conformity with this mechanics.
The first chapter explains the theory of balance of power and its major concepts. In 
the following chapter, these concepts are applied to the European system o f interstate 
relations, tracing it from the Treaty of Westphalia. The third chapter explains the link 
between Egypt and the European system, as well as the rise of the Egyptian Question. 
Chapter four deals with the effect o f the Egyptian intervention in the Wars o f Morea 1827, 
Anatolia 1832-3 and the European system. The final chapter is the mechanics of balance 
o f power applied to pacify the Egyptian Question.
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ANTLAŞMASIYLA AVRUPA'DA BAŞLAYAN SİSTEME NASIL UYGULANDIĞINI KAP­
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Introduction
I. Understanding the Egyptian Question:
The Egyptian Question is defined here as the influence Egypt exerted on the 
function o f the European System of balance of power and vice-versa. It began with the 
French campaign to Egypt in 1798, whereby it became an important strategic element in 
this interstate system. By 1805, a young Ottoman officer of Albanian origin named 
Mohammed Ali undermined his political opponents in Egypt and established himself as the 
sole ruler. His transformation of Egypt from a backward and underdeveloped Ottoman 
vilayet to a de facto  independent, prosperous and strong Empire turned the Egyptian 
Question from an internal Ottoman question to an international one. However, when the 
Egyptian forces defeated the Ottomans in 1833 and 1839, and began to threaten the 
European equilibrium, the major European powers prevented Egypt from going further 
and worked to pacify the Egyptian Question in the framework of the mechanics o f balance 
of power.
The historical facts o f the Egyptian Question and Europe are well known to any 
student o f diplomatic history. Many publications, whether Egyptian, French, British or 
Turkish provide a detailed explanation of this episode. However, there has been a lack of 
focus on the effect of this episode on the European security structure. Hence there is a 
need to approach this period from a systemic perspective to appreciate its true 
significance, for if the Egyptian Pasha pursued his victories, it is within the bounds o f
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possibilities that the European security and geopolitical structure would have been altered 
significantly. Moreover, this work attempts to establish the correlation between the events 
in Europe and Egypt and see this interdependence from a more broad perspective.
In addition, the study of the Egyptian Question by Egyptian authors was influenced 
by the conditions under which the writers lived. Since most of the most important books 
on this subject were written during the era o f the British occupation o f Egypt (1882-1956) 
there has been a general tendency to attribute the European intervention in Egypt from a 
unidimensional colonial perspective, or even from the perspective o f inter cultural schisms. 
However, this work demonstrates that this is not the only way in which this historical 
episode could be studied. This dissertation, therefore, attempts to understand this episode 
from a different perspective. It does not deny the possibility that imperialism could be a 
factor for thwarting the rise of Egypt under Mohammed Ali, but it argues that when the 
European powers intervened, they did so as a result o f classical balance o f power 
mechanics that dominated the system. Since this is the main thesis o f this dissertation, it is 
natural to adopt the theoretical framework of the Realist's concept of balance o f power. 
This represents a new approach in studying this period as it links the Egyptian question to 
the European system functioning under the balance of power mechanism.
n: Scope and Objective:
The aim of this dissertation is to study the impact of the Egyptian Question 1827- 
1840 on the European system of international relations and to offer an explanation within 
this context as to why Mohammed Ali's ambitious foreign policy was undermining 
European equilibrium, and hence failed. The hypothesis of this dissertation is that all
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actions of the European powers, especially Britain, stemmed from the conscious tradition 
o f balance o f power mechanism dominating the European system o f interstate relations 
since 1648. This work adopts as a theoretical framework the balance o f power theory as 
postulated by some scholars of international relations, such as Morgenthau, Claude, 
Platzgraff and Daugherty. It is believed here that the mechanics o f balance o f power 
provides sufficient understanding and rationalization as to the consequences o f the events 
under review. This dissertation shall include the historical events that led to the Egyptian 
Question, the development of the issue, the roles of the different European actors and 
finally, within the context of balance of power mechanism, how the European powers 
thwarted the ambitions of Egypt. This is an analytical case study will focus on 
reinterpreting this period on the basis of one of the most prominent approaches o f 
international relations.
The sources o f this dissertation are political and historical books that deal with the 
Egyptian Question, as well as some archival materials from the Egyptian, British, Russian 
and Austrian archives.
m  O utline of the Study:
C hapter I: The Theoretical Framework: Balance of Power discusses the 
theoretical framework of this work, i.e. the balance of power theory within the Realist 
tradition. It begins by focusing on the historical uses of this approach, and then the 
definition of the balance of power concept is discussed as used here. The next section will 
define operational perspectives, with a detailed explanation of its mechanics. Throughout
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the chapter, there will be references to the other chapters in order to link theory and 
concepts to the practices in the European system.
C hapter H: The European Balance of Power System is the application o f the 
balance o f power concept to the European system from its birth at the Treaty o f 
Westphalia (1648) until the 1820's, i.e., just before the rise of the Egyptian questions. This 
chapter will trace the rise of what is called the balance o f power system o f interstate 
relations in Europe. Theoretical application is the basic aim of this chapter while a 
secondary aim is to set the stage for the analysis o f the Egyptian Question within the 
European system. A major section in this chapter focuses on the position o f the Ottoman 
Empire in the European system. This section aims to establish that the Ottoman Empire 
was a major actor in the European system as well as a cornerstone for European 
equilibrium therefore making it a powerful link between the Egyptian Question and the 
European system. This point will be further explored in the Third Chapter.
C hapter HI: The Egyptian Question: Europe, Egypt and M oham m ed Ali,
defines the Egyptian Question and explains relations between Egypt and Europe over a 
period o f thirty years within the context of the Egyptian Question. The focus will be on 
two main angles, the European perspective and the internal developments in Egypt. This 
chapter will divide the Egyptian Question into historical phases that serve as an 
introduction to Egyptian politics vis-à-vis Europe by the third decade o f the eighteenth 
century. This chapter will provide. A) a background to the Egyptian Question and Europe 
and B) the historical data needed to evaluate the events that took place afterwards.
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C hapter IV: The Development of the Egyptian Question - W ars in M orea 
and A natolia explains the nature of the Egyptian position vis-à-vis the European powers, 
primarily Britain, France, Russia, Austria and the Ottoman Empire and how these relations 
developed over time into the active phase of the Egyptian Question. The purpose o f this 
chapter is to explain the active phase of the Egyptian Question that began with the Greek 
Campaign of 1827 and the 1832-1833 Egyptian-Ottoman war. These events will be 
studied carefully from a European perspective, i.e., how these two events affected the 
different European actors, their aims, and the equilibrium within the overall system. The 
final part of this chapter will review the impact of the Egyptian Question on the 
development o f the European system and how it created a dangerous disequilibrium within 
that delicate structure.
C hapter V: Balance of Power Mechanics and the Pacification of the  Egyptian 
Question deals with the peak of the third phase of the Egyptian Question, the 1839 
military campaign in Anatolia and how the subsequent Ottoman defeat opened the way for 
the Egyptian Pasha to conquer the Ottoman capital. The chapter will review both these 
tumultuous events and the European reaction at the time. In this section we shall analyze 
how the European balance of power could have been threatened by 1) an Egyptian 
conquest o f the Ottoman Empire, 2) the possibility of the rise of an Egyptian power in 
Southern Europe, 3) the fate of the Ottoman held territory in Europe and, 4) the dangers 
o f a possible French preponderance. Careful analysis of these possible events gives ample 
explanations of how they would have affected European equilibrium. Once this point is 
established, the next section of this chapter will deal with how the actors o f the European 
system followed precise mechanics o f balance of power, as explained in the first chapter
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theoretically and in the second practically, to thwart the threat posed by the Egyptian 
Question in 1839.
The Conclusion includes a brief summary of the entire dissertation within the 
scope o f the European system. It shall focus primarily on establishing the patterns o f the 
Egyptian Question on the European system, arguing that it caused unity, polarization and 
unity once again in a time span of sixteen years. These patterns will be elaborated upon 
from the analytical perspective of the entire work. In addition, it will attempt to establish 
an explanation why the Egyptian Question should be considered a unique case in modern 
European diplomatic histoiy and establish some of the effect o f the Egyptian Question on 
modem Egyptian politics.
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Abbreviations
(i) Documents from the Public Records Office in London are abbreviated B.A. standing 
for British Archives, whereas F.O. stand for Foreign Office. The first number afterward 
stands for the correspondences of the state involved, that is to say, the Ottoman Empire, is 
referred to as 78.
(ii) The Documents from the Egyptian Archives in Daar El Kitab are referred to as 
E.A. The names that follow, i.e., Abedeen or Maiyya Turki etc... refer to the 
classifications o f these documents according to issues and distributions.
(iii) All Documents of the Russian Archives, that are in the Egyptian Archives, are referred 
to as R. A.
(iv) Correspondence from the Austrian Archives in Vienna -The Haus H offU  Staatarchiv- 
are referred to as A. A.
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Note on Transliterations
All Ottoman names and places that are not identified with Egypt and Arabic 
language are written in modern Turkish, and for convenience, will be followed by its 
pronunciation in English language between brackets when first used. However, the only 
exception shall be the title "Pasha", which should be spelled as Pasa in Turkish language.
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Chapter I
The Theoretical Framework 
Balance of Power
1.1 The Realist Paradigm :
The Realist paradigm represents one of the basic pillars o f international relations 
theory today and one of the most useful approaches to the understanding o f relations 
among different nations and states. Although subject to heavy scrutiny since the early 
1960’s it remains among the few approaches to survive the tides o f criticism. Many 
approaches appeared in the past few decades with different premises regarding the 
functioning o f the international system, especially after new factors, i.e., the 
communication revolution, global interdependence and a new applications to the concept 
o f collective security, etc., appeared in world politics. Unlike many other approaches that 
could not survive these developments. Realism maintained itself as an independent and 
comprehensive approach, fostering other approaches, and yet remaining an important tool 
for international political analysis.
Though many scholars consider Hans J. Morgenthau to be the first Realist to set 
the tenets of Realism in his book. Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and 
Peace; the fact remains that this is an old tradition with some of its basic assumptions 
expounded as early as Thucydides in describing the Peloponessian War. Other scholars 
have traced the rise of this tradition to Machiavelli in the sixteenth century.' In modern 
times, the rise of this tradition to the level of a foreign policy approach may be found in 
the works o f Morgenthau in the late forties and early fifties, making these publications the 
first comprehensive modem theory o f international relations.^ The works o f Niccolo
Machiavelli, David Hume, Thomas Hobbes, Rheinhold Neibhur and Nicholas Spykman 
also serve as examples of this approach.
1.2 The Tenets of Realism:
Realism, like any other approach in international relations theory, derives its focus 
from giving explanations for the recurring political phenomena in the international arena 
and attempts to shed light on the possible future behavior of the different states. It 
contends that there exists an international system composed of a set o f political actors 
referred to as states.^ "The state ... is the fundamental political unit in the world system 
and therefore, it is possible to analyze world politics largely in terms o f interstate 
relations." “ By focusing on the state as the center of analysis, the approach refuses to give 
weight to the role o f any other actor in the international arena, thereby dismissing the role 
o f international organizations, - since they merely represent the collective will o f the 
individual states - international regimes or multi-national corporations as unimportant or 
secondary.
The Power concept:
Central to the view of Realism is that all states pursue the fundamental aim of 
independence and survival at the minimum, and the domination o f others as a maximum. 
Therefore, the concept of power becomes a cornerstone since it is the only means 
available to attain such aims. Power in this approach is like money in economics; its 
acquisition is the innate aim of all states in all their interactions. Power to them is both a 
means and an end in itself Morgenthau believes that among the principles o f political
realism, is the idea that states' action is the pursuance of their " interests defined in terms 
of power.”  ^ Thus there exists a correlation between the concept of power and interest, 
and both are often used interchangeably in the Realist literature as the rationale for actions 
o f states.
Though the term "power" is a vague concept susceptible to interpretation, as well 
as being a subject of massive confusion in the literature o f international politics, there have 
been many attempts to seek a single definition. ® Morgenthau, for example, uses the term 
in politics to postulate the notion of control over the minds and actions o f others.’ 
Different scholars use this concept in terms of attributes or influences.®
Less controversial are the characteristics of power in international relations theory. 
Morgenthau distinguishes a set of attributes to power, ranging from environmental factors 
(i.e., geography or natural resources) to demography, population, leadership, national 
character, quality of government, diplomacy, and the military capability o f a state.® Thus 
to Realism, power is a multidimensional phenomenon with all qualitative and quantitative 
attributes included.'® Nevertheless, in so far as this paper is concerned, we shall limit the 
use of power to the military aspect with respect to interstate relations. Components of 
military power will include only such factors as armament, strategic, and territorial 
attributes. Power measured as military capacity is an essential cornerstone in the bid for 
power in the international system, thus adding the dimension of relativity o f power, since 
this type o f power is determined by the number o f states in the international arena and 
their individual military capabilities and how each views the power o f the others.
The International System:
Because the Realist paradigm focuses on the state as the major unit o f analysis, the 
international system is also important for it is considered to be a product o f the web of 
relations among the states. In other words it is the environment in which states interact. 
The international system in this paradigm is a recognized, but abstract concept, that 
underlines the framework involving the different states and the different attributes that 
affect the state's actions. An international system as used here refers to a collection of 
independent political entities, nations or empires, that interact with considerable frequency 
and according to regularized patterns," within a limited setting. Others define the 
international system as "a collection of recognizable units or components that hang 
together and vary together in a manner regular enough to be described.”'  ^ In general, an 
international system is a framework for an event/interaction or a technique for identifying, 
measuring, and examining interactions among states.'^ Every system here had a certain 
geographical boundary where these units interact, and this boundary is what distinguishes 
it from other systems, (see pp. 12)
The international system receives its raison d'etre from the state, however, the 
state is also affected by it. Thus if states form the system, they are also restricted in their 
actions by the nature of that system in which it interacts. If  all the actors in the system are 
bound towards power acquisition, and there are no regulatory organs where power could 
be centralized, the system is described as anarchic. Anarchy here refers to the fact that 
there is no essential harmony of interest among the nations, for each has conflicting 
national objectives,''* in other terms, it is a state where order is nonexistent.'^ If the 
international system is anarchic, then power is dispersed among the units without order. 
This was the nature of the European system during the period of our study, given that the
Treaty of Westphalia (1648) recognized the autonomy of the main principalities and laid 
the seeds for the independence and rise o f the state system. Therefore each o f those states 
and principalities appeared on the international arena with its own foreign policy aimed at 
acquiring power. (See Chapter II)
1.3 The Management of Power in an International System:
The premise o f anarchy in international relations leads us to a serious problem in 
international affairs, basically, that of power management. Inis Claude Jr. in his book. 
Power and Tntftmational Relations, provides some insights regarding this problem.'® His 
assumption is that this is not a problem as much as it is an eternal and ongoing phenomena 
in international affairs, and should be dealt with on that basis since the power factor will 
remain a part of the international system.” From this premise, it becomes an elementary 
task to observe how states in such an anarchic system secure their survival and guarantee 
independence It therefore becomes a problem of how to avoid the preponderance o f a 
state/s that could control and possibly destroy all the other states.'®
The structure o f the international system that recognize sovereignty only to states, 
plays the decisive role in respect to this problem, thereby making power distribution its 
main issue. This was a relatively inert problem in the European system until the Treaty of 
Westphalia, due to the fact that secular power was centralized to a great extent in the 
institutions o f the Habsburg domains in central Europe and east Europe.
The international system today (as it has been since 1648) does not comprise an 
institution whereby power is centralized. This marks the major difference between the 
international system and the state system. In the state system, the concept o f law and 
punishment plays the decisive role in deterring the use of power by one citizen against the
other. The system itself regulates power distribution. Supreme powers generally rests in 
the institutions of the state, the guarantor of life, liberty and property to avoid the 
Hobbesian notion of the state o f nature. By nature, the international system does not 
comprise an institution which defends the existence o f small weaker states. Therefore, 
power regulation and management becomes the crucial problem.
Since states have unequal distribution of power among themselves, it becomes 
their task to create an arrangement in which they maintain peace and security. Inis Claude 
mentions three such arrangements: balance of power, collective security and world 
government. Other scholars added additional arrangements e.g., bandwagoning. Each of 
these are means for power management in the international system. The means by which 
power is managed in each of these arrangements is different since each has a different 
functional mechanism.
The basic tenets of collective security is the premise that states in the international 
system, voluntarily enter into accords whereby they cooperate to maintain international 
peace and security through collective actions to deter aggression and punish it if it occurs. 
In theory, the present international system functions under this umbrella. The major thesis 
here is that "{states} would come to the aid of those states that have become the target o f 
aggression.” ”  In addition to this, the system rests on the state's condemnation o f force as 
a tool in the conduct o f relations with others, as well as the principles o f conformity and 
universality, whereby, states share the same principles and vision with regard to many 
issues, including defining aggression and collective actions.“  Furthermore, the function o f 
the system becomes inconceivable without the presence of an international organ to 
coordinate the means o f defining, repelling and punishing aggression. The League o f 
Nations and the United Nations are the examples of such organs of collective security.
Bandwagoning is another means for power management in international relations. 
It is in essence a means for state(s) facing the threat emanating from the differential power 
structures and uneven distribution of power. If  collective security is the embodiment of 
joint power allocation among the states to thwart any aggressions, bandwagoning offers a 
different alternative, especially in systems that lack any kind of effective collective security. 
It offers a weaker state an alternative to avoid aggression through a process by which it 
could align itself with the state representing the source of threat either to avoid losing 
materially (independence or territory), or to benefit from joining this state (rewards). In 
other words, it embodies the common proverb I f  you can not beat them, join them. 
Stephen Walt asserts that, "states are attached to strength. The more powerful the state 
(the hegemonic power) and the more clearly this power is demonstrated, the more likely 
others are to ally with it. By contrast, a decline in a state's fortunes will lead its allies to opt 
for neutrality at best or defect to the other side at worst..” ' ' Usually a state opts for 
bandwagoning when faced by a stronger state, and when the power o f the latter is 
overwhelming, and the former state can not find allies to assist it. Waltz believes that at the 
stage when the hegemonic power has established its position within the system, opposition 
proves too costly for a weaker state, hence opting for bandwagoning. It could be also 
claimed that this may result from shortsightedness on part of the weaker state's leadership. 
The European system witnessed several bandwagoning attempts by weaker states and 
perhaps the best example was Prussia's decision not to join Austria and Russia against 
France, the result o f which was the defeat of the Austrians and Russians at Austerlitz and 
the French defeat o f the Prussians later. (See Chapter II)
The concept of world government, in very crude terms, transforms the 
international system into a system very similar to that of a single state where power is
vested in an international organ. All the other means for power management mentioned 
here and in the next section have appeared in histoiy in one form or another. Only world 
government remains the unborn child of Idealists.
1.4 Balance of Power as an Option for Power Management: Theory and Practice
Central to the problem of power management in the international system is the 
concept of balance of power. Simply stated, it is the mechanism whereby the independent 
units in the system preserve their security and independence through a series o f alliances 
with other affected actors, aiming towards containing any expansionist hegemonic power 
that threatens to dominate the system and centralize power.'" This is a traditional concept 
adhered to by many scholars in the field of international relation. This theory has its place 
in the core o f the Realist paradigm. Scholars such as Hume, Morgenthau, Kissinger, Walt, 
Claude, Waltz, Luard, Gullick and many others have often referred to this arrangement as 
the means by which the exercise of power was controlled and managed in the international 
system. It is often believed that all the states in the international arena have applied this 
concept in their foreign policy. What makes this an important element in the Realist 
analysis is that it has been followed in European affairs throughout the last three centuries 
as we shall see.
Although the concept has been subject to heavy scrutiny during the last few 
decades, its origins are found in the Hellenic age. Thucydides, at The Peloponessian War, 
used this term in his explanation of the period when the power of Athens increased and 
threatened Sparta. He used it in the sense of power distribution. This term also appeared 
during the Roman era in similar contexts. Balance of power was used to describe the
power distribution among the Italian republics during the fifteenth century, during the rule 
o f Lorenzo De Medici. The concept, though not the term, became current by the 
beginning o f the 17th Century when Henry VII expressed his famous statement regarding 
his position vis-à-vis king Charles V and Francis I , as "cui adhaero praeest", the one that I  
join will prevail, which meant a classical position of balance of power between the two 
kings (states), where Henry VII acted as balancer.
The term was probably used officially for the first time in the Treaty o f Utrecht in 
1713 where it stated, " ... in order that peace and tranquillity of the Christian World may 
be ordered and stabilized in a just Balance of Power, (which is the best and most solid 
foundation o f mutual friendship and a lasting general concord).” During the eighteenth 
century, the concept developed a new usage through the works of such philosophers as 
David Hume. He argued that although the terminology had only recently developed, it 
existed de facto  in the past, and the debate evolved around .’’..whether the idea o f balance 
o f power be owing entirely to modem policy, or whether the phrase has only been 
invented in these latter ages?", and throughout his work, he concludes that it was an old 
practice. By the beginning of the 19th century it became a recognized to the extent that it 
was used very frequently in the international treaties, especially during the peaceful 
settlement that followed the Napoleonic wars in Europe. By the beginning of the 20th 
century, the concept became an integral part of the Realist paradigm, whereby emphasis 
was laid on it to explain how states in the international system maintained the 
independence o f the units and preserved stability.
Although this concept endured heavy criticism by many scholars during the early 
decades o f this century, especially the Idealists (who proposed the idea of collective 
security against the application of balance of power as means for power management).
The concept reappeared in the sixties as a product of the cold war and in the company of 
similar concepts such as "balance o f terror" and "nuclear parity.” ’^ Even today, in the 
field o f international relations theory, there exits the controversial argument as to the 
existence, utility and the purposes of this concept.
The concept and practice o f Balance of Power is well recognized among the 
different authors in the field of international relations as well as history, yet there remains 
a great deal o f ambiguity in defining this concept, and much more, in operating it. The 
problem with it is not that it has no meaning, but rather that it has too many Many 
scholars confront this ambiguity by claiming that it either "has so many meaning that it is 
virtually m e an in g le ss"o r that it is "ambiguity enshrined.” “^ The major reason for the 
confusion that surrounds this concept, is not in the fact that it is not defined, but in the fact 
that many scholars use it in different contexts. Even firm advocates o f this concept have 
different uses for it. Morgenthau, for example, believes that the term could be used in four 
different meanings, as a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs, as an actual state o f 
affairs, as an approximately equal distribution of power or as any distribution o f power. 
Inis Claude argues, that the term is used as a situation of power distribution, or as a 
foreign policy or as a system of interstate relations. Martin ^^ight, for example, 
categorizes the proponents of the concept of balance of power, dividing them into 
Griotians, Michiavellians and Kantians.^^ Such categorization also runs along similar lines 
to those o f Morgenthau and Claude. Earnest Haas lists several definitions for the term 
balance of power, in a rather criticizing fashion ranging from descriptive and prescriptive 
intents to ideological and analytical ones. 34
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1.5 Defining Balance of Power : A System of Interstate Relations:
Regardless o f the different usage of balance of power in international relations, 
there seems to be a common idea that unites the different authors using this concept. 
Though the term could be used in many meanings ranging from foreign policy to power 
configuration, or ideology, nevertheless, there seems to be a general understanding among 
these authors that the term can mean power configurations and arrangements among states 
in an international system. This common use for the term is very similar to the definition o f 
Claude with regard to balance of power as a system of interstate relations. Kaplan also 
uses it to describe the functioning of the multipolar systems in world politics.^* This seems 
to be the original use of the term, and in the Realist tradition, it becomes the law that 
governs power in the international arena and its elements could be understood in common 
sense, and not necessarily with sophisticated anal5i i^cal tools.
In as far as the scope of this work is concerned, the concept of balance of power is 
used to refer to .”..a situation or condition, implying an objective arrangement in which 
there is relatively widespread satisfaction with the distribution of power. The universal 
tendency or law describes a probability... that members of a system threatened by the 
emergence o f a 'disturber of the balance - a power seemingly bent upon establishing an 
international hegemony - will form a countervailing coalition ...(against the disturber o f  
equilibrium). ”
Long as the definition may seem, it appears to be among the most universal o f all 
available definitions that provide a clear cut understanding and link all the different uses o f 
this term. It offers a core understanding to the concept, where many o f the uses o f the 
term can fall into place logically with a unified line of thought. And as we shall see it is
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consistent with the general definitions of the term by the different scholars. Moreover, this 
definitions seems to offer a good explanation of the means by which the European system 
was functioning during the period under study here.
The definition adopted here includes a variety of assumptions and concepts that, if 
carefully analyzed and understood, offer a useful analytical fi'amework for understanding 
the mechanics of the European system and how the Egyptian Question in 1831-1841 
affected the policies of the different states. As these assumptions and concepts are 
elaborated the essence of the European structure would become more clear and subject to 
possible study.
First among the most important assumptions of this definition is the notion of the 
existence o f a system, (in this study it is the European system). Though an abstract 
territorial delimitation, the concept of the system here advocates the existence of a variety 
of states, units, interacting according to regular observable and identifiable patterns. In 
this case the most important pattern with which we are concerned is balance of power 
and its mechanics (see p.p. 4) Moreover, these units have a distinct boundary separating 
them from the rest of the states in world politics. Therefore, the concept o f system here 
includes a structural element, the existence of a group of states, actors with a fixed  
boundary i e a specific geographical territory. In the case of the European system, this 
territory extends roughly from Scandinavia in the north to the Mediterranean in the south, 
and from the Atlantic in the West to Russia in the East.
Though such a concept is abstract in nature, there remains a strong emphasis on 
the idea that a cohesive element exists among all these states in a given system, separating 
it from other systems.^® This idea is that the actors in a certain system are bound by 
commonly shared values among them, thereby giving the system its own cultural
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distinction from the rest of the world. This distinction is easily identified by the idea 
advocated by many European philosophers who believe in the existence of a European 
Commonwealth that is based on similar historical, cultural and value basis distinct from the 
rest o f the world. This is what we may call fencing the system through a cultural boundary. 
Henry Kissinger, for example, believes that there exists a shared value system in the 
European affairs that helped develop a concept of legitimacy for the European nations, 
thereby assisting in the restoration of peace and maintaining it in Europe.^®
Such ideas were postulated by Raymond Aron more systematically when he 
asserted that relations between actors inside a given system does not depend entirely on 
military and geographical factors, but that such relations are also determined by ideas, 
emotions and values shared by members o f the system.““ If such conditions exist, then that 
system may be described as homogenous, in the sense that the actors are of a similar type 
and obey the same rules and conceptions.“' The European system that developed after the 
Westphalia accords could be considered a homogenous system whereby all the states 
accepted the notion of sovereignty, secularization of relations among the states and a 
common shared value system (See Chapter II, The Westphalia System). A heterogeneous 
system on the other hand, is the opposite of the aforementioned system, whereby states do 
not share the same codes of action and "are organized according to different principles and 
appeal to contradictory values.”“^
The distinction between the homogenous and the heterogeneous system is very 
useful for the study at hand because it allows us to reflect on an immeasurable factor of 
inter-state relations, thereby guiding us to a better understanding o f the system itself 
Moreover, it helps us understand the functioning of the system. In our study, this 
distinction helps us fathom the position and interaction of the Ottoman Empire in the
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European system, its presence creating the heterogeneity of the system, in as far as it was 
concerned. The main reason for this was that the actors in the system did not follow the 
same rules, conduct or intentions towards it, basically because it was "not an integral part 
o f the transnational cultural ensemble" of Europe at that time."^ Nevertheless, it 
represented an integral element in the power distribution in Europe, as well as in the 
general equilibrium in Southeastern Europe, and it is upon this element that the focus o f 
this work is concerned. (See Chapter II- 2.3 The Ottoman European Identity, and 2.4 
The Ottoman Empire in the European Balance o f Power System).
Second the definition assumes the existence of an objective arrangement, i.e., a 
mechanism within the framework of the system, among the units. This is what we consider 
to be the mechanics of balance of power which will be explained later in this chapter. This 
arrangement is compatible with all members of the system. They formulate their policies in 
accordance to it, with the aim of serving to regulate the interstate relations. The question 
here is whether this arrangement is declared or not? Though the definition does not 
provide a clear cut answer, but from the European system under study here, balance o f 
power was a logical and rational practice in the European system since the Treaty o f 
Westphalia. Later it became a declared principle in the European political dictionaiy 
especially after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and the Treaty of Paris in 1814. Whether it 
was a declared arrangement, or not, the fact remains that there was a common 
understanding regarding its practice in Europe since 1648, to the extent that many authors 
believe it to be a natural outcome of a decentralized system of states. This is consistent 
with the works of many of the Realist scholars that deal with balance o f power. David 
Hume believes it to be " founded on common sense and obvious reasoning ", Kenneth 
Waltz believes it to be viewed by some as "akin to a l a w " O t h e r s  view it also as aspiring
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to the condition o f law/® Therefore, it is not necessarily a declared arrangement among 
the different states, for the threat of one state's excessive accumulation of power is so 
obvious to all the actors in the system to the extent that they should be bound together to 
contain this state. That is why the definition claims it to be a universal tendency or law, 
since it is obvious.
Third, in the definition is the concept of distribution o f power among the states in 
the system. This assumption on face value could be misleading as it assumes power may be 
distributed among the units in the system, and since there are sufiRcient problems with 
regard to its measurement, it becomes difficult to comprehend or to operate. The 
assumption here is that there is a relative equity in power distribution among the different 
states inside the system, in the sense that no one single state could accumulate sufficient 
power to allow it to overrun the entire system and its actors thereby forcing its hegemony
over them.
However it should not be understood from this that a state in the system will not 
strive to accumulate power, for this is a natural course of event for any state. Kissinger, for 
example, believes that by nature, it is impossible to satisfy every actor in the international 
arena when it is functioning under balance of power systems.'’ But what actually regulates 
a dissatisfied state from extra power acquisition to the detriment of others, is that there is a 
minimum satisfaction within the state for the amount o f power at its disposal through the 
peaceful means available to it. However, if the system functions properly, it will keep 
dissatisfied states below the level at which it would seek to overthrow the entire system. 
That is to assume, that a state would not risk striving for excessive power accumulation on 
the detriment of encroaching on other members in the system, if the cost would surpass 
the benefit or reward o f this extra acquisition. In this case, through the objective
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arrangement in the system-the mechanics of balance of power- the state would face a 
coalition against it, thereby rendering the excessive power acquisition too costly in the 
final account. But as mentioned, this does not necessarily dissuade a state from trying, and 
there are several instances, when some states in the European system actually tried this and 
faced with opposition from the other members. Perhaps the example o f Tsarist Russia with 
its policy aiming at conquering Poland and fair portion o f the Ottoman territory since 
Catherine the Great illustrate this point. These aims faced opposition from other members 
o f the system who secured the survival of the Ottoman Empire to the extent that by the 
reign o f Nicholas I, Russia abandoned the policy of dismembering the Ottoman Empire 
since the costs would have been too high in comparison with the gains, and therefore 
settled for a policy of active influence in the Ottoman Empire.“® (See Chapter IV) 
Moreover, political influence on behalf of one actor with another, is also a means o f 
power acquisition, for in many cases political influence in the court o f one state could 
substitute for territorial acquisition and strategic advantages. Perhaps the best example was 
the Treaty o f Hunkar Iskelesi in 1833 whereby Russian preponderance was established 
through political means, rather than military and strategic ones.
Therefore, what is meant by the distribution of power in this case, is the military 
capabilities of the states involved in the international arena. This distribution by nature is 
unequal in the sense that different states have different military capabilities, and creates 
the problem o f power management.
Fourth, the concept of equilibrium is also an important assumption in the balance 
of power system in international relations. It is vague and misleading and there is no real 
consensus on the use of this term. Morgenthau for example, uses it in the sense that 
.’’..without... (it) one element ( a state or its allies), will gain ascendancy over the others.
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encroach upon their interests and rights and ultimately destroy them..” From the work 
o f Martin Wight, we can infer that equilibrium to him could be summarized in the idea 
that power distribution between the different states is in such a way that no single state 
should ever become strong enough to dominate the rest; i.e., to say it represents an 
extension to the idea of distribution of power. In his book, A World Restored: Mettemich. 
Castlereaph and the Problems of Peace 1812-22, Henry Kissinger shares the same view, 
yet carries the concept of equilibrium to a much higher level, by not actually separating 
between this concept and that of balance of power itself, since he uses them 
interchangeably without distinctions. Edward Gullick, for example, uses the term of 
equilibrium with regard to both coalition and territory. With regard to territory, he offers 
the idea o f a geographical balance or territorial distribution that would both maintain the 
level o f dissatisfaction of states at a low level and preserve the system’s stability.^'
From the works of the above authors we can see that equilibrium is closely linked 
to the concept o f power distribution, whereby no state is permitted to pose a threat to the 
existing structure o f the system. Thus the concept of equilibrium here is described as the 
attempt to arrange and exercise relative control over the factors that affect the power 
accumulation o f one state vis-à-vis the other members in the system. This is the vanguard 
for the stability o f the security structure of the entire system. It is the outcome o f precise 
calculations on the military, geographic, territorial, political, structural and demographic 
factors by the different actors to avoid the preponderance and outburst o f a hegemony 
inside the system. We can confidently assume that equilibrium here is the ultimate aim o f a 
balance o f power system, where a states' excessive power accumulation is controlled by a 
variety o f means through a check and balance system.
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The Vienna settlement is perhaps the best illustration and application o f the general 
concept o f equilibrium. It offered Europe an overall equilibrium by adopting a system of 
checks on France through the creation of a variety of independent buffer states to prevent 
future French adventures, while at the same time it secured a relatively strong central 
Europe to prevent possible future Russian threats. Simultaneously, it did not allow French 
power to remain at a level by which it could act as a check to Austrian and Prussian 
possible attempts of hegemony over certain geographic locations. (See Chapter II)
It should be noted here that the notion of equilibrium is a relative issue varying 
from one politician to another, according to time, space, the structure o f the system and its 
component units. Therefore, we assume that the concept is the child o f the calculation o f 
given politicians, at given interval of time and place.
Fifth if equilibrium is an integral part of general notion of balance o f power, then 
does this mean that the ultimate aim of balance of power is to set exact military 
congruency among the different states? Certainly not, for precise equilibrium would result 
in equal power distribution, and this is unattainable. The notion of equilibrium here refers 
to the idea that the power of state "A", or its allies, should not be too great in comparison 
to state "B" in order to avoid possible temptations by the former to expand territorially and 
encroach upon the latter. This in itself is the concept of "balance.” As Morgenthau 
explains, military equilibrium or "the scales of the balance of power will never be exactly 
poised nor is the precise point of equality discernible nor necessary to be discerned. It is 
sufficient... that the deviation not be so great" Accordingly, the actors in the 
international arena must keep a vigilant eye on the other states and monitor their power 
accumulation and see that the gap is not too wide between their own military capabilities 
and that of the collective members in the system.
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A final remark with regard to equilibrium should be noted here. It is the idea that 
inside a homogenous system, equilibrium is preserved with less difficulty than the other 
systems. Perhaps this is a result o f the fact that Raymond Aron believes that such systems 
are more stable than others.^'' However, we can contend here that this is primarily because 
the actors in the system obey the same code of conduct vis-à-vis the others, thereby 
limiting, though by far not, eliminating the possibility of war. If this is the case, a fortiori, 
the heterogeneous system is much more vulnerable to defects in equilibrium. Perhaps this 
could shed some light on the reasons as why equilibrium was barley maintained with 
regard to the Ottoman Empire, in the European affairs which will be discussed in the next
chapter.
Sixth if the meaning of equilibrium or balance is established, then what does the 
concept OÏ disturber o f balance refer to in the definition? Based on previous analysis and 
explanations the disturber of the balance could be considered as the dissatisfied state that 
seeks to increase its power to the detriment of other members in the international system. 
However there are other means that could cause a disturbance in the balance or 
equilibrium. Such actions could range from the conquest of a neighboring state to creating 
variations in the factors (such as an arms race) that would affect the general equilibrium. 
The last point could be clarified through the example of the Russian aims to overrun the 
Ottoman Empire and conquer Istanbul during the beginning of the last century. The 
success o f such a policy was bound to upset the structure of equilibrium o f the European 
system. Such a conquest would not only give Russia control over strategic locations, it 
also would have created a power vacuum regarding the European territories o f the 
Ottoman Empire. This would have also created a very strong competition among the 
major European actors to control these territories, and the possibility o f war would be
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almost certain and eminent. Hence the importance of maintaining the Ottoman Empire 
became a pillar of equilibrium in Europe. (See Chapter II and V)
Finally, in the definition, the authors believe that in case of the rise o f a disturber of 
power, there is the probability that enables one to predict....that affected states would 
form countervailing alliances. This poses a question o f what the authors really mean, i.e., 
whether balance of power is a law or probability. Upon initial comprehension o f the terms 
used by the authors, there seems to be an inherent contradiction, for if it is a law, then by 
stronger reason, probability is out of question. My analysis of this is that on the rational 
level, if a hegemony appears with aims to control the system and threaten the 
independence of the state/s involved, the natural reaction would be the formation of a 
coalition to face the hegemony collectively. However, this is not necessarily the case 
always Therefore, the authors refer to the rational act, -balancing- to face a hegemonic 
power as a law It is simply a rational long sighted necessity, yet rationality is not a 
necessary trait for all statesmen. That is why the authors used the term, tendency to avoid 
the absoluteness of the implication o f the term law, so as to account for the cases when 
states do not balance.
Thus far the definition of balance of power was used as a system of international 
relations, whereby power distribution does not permit any state to overrun the system. As 
long as this is possible, then the system remains in a state of equilibrium. However, as 
soon as a state(s) eludes this equilibrium, other states will check this growth immediately 
so as to restore the equilibrium. This definition gives a general theoretical idea of the 
nature o f the European system of interstate relations during the first part of the previous 
century, and the next section will discuss the means of establishing a balance o f power, 
that is to say the mechanics of balance of power.
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1.5 The Mechanics of Balance of Power:
Equilibrium is the calculated essence o f the balance in the system, which is 
followed by the question of how this balance is achieved and how it functions and why. 
The consensus found in works dealing with the concept of balance of power is that this is 
achieved through the balancing process. The mechanics of the balancing process includes 
such major factors as alliances or coalition formation, intervention and proportional 
aggrandizement or reciprocal compensation, as well as minor ones such as rational 
estimation o f other's powers. It should be noted here that there could be a variety o f other 
means suggested to maintain a balance of power. This work will focus on the major 
factors that affected the balance structure in the European system and offer a rational 
interpretation why the expansionist policy of Mohammed Ali threatened the equilibrium in 
Europe.
I. Alliances
Alliance may be viewed as a "formal or informal relationship of security 
cooperation between two or more states." ’’ It embodies some commitments between the 
parties involved to share the costs and benefits of their collective actions. Walt believes 
that the strongest types of alliances are those based upon a perception o f common threats 
by the parties of the alliance. The Fourth Coalition, established by the Treaty o f Chaumont 
in 1813 against France, is a good example of such alliances.^® At that time France was 
viewed as the common threat to Europe, and a decision to unite against it was a security 
arrangement between the different states involved. (See Chapter II)
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There are several other definitions of an alliance that are based on different 
assumptions and differ in nature and scope. However, for reasons relating to the essence 
o f this work, this analysis will be limited to the military and diplomatic aspects only.
As mentioned earlier, there exist a variety of definitions and usage o f the term 
alliance or coalition, but different authors accept that it is the primary means for the 
mechanics o f balance of power to the extent that some believe that "whenever a state 
forms an alliance with another against a third, a balancing of a kind takes place" Morton 
Kaplan believes that the first maxim of a balance of power system would be to "oppose 
any coalition or single actor that seems to assure a position of predominance within the 
system.” *^ Others believe a "prevailing power {threatening to become a hegemony} was 
sure to meet with a confederacy against it.” ’^ In simple terms, the states involved in the 
international system monitor the actions of the different actors, and if any o f those actors 
were to have a predominance that could pose a future threat, they would collate against it 
immediately to avoid it from overrunning the system.
Closely related to these points is that alliances can take other forms so as to 
maintain the equilibrium inside a system, not necessarily against the disturber o f the 
balance. On some occasions, states might enter an alliance with a certain state to restrain it 
from disturbing the equilibrium of the system. This was clearly manifest during two major 
cases during the period under study, the first was the Mettemich's policy vis-à-vis Russia 
where he intentionally tried to restrict Russian ambitions towards the Greek War of 
Independence, while the other case was the allied attempt to restrain Russia by accepting 
her in the alliance during the Second Egyptian-Ottoman War (See Chapter IV).
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n  Intervention
Forming an alliance or coalition does not necessarily mean that it is sufficient to 
deter the disturber o f equilibrium, even if such an action could include certain aspects o f 
conventional deterrence. Thus intervention becomes an important element in the 
functioning of the balance of power. By intervention, it is meant that the coalition or 
alliance would take active measures to remedy the disequilibrium present in the system. 
This could range from diplomatic to coercive measures, depending on the situation and 
the degree o f disequilibrium caused in the system. Diplomatic measures could simply be 
in the form of objections, threat of alienation through severing relations or even 
ultimatums However, if the disequilibrium is too acute and becomes irreversible, then 
members of the coalition or alliance may have to resort to force so as to reestablish the 
balance It is practically impossible to set certain generalizations as to when members of 
alliances or coalitions would resort to diplomatic or coercive means to reestablish 
equilibrium. This is more a factor of the system and the priorities perceived by the actors, 
as well as the willingness of the disturber of balance to show flexibility in negotiations.
There are a variety of examples whereby alliances in a balance o f power system 
resort to diplomatic and coercive measures. The case of the Greek War o f Independence 
provides a good illustration. By 1827, the combined Ottoman-Egyptian fleet was caught in 
the Bay of Navarino, trapped and surrounded by the allied fleet. At this stage, the crisis 
could have been resolved peacefully, and there was no need to resort to coercive measures 
on part of the allies. However, the fear of the excessive Ottoman-Egyptian naval power 
was not what the allies wanted in the future, especially Russia and Britain and may explain 
the reasons for the Battle of Navarino (See Chapter IV).
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n i .  Reciprocal Compensations
Proportional aggrandizement or Reciprocal compensation is a common term in 
the mechanics of the balance of power systems. Edward Gullick explains that this concept 
was used by different authors under different names. He contends that similarly, scholars 
used the concept under the title of proportional mutual aggrandizement, or reciprocal 
reduction.^ This term refers to the idea that if any state expands by one means or another, 
the rest o f the units in the system also have the right to expand proportionally. Thus if the 
states in a system accept the transfer o f a certain territory to another state, they are entitled 
to equal compensation to maintain equilibrium in the system. Certainly this is done under 
the prerequisite that the entire structure of the system would not be undermined.®' Along 
similar lines, it could also be a state of reciprocal non-compensation, i.e., that states do 
not benefit at all from their actions. In this case, the basic spirit o f the equation is 
maintained, for in some occasion, states would prefer to apply this formula to avoid 
affecting the equilibrium in the system. This was the formula functioning among the 
powers vis-à-vis the Greek War of Independence and the Second Egyptian-Ottoman war.
Whether such a practice is ethical or moral is irrelevant, for this is a practice that 
was adhered to by nearly all the great powers in the European system since 1648. The 
articles o f the Treaty of Utrecht marking the end of the War of the Spanish Succession is a 
clear example of proportional compensation. Louis XIV of France, remained adamant that 
a Bourbon monarch occupy the Spanish throne, despite the coalition against him from 
members in the system. This insistence produced an eleven-year futile war that forced the 
members of the coalition to seek new means for ending hostilities. Thus the basis for peace 
was to compensate each of the powers involved so as to maintain equilibrium in Europe.
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The French Bourbons did not gain the Spanish throne free; England received territorial 
compensation in Southern Iberia, primarily Gibraltar, giving its fleet the necessary strategic 
location to control possible future joint French - Spanish schemes against the equilibrium 
in Europe. Austria was also compensated territorially in Northern Italy and in Netherlands, 
and Prussia received similar gains. The Vienna settlement in 1815 was also an example o f 
this mechanics, whereby Russia and Prussia's aggrandizement plans were matched with 
equal compensations to Britain and Austria. (See Chapter II)
This concept is a cornerstone of the mechanics of balance o f power, especially 
with regards to the scope of this study. It was this precise concept within the structure of 
the European balance of power system that sustained the Ottoman Empire. Regarding the 
dismemberment of certain parts o f the Empire, the remaining powers ensured that no state 
would have an influence or military presence in this region. This was the case with Greece. 
However, when the overall dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was suggested by 
Russian actions the members of the system refused the proposition because o f the 
problems related to the operational aspect of this concept. That is to say, who gets which 
territory when and why, in addition to the problem of how to achieve proportionality 
among the different benefactors of the Ottoman heritage. That is why the term hereafter 
will be used to mean territorial proportionality or territorial equilibrium. (For further 
details. See Chapter II and Chapter V.
1.7 Conclusion
The previous pages examined the definitions of the term balance o f power 
within the context of the Realist paradigm, which is believed to be the most suitable 
context for the study of the European system in the nineteenth century. The general idea
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of balance of power as a system of international relations could be summarized along the 
following lines. In an international system consisting of different states, power by nature is 
distributed unevenly, and each state is attempting to maximize its power vis-à-vis the 
others, thereby creating patterns of opposition. Second, any state that succeeds in 
accumulating high levels of power and threatens to dominate the entire system will be 
faced with the collective power of an alliance of other states to check its power and 
thwart its aims. Third, equilibrium is the foundation upon which the actors in the system 
form their power calculations and foreign policy. Even if there is no coercive measures in 
the international arena, states will seek to check the power accumulation of a hegemonic 
state by diplomatic means, through coalitions and allies. Fourth, balance of power is not a 
natural born dynamic, but a voluntary choice of statesmen to safeguard their state's 
independence and security.
Finally the question of how the balance of power system comes into being, that is 
whether it is a natural practice or a shared principle among the different statesmen in an 
international system remains a controversial issue in the literature o f international relations. 
This is known as the Voluntarism vs. Determinism problem.“  Authors like Kenneth Waltz 
believe it to be the product of nature. He claims that balance of power "is not so much 
imposed by the statesman on events as it is imposed by events on statesman.” “  
Accordingly it is believed that the choices are limited by the circumstances surrounding 
him. Kissinger represents the other end of the spectrum by laying the emphasis on the 
shrewdness o f the statesman. Both his works, A World Restored and Diplomacy advocate 
that statesmen are the adopters of the mechanics of balance o f power, or as he prefers to 
call it sometimes, equilibrium. Hume, Gullick and Morgenthau are also supporters of this 
proposition.
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One may contend that balance of power is a result of the efforts by the different 
statesmen. The primary reason for adopting this position is that although balance of power 
or equililibrist policies are, in certain circumstances the most rational policy available for 
states, rationality is not a necessary trait in every statesman. Though a rational choice is 
more likely to impose itself on the statesman, a statesman might perceive maximum 
benefits to from following a policy of bandwagoning instead of balancing or remaining 
neutral Therefore, if there is an alternative to balance of power, it would be too 
dangerous a generalization to claim that events force statesmen to adopt balance o f power 
strategies, for there are other alternative that could be adopted.
In his study, Stephen Walt concluded that states prefer balancing to 
bandwagoning.®'’ He did not lay a deterministic generalization, believing that states have a 
choice Moreover, there are several instances when states prefer no policy rather than to 
accept a balance Perhaps the clearest example is that of Prussia preferring to mediate with 
Napoleon than coming to the aid of Austria and Russia, the result o f which was the defeat 
o f the latter by the former at Austerlitz. As Kissinger noted, "in vain did Metternich preach 
his lesson o f equilibrium (to Prussia).” The examples o f the Treaty o f Tiltsit between 
Russia and France in 1807 and the Nazi-Russo pact of 1942, are clear example o f Russian 
bandwagoning in face of a hegemonic power. Therefore, we can that balancing in the face 
o f a hegemonic power is the most likely policy to be adopted by states under threat.
Many believe balance of power to be an obsolete concept, and that it has failed in 
its aim to preserve peace and security in the international system whenever it was applied, 
therefore, unworthy of consideration as a system of international relations. The Wilsonians 
(as they have come to be known) champion this cause, as well as modern scholars such as 
Haas, Organski and others. A.F.K Organski refuses the correlation between peace and
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balance of power, believing that it lead to war in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, 
and that the historic periods dominated by balance of power are periods o f wars; in other 
words, balance o f power fosters what its advocates claim it avoids. “
This criticism is not new. However, there are several points that must be 
mentioned. First such criticism fails to understand a basic fact that balance of power does 
not aim to eliminate war. It merely aims at stability of the international system and the 
independence of its actors. "It is the purpose of equilibrium to maintain the stability o f the 
system without destroying the multiplicity of elements composing it."®’ Kissinger's reply to 
this criticism is powerful. He contends that "the balance o f power system did not purport 
to avoid crises or even wars. When working properly, it was meant to limit both the ability 
o f states to dominate others and the scope of conflicts."®* In other words the aim of 
balance of power was not utopian peace, but the stability of the system through preserving 
its actors By definition, war is a human phenomena without antidote, at best its 
destructive capabilities would be diluted. Balance of power has achieved this in the 
European concert from 1815-1914, where it helped limit the spread of wars. It was the 
failure of the balance of power that triggered the First World War; and in an anarchic 
international system, nothing is infallible. Moreover, no other means o f power 
management in the international arena was capable of depriving any single hegemonic 
power from overriding the entire system than balance of power.
This chapter established a general and theoretical framework for the analysis of the 
European system. The following chapter will discuss the application of this theoretical 
framework, and how the European system function on this basis. The embodiment of the 
concept of balance of power shall be clearly understood and its mechanics further clarified 
upon the lines mentioned throughout this chapter.
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Chapter II
The European Balance of Power System
2.1 Origins of the European Balance of Power System: The Westphalia System
It had been a common belief, until the fall o f the Soviet Union, that an 
international system or order can be changed only as a result o f a major war. The 
European system was not different. Europe today is a product of interwoven historical, 
political military cultural and economic factors that time transformed into a system of 
interstate relations.* The Vienna System came into effect since 1815. It has been argued 
that the Vienna System is the revival of what has been called the Westphalia System, 
after the Treaty by the same name in 1648.
The Treaty of Westphalia marked the end of the Thirty Years War and with it 
the Habsburg bid for domination of Europe. Its articles were undoubtedly among the 
most important elements in reshaping both the political values and the modern European 
system. Paul Kennedy argues that both - the Treaty of Westphalia, and the Pyrenees in 
1648 and 1659- between France and the Spanish Habsburgs sealed the fate of possible 
Habsburg hegemony over Europe.^ This opened the way for the rebirth of Europe and 
the introduction of a new system of interstate relations.
The political impact of the peace at Westphalia^ on the European pattern o f 
interstate relations, could be summed up as follows: First, the terms of the treaty laid
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down the basis for the establishment of the system's units. Thus Switzerland and the 
United Provinces were granted formal recognition in the form of independence from the 
Holy Roman Empire. The seeds of Prussia were laid in the independence o f 
Brandenburg with designation of the Hohenzollem Dynasty as legitimate sovereigns. 
The German principalities were granted semi-independence vis-à-vis the Habsburg 
Emperor. The "... power of the (Habsburg) Emperor was further weakened as to make 
his position little more than nominal: By receiving ... the unfettered control of their 
foreign policy the member princes of the Empire became sovereigns".“* This marks the 
beginning of the growth of the independent units of the system as a result o f their new­
born sovereignty (See pp. 4).
Second, the homogeneity of the system was reestablished, partially through the 
principles of sovereignty of the units. (See p.p. 13-14) Papal involvement in interstate 
relations diminished gradually, and the Pope was left with the fact that religion in 
Europe was not the force it used to be. Now the states "began to have the same 
conception o f international politics, at least with respect to the rules o f the game".^ They 
developed common moral and political codes, i.e., the balance o f power, the 
preservation of the defeated actors as well as a shared value system. A common 
understanding of legitimacy developed among the different actors in the system. The 
development o f what we may call the secularization o f interstate relations. Westphalia 
marks the division between religious wars and national wars.®-’ Now relations in Europe 
were conducted on the basis of sovereignty and power, not religion. This factor led to 
the problem o f power management in the European system (See pp., 7-10)
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Third, the combination of all previous factors, especially the last, played the 
major role in the formulation of a distinct interstate relationship among these different 
sovereigns, that became an accepted part of their political culture. Thus the balance o f 
power began to operate in the European system as the only means for power 
management. This marked the beginning of the appearance of a regular pattern o f 
interstate relationships in Europe. Why did this occur ? The answer to this question is 
explained cogently by Kissinger when he asserts that :
Europe was thrown into the balance o f power politics {not vohmtarily}when 
its first choice, the medieval dream o f universal empire, collapsed and a host o f  
states o f more or less equal strength arose from the ashes o f that ancient 
aspiration. When a group o f states... are obliged to deal with one another, there 
are only two possible outcomes: either one state dominates all the others and 
creates an empire or no state is ever quite powerful enough to achieve that 
goal. In the latter case the pretensions o f the most aggressive member o f  the 
international community are kept in check by a combination o f others; in other 
words, by the operation o f the balance o f power mechanics.^
This marked the characteristic of the system. (See pp. 14-15)
Fourth the boundaries of this new European system did not differ much from its
predecessor This system extended from Italy in the South, to Scandinavia in the north,
and from St Petersburg in the east to Lisbon in the west. Thus, there were eight major
powers in Europe towards the middle of the eighteenth century. These powers were-
England France Prussia, Russia, the Habsburg Empire in central Europe, later known
as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Sweden, Spain and the Ottoman Empire.^ Thus in
part, the geo-political divisions of the system were established. (See Chapter I, pp. 13)
With regard to the Ottoman empire, it became an active member as a result o f its
position in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. However, though its presence in the
power distribution and equilibrium in Europe was certain, yet "it was not an integral part
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in the transitional cultural ensemble" of Europe/^ Therefore, it is contended that the 
Ottoman Empire’s entrance into the new systems, made it a heterogeneous one, 
whereby the same code of conduct among the states was not applicable to it. That is 
perhaps why Russian ambitions to eliminate it as an actor in the system was not an act of 
political apostasy to the others, though they strove to prevent that for political reasons 
(Seepp. 62-67)
Throughout the mid seventeenth century and nearly the whole of the eighteenth 
century interstate relations functioned on the basis of balance of power. Most of the 
wars that the concert of Europe witnessed was characterized by this mechanism. 
Equilibrium in practice meant that France and Spain could not unite, and the former's 
appetite for land acquisition in Europe was to be checked continuously. The Holy 
Roman Empire could not aggrandize, and Russia was not to be allowed full control o f 
Eastern Europe .Br i t a in  with all its trade interest in the continent and its rising naval 
power surpassing that of Spain, began to play the role of the balancer o f European 
power As a non-continental power, British objectives "reflected the policy o f an island 
power to which the continent, if united under a single rule, represented a mortal threat 
Thus it became the role of British foreign policy to ally itself with the weaker state 
to face the preponderant one, a policy it did not relinquish for nearly three centuries.
The interstate relations in the hundred and forty one years preceding the French 
Revolution functioned along this basis. An illustration of this mechanics o f balance o f 
power (See p.p. 20-29) can be viewed in the context of some of the major conflicts o f 
the period. The expansionist aims of Louis XIV, the Sun King, were carefully thwarted 
by an alliance o f several European states to avoid unbalance in the system. This was
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clearly manifest during the war he launched to acquire the Spanish Netherlands, where 
his aggrandizement scheme was thwarted by an alliance of Britain, Holland and Sweden 
in 1665; and when he conquered Holland, he was confronted with the League of 
Augsburg formed by Spain, Austria, Sweden, Britain and some Germanic principalities 
in 1686. '^* The Wars o f the Spanish Succession were also handled by the mechanics o f 
balance of power. "{This war}... reflected the dilemma of the French hegemony and 
continental equilibrium in Europe". The Treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt, 1713 and 
1714, marked the termination of this war, along a classical equilibrium o f strategic, 
political and military calculations. Accordingly, the French candidate, Philippe Anjou 
was declared monarch, however, France and Spain were not to be united.*® Britain and 
Austria were reciprocally compensated, whereby they received territories to keep them 
satisfied Thus other states formed alliances, intervening and later reciprocally 
compensating themselves, along the mechanics of balance of power
Another feature of the system in Europe was the shifting o f alliances, or 
what Kennedy refers to as "volatility of alliance relationship", as a result o f balance of 
power mechanics. Britain generally aligned itself with the weaker sides, yet this was not 
a rule. The decade-long animosity with France which ended by 1715, marked the 
beginning o f alliance between France and Britain that lasted for over two decades. 
However, when French preponderance rose, decades after the Treaty o f Utrecht, Britain 
aligned itself with the Habsburgs. During the Austro-Prussian War (1740-1741) France 
sided with Prussia to check Austria, causing Britain to side with Austria. When France 
shifted alliances a decade and a half later during the Seven Years War or The Second 
Austro-Prussian war, alliances reshuffled. Now it was Britain and Prussia against Russia,
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Austria and France. Again, balance of power patterns were observable during these two 
crises in Europe. It should be noted that some states opted for neutrality like Denmark, 
Switzerland and Sweden at certain historical intervals.^’
As illustrated by these examples, a distinct homogenous system can be traced in 
Europe since 1648. It was initiated by the Treaty of Westphalia, and to a lesser extent, 
the Treaty of the Pyrenees, whose articles helped reshape the balance of power system 
along the lines mentioned earlier. Relations among the members of the system were 
formulated along the mechanics of balance of power that functioned undisturbed until 
the rise of France as the sole power on the continent in the early years o f the nineteenth
century.
2.2 Imbalance and Restoration of the System 1789-1815:
Political and philosophical developments in France in 1789 transformed the 
system entirely This showed that internal problems and events in one state can have a 
profound effect on the system to which it belongs. The revolution, along with its the 
slogans o f liberty equality and fraternity, and the new political institutions it included, as 
well as other newly injected practices as the levee en masse represented a threat to all 
members o f the European system. Other states viewed these developments as political 
apostasy that was intolerable and must be fought. European monarchs viewed the 
revolution as possible threat to their own existence. Simple revolutions, or coups d'état 
were much more tolerable than ideological ones, for the latter could transform the 
system as a whole.
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The result o f these new concepts and developments affected the structure of the 
system as a whole, transforming it from a homogenous system to a heterogeneous one. 
Common moral, political and value codes changed. Exacerbating matters was that the 
new French system attempted to change political values shared by the members o f the 
system. The degree of transformation in the system could be even felt when Napoleon 
tried to spread his Napoleonic Code, which was totally unacceptable to the other states. 
In other words, the European System found itself in a struggle between Liberalism and 
Conservatism.
The transformation of the system was not only a factor of the cultural and value 
schism but such an event like the French Revolution altered the system's power 
distribution and equilibrium as well. Each of the actors had its distinct reason for the fear 
o f the events taking place in France. For Britain, the reasons for fear were different. 
Some writers and philosophers, such as Edmund Burke, attacked the revolution on 
philosophical and practical grounds. However, the real fears rested in the fact that this 
revolution was a challenge to Britain on the continent, upsetting the equilibrium by 
undermining the political institutions of the system. This in itself, marked a potential 
danger to its trade and strategic interests, especially given the revival of French 
expansionist policies. Austria and Prussia, main continental forces, were anxious for 
similar reasons. Vienna feared particularly for the position o f the French monarchy, 
especially since the French queen was a Habsburg, and that it formed the least 
homogenous political structure in Europe. Hence any spread of nationalistic ideas could 
easily foment problems in its domains.
35
Such fears, enhanced by the anxiety and tension present in the European system, 
led naturally to the establishment of the mechanics of balance of power on a small scale. 
The limited nature o f the system was a factor of the lack of mobilization and expansion 
on the part of France. By August 1791, Prussia and Austria exacerbated tensions by their 
decision to join forces against the revolution in France. This was expressed through the 
Pilinitz Declaration in which they emphasized that the position o f the French king and 
events in France are a matter of concern to all Europe.** In addition, they mobilized an 
army and penetrated French territory. In April 1792, the French Revolutionary National 
Assembly declared war. Events moved towards serious confrontation when France 
invaded Belgium and Mainz, declaring war on Great Britain, Holland and Spain in
February 1793.
So began the formal declaration o f hostilities in Europe and the beginning of the 
rise of a disturber of balance in Europe. Interstate relations in the European system for 
the next two decades were marked by a series of coalitions against French ambitions in 
the continent. (See Chapter I, p.p. 21-2 and 25-6).). The major aim o f these coalitions 
was to restore the European equilibrium threatened by French preponderance and 
conquests of minor states. Though each state had its own ambitions, they were cemented 
together by their common opposition to France.
The origins of the First Coalition can be traced to the Pilinitz Declaration. 
However, it was not until four years after the failure of the first invasion that it took 
serious action against the French. This is understandable given that in addition to the 
strength o f France, Austria, Prussia and Russia were engaged in the third and final 
partition o f Poland in 1793.^® The Treaty of Campo Formio in 1796 ended this alliance
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when Austria concluded a separate peace with France. Reciprocal compensation 
terminated the coalition. Though it would be rather uncharacteristic that a state, existing 
in a system o f balance of power, would abandon a coalition for gains. However, if the 
principle of reciprocal aggrandizement is applied, the move is logical. Campo Formio, is 
the application o f this principle (See p.p. 24). The French and the Austrians maintained 
equilibrium through the accord in which both secured nearly equal gains.
French steps in 1798 to seize Piedmont and Egypt caused further disturbance in 
the power distribution across Europe. Not only was France accumulating power by its 
new conquests, but also threatened India, one of Britain's main sources o f power. 
Moreover, by 1799, the Syrian campaign threatened Ottoman existence and posed a 
serious threat to equilibrium. These developments resulted in the establishment o f the 
Second Coalition.
The British and Russian rapprochement formed the core o f this coalition and 
soon Austria joined. Russian armies, under the command of the able General Suvorov, 
were initially successful. However, the French military machinery proved too powerful 
for Russia. Austria suffered a similar defeat at the Battle of Marengo in 1800, and was 
forced to withdraw from the coalition in accordance with the Treaty o f Luneville. 
Napoleon’s offer o f Malta to Tsar Paul I withdrew Russia from the coalition. Britain 
was left alone to fight a war against a very powerful foe. The French were successful as 
a result o f their careful application of the principle of reciprocal compensation, whereby 
every state in the coalition secured some gains. The Treaty of Amiens in 1802 marked 
the restoration of temporary peace.
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Had France ceased power accumulation and territorial ambitions at that time, the 
situation would not have changed dramatically. Instead, Napoleon shattered the 
equilibrium by 1802 when he annexed Piedmont to France, reoccupied Switzerland. In 
addition, the earlier French unification of the Germanic states into a confederation of 
thirty states created a surrogate for France. Such actions were viewed across Europe 
with suspicion and distrust. Britain viewed the French and Russian rapprochement with 
alarm especially when word came that the Russians planned to send an army to India 
from the North, while the French were preparing an invasion by sea.^^ This was clearly a 
destabilizing factor in the European system for now France was in control o f a great 
portion of the continent with these conquests and it was bound to face a third coalition.
The two years that followed marked a serious attempt to confine France to its 
territories through a series of diplomatic and military maneuvers. Britain viewed an 
alliance with Russia as essential. This would be impossible as long as Tsar Paul I held 
the throne and the British ambassador to Moscow played a major role in the conspiracy 
oust the Tsar for his son Alexander I. Alexander established contacts with William Pitt 
in 1805 due in part to Napoleon's policy towards the Ottoman Empire (a detailed 
section in this chapter will be devoted to the position of the Ottoman Empire in the 
European balance of power system). Earlier, a defense agreement was concluded 
between Russia and Austria and Britain was left with the job of bringing Prussia into the 
coalition. The Battle of Trafalgar cost Napoleon control of the seas and brought these 
countries together.
The stage was set for the establishment of the Third Coalition. This coalition of 
Austria, Russia and Britain met with the same fate as its predecessors. The Battles of
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Ulm in October 1805 and Austerlitz allowed Napoleon to humiliate the Austrians in the 
former and joint Austrian-Russian army in the latter. The Peace o f Pressburg in 
December 1805 between France and Austria marked the end of the coalition and cost 
Vienna dearly: Austria surrendered territories in Germany and Italy as well as accepting 
a ceiling on the size of its armies.
Prussia was defeated at the Battles of Auestadt and Jenna, whereby Berlin was 
occupied. These overwhelming defeats brought Prussia on its knees. Although it took 
Napoleon two more years to alienate it from Britain, in 1807 the Russian army was 
defeated in Friedland and Alexander was forced to accept the Treaty o f Tilsit. This treaty 
was a very controversial arrangement, for unlike the humbling treaties with Austria and 
Prussia Tilsit divided Europe between Russia and France.^^ It clearly violated all the 
requirements for proportional aggrandizement, Austria, Prussia and Britain were not 
included, and it was bound to collapse.
At this point, France had shattered the equilibrium by its domination of Europe. 
France's dominions extended from the Atlantic to the Vistula in the East, and from the 
Baltic to the Mediterranean.^“* "His [Napoleon's] relatives and marshals occupied the 
thrones o f kingdoms in Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Spain;... the Swiss cantons 
...and a Grand Dutchy of Warsaw. Almost everywhere throughout these territories ran 
the writ o f the Civil Code, embodying the Napoleon version of the social and political 
message o f the French revolution".^’ Britain remained the sole official enemy and no 
single state had the power to curb French aggression. France, enjoying Europe’s largest 
population at 28 million, possessed a military machinery of approximately 600,000 men, 
not counting reserves.^^ In addition, Napoleon’s strategic and tactical innovations won
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France one victory after another. Napoleon introduced the Continental System to 
damage England’s economy, by blocking its trade in the continent. This system managed 
to harm the trade among the Europeans as well and was a source o f continuos trouble 
for France. This step was the final blow to the European equilibrium. In essence, France 
had control o f all the factors affecting the power distribution in the system.
French calculations failed when Napoleon began his Russian campaign. The 
catastrophic French withdrawal laid the seeds of the Fourth Coalition. In February 1813, 
the Fourth Coalition against France began with the Russian-Prussian alliance. Britain 
joined the coalition by June the same year with the Treaty of Reichenback. Sweden, 
whose trade was seriously affected by the Continental System, was eager to uproot the 
French from the Baltic. Spain was not different. It rebelled against the reign of a 
Napoleon-imposed monarch in a costly campaign of civil strife.
In Austria, all of Metternich’s skills were required to maintain Vienna’s delicate 
foreign policy. On the one hand, Metternich worked to secure his country from French 
wrath in case he would join the coalition, while at the same time he made sure that 
Austria's place in the coalition remained safe. Therefore he conducted a policy of 
mediation between Napoleon on the one hand and Castlereagh and Alexander on the 
other, while pledging his country's full support to the coalition when the time was ripe 
for Austria to declare war.^’ In fact, Mettemich was not convinced that European 
equilibrium could be achieved through a total emasculation o f the French. On the 
contrary, he feared such a move could strengthen the Russians, a more dangerous 
situation, given its grand designs towards the Ottoman Empire and Eastern Europe. The 
dilemma was that France was the strongest counterweight to Russia, yet it was too
40
preponderant to be entrusted with the task.^* This explains the decisions of the allies at 
the first Treaty o f Paris and Vienna Congress, as to why France was not emasculated 
and alienated from the European System.
The Treaty of Chaumont marked the formal birth of the final coalition to quell 
French hegemony and restore equilibrium. This was to be achieved through the 
following steps: first, the coalition members would confront future French aggression, 
second the coalition would reestablish territorial and strategic equilibrium in Europe 
(See Chapter I, pp·, 22) through the expulsion of French forces in the adjacent 
territories Flolland, Spain, Portugal would be independent and an independent 
Germany composed of various small states, would be created.^^ Third, to achieve all 
these aims the allies prepared for war. All members of the coalition were obliged to 
offer a certain number of forces to counter France. The only exception was Britain, 
which presented its share in the form of financial subsidies. Thus the allies decided on 
intervention to restore the equilibrium (See p.p. 23) but also agreed upon diplomatic 
maneuvers with Napoleon in case it was possible to avoid war.
The Treaty of Chaumont marked for the first time when principles o f balance of 
power were written down precisely in an international treaty.^® Following Napoleon’s 
refusal to accept any settlement that would return France to its 1789 borders, the stage 
was set for a war to liberate Europe and the restore of the system's equilibrium. 
Castlereagh, the British Foreign Minister, wrote in a dispatch home that this treaty 
should be regarded, "not only as a systemic pledge of preserving concert among the 
leading powers but a refuge under which all the minor states, especially those on the 
Rhine, may look forward to find their security upon the return of peace, relieved of the
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necessity of seeking a compromise with France". He was correct in his assumption, for
this treaty was the first step in achieving equilibrium in Europe.
The Battles of Lutzen and Bautzen between the French and the combined forces 
o f the coalition, marked the enforcement of the mechanic of balance o f power, i.e., 
intervention. Though the French won the encounters, they were pyrrhic victories. The 
French troops were weakened and their stamina fading, forcing Napoleon to accept an 
armistice to discuss a peaceful settlement. Metternich acted as mediator but was ready at 
any moment to join the allied camp formally. This effort was followed by the 
unsuccessful Congress of Prague. Sensing that Napoleon would not accept a peaceful 
settlement Austria declared war on France in August 1823. This resulted in what is 
referred to as the war o f nations, and France was defeated at the Battle o f Leipzig. The 
British, in cooperation with the Spanish resistance, closed the other end o f the pincer by 
liberating Spain It was only a matter of time before the French surrender and the allies 
occupied Paris. This occurred in March 1814 and Napoleon abdicated.
Alexander I Castlereagh and Metternich realized the importance of France in the 
system while on the other hand the minor powers of Prussia, Holland and the Germanic 
states wanted to eliminate the French threat through a wartime indemnity, a drastic 
change in government and the stationing of an allied army in France. After some 
discussion, the opinions of Alexander I, Castlereagh and Metternich prevailed.
The Treaty of Paris, following the patterns of Chaumont, signed by the allies and 
France represents a classical example of political wisdom and creativity for the 
restoration o f the equilibrium of Europe. A secret article of the treaty actually embodied 
the aim o f the whole treaty when it stated that the settlement was to "result {in}a system
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of real and durable equilibrium in Europe"; also Article III stipulated that the principle of 
Balance of Power was to govern relations in Europe.^“ France kept its 1792 boundaries, 
suffered no reparations, and its former colonies were returned. This represents another 
manifestation of balance of power principles in that France was to be left with no 
reasons to complain and attempt to overthrow the system in the future (See p.p. 16).
For equilibrium to be just, France had to maintain relative strength, while the 
surrounding states were strengthened. Thus Holland gained both Belgium and the 
Habsburg Netherlands. The German states were linked in a federation, Austria received 
territories in Italy while other areas of Italy gained their independence.
Nearly a decade earlier, William Pitt said, “Supposing the efforts o f the allies to 
have been completely successful... H.M. would nevertheless consider this salutary work 
as still imperfect, if the restoration of peace were not accompanied by the most effectual 
measures for giving solidarity and permanence to the s y s t e m . . I t  remained the aim of 
the Congress o f Vienna to achieve these effectual measures for the system's maintenance 
under the principle of balance of power. The Congress opened in Vienna and included 
representatives from most of the powers of Europe. Strange as it may appear, the 
Congress never had a plenary session, instead Vienna was in a state o f non ending 
the same time, the big four, Britain, ^^ustria, Prussia and P.ussia 
assumed command.^“* France joined later, however, and it was among these four 
members that negotiations took place. Castlereagh and Metternich aimed to enforce the 
Treaty o f Paris, in order to pacify France, as well as to establish a durable equilibrium in 
Central Europe. Problems regarding the first issue were resolved without serious
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difficulty, leaving the problem of Poland to overshadow the Congress. Prussia wanted 
full control over Saxony, while Alexander I claimed the remainder o f Poland.
The problems of Poland and Saxony posed a genuine threat to the restoration o f 
equilibrium. Castlereagh viewed Poland in the hands of Russia as a "Russian appendage 
extending deep into central Europe {that} would constitute a constant source o f 
disquiet".^’ Mettemich believed that if Poland fell to Russia and Saxony to Prussia, the 
whole equilibrium in East and Central Europe would be threatened. These two issues 
created a serious problem for the Congress, and, although eventually resolved, Britain, 
France and Austria signed a secret protocol on January 1815 to form a military alliance 
against Russia to force a solution to the Polish question. By the time of its conclusion in 
June 1815 The Congress of Vienna created a lasting equilibrium among the different 
actors in the European concert. The general idea could be summed as returning Europe 
to the status quo ante bellum, primarily through the mechanics of balance of power.
The restoration of the system was achieved as follows: First, European 
states were organized into a balance of power system where no state had sufficient 
power to overrun the entire system as was the case with Napoleon. It reaffirmed the 
return of France to the 1792 borders, hence reducing possible future fears of French 
expansion Furthermore, the territorial balance achieved by the First Treaty of Paris was 
overall settlement, therefore it Avas reassured in 'Vlenna. Holland Avas 
strengthened to act as a buffer, while Germanic states were united into a confederacy so 
as to limit the possibilities of great power intervention. Piedmont and Sardinia were 
united and strengthened by the annexation of Genoa. Austria acquired several kingdoms 
in Italy, and was "placed in a strategic position to defend ... the entire peninsula
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These arrangement were believed to have reestablished security in the European concert, 
by surrounding France with strong and stable neighbors.
However, France was not the only power that worried the allies. Russia 
was also a power to be monitored. Prussia was another power that played a major role 
in defining the security of central and eastern Europe. The two powers, Russia and 
Prussia were interwoven at a strategic point, Poland. Both shared parts o f Poland, and 
their mutual power balanced each other to some extent. Austria, through the retention 
of Gallicia could act as a balance when necessary with the one o f the two against the
other.
The Germanic states were interwoven into a confederation that would 
hopefully act as a buffer against any power which tried to expand. At the same time, 
their limited powers denied them an offensive capability. As stated in the treaty, the role 
of the confederation linking these states was " maintenance of the internal and external 
safety o f Germany ..."· Holland, like Germany, was too weak to foster problems but 
could play a role in maintaining equilibrium.
Second, closely related to the first point, the treaty managed to reach 
proportional aggrandizement or reciprocal compensation for all o f the major powers that 
accounted for the defeat of France. Of primary interest, Russia achieved parts of its aims 
in Poland. At the same time, Austria retained Gallicia and the district o f Tamopol, while 
Prussia retained the district of Posen and the city of Thorn (allowing it control o f the 
upper Vistula). The remainder of the Duchy of Poland became the Kingdom of Poland 
under the supervision of Russia.^* As for Prussia, the settlement o f the question o f 
Saxony, was resolved along similar lines. Prussia retained nearly 20 percent but was
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rewarded with territories in the Rhineland. Britain on the other hand received several 
strategic location, among which was Malta, Ionian Islands and Hanover in north 
Germany. These are clear manifestation of proportional aggrandizement achieved by the 
Congress of Vienna. (See Chapter I, p.p. 24)
Third, a new mechanism of consultation among the powers in the system 
was introduced. The Congress System was introduced based on the principles stated by 
the Treaty of Chaumont for the continuation of the alliance even after the French crisis. 
Now the major powers were to consult regularly with each other. This system proved 
useflil in conducting European affairs for years to come.
This was the restored system of inter-European relations established by the 
Congress o f Vienna in 1815. "This unique state of affairs occurred partly because 
equilibrium was designed so well that it could only be overthrown by an effort o f a 
magnitude too difficult to mount." As Kissinger states, it was a system based on 
balance of power yet required the least power to maintain. This may be understood 
within two main contexts, the first of which is the fact that there was a shared sense of 
legitimacy and value among all the states involved and this restricted the use o f force, i.e. 
homogeneity Second, the mechanics of balance of power functioned properly and were 
understood by the different actors in the system.
This system limited attempts at territorial aggrandizement by countering, 
usually at diplomatic levels, any aggressor with a coalition of states. In addition, the 
system witnessed numerous alliances, or rather axis formations during the Greek War of 
Independence, the Belgian Crisis and the Egyptian Question. (See Chapters IV and V)
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2.3 The Development of the System after the Vienna Congress:
The Congress of Vienna settled the outstanding matters o f European 
security, maintained a firm grasp on French aspirations and, last but not least, gave birth 
to the idea of maintaining peace through collective consultations and actions of the 
Great Powers. But its most outstanding achievement was the restoration o f homogeneity 
to the system. Using principles derived from the Treaty of Chaumont, Britain, The 
Habsburg Empire (Austria), Russia and Prussia coordinated their foreign policies in what 
came to be called the Congresses. The purpose of these meetings were to establish a 
system of consultation among them for security purposes.
However, the emotional instability of the Russian Tsar Alexander I affected 
the process of the system by his suggestion of the Holy Alliance, in which members 
were to abide by Christian ethics and values in the conduct of their relations. In reality, 
this was a means o f fostering the conservative values inside the system, and thereby 
would guarantee its homogeneity. Soon an agreement to this affect was signed by all 
Europe with the exception of Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Castlereagh viewed the 
initiative as "mystical nonsense","*® while the Ottoman Empire, being a Muslim state, 
could not accept a Christian-based document. At the same time both Castlereagh and 
Metternich viewed the Tsar with suspicion and considered this mystical liberal phase a 
stratagem to spread Russian influence over the continent.
The agreement created a dilemma for both Britain and Austria. Although 
Britain hoped to avoid costly entanglements in Europe, it was too dangerous to permit
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the continental powers to unify. Austria feared that a conservative rapprochement with 
Russia would alienate Britain, while at the same time, proximity to Britain could 
strengthen the feared liberal cause. Thus Metternich concluded that he could use the 
congresses to achieve two of his aims of maintaining Britain and Russia as allies through 
the Congresses, while at the same time forcing the Tsar to accept a mechanism for 
consultation. Thus the conservative Metternich became the prime advocate o f the
41Congress System.
The congresses may be characterized as a drift towards collective security 
in contrast to balance o f power (See p.p. 5-7). However, this was not the case and the 
gatherings were more a mechanism of consultation. The European powers neither had 
the institutions nor the will to implement the fundamental aims and mechanics o f this 
power management mechanism. Their interests were not uniform and there existed a 
sense of suspicion amongst the powers. The mechanisms of balance o f power 
functioned as before. Alliances and counteralliances, intervention, and reciprocal 
compensation continued. However, the consultation mechanism diluted crises in the
system.
The first Congress took place at Aix La Chapelle. The meeting became a 
forum for several issues, the most important of which was the reinstitution o f France into 
the Quadruple Alliance, transforming it into the Quintuple Alliance. This was achieved 
p^i^jy because France was able to pay the war indemnity much before the five years 
period that was enforced on it by the Second Treaty o f Paris. In addition the role of 
Talleyrand the French Foreign Minister was crucial in incorporating his country back to 
the European System. Allied forces subsequently left France after they invaded it after
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the Battle o f Waterloo. Russian attempts to spread its influence on the continent was 
blocked by the major powers. An attempt to create a permanent allied army on the 
continent was vetoed by Britain whose refusal ended the threat o f Russian military 
presence on West European soil as well as the suggestion o f a combined Mediterranean 
fleet to combat piracy.
Between the Congress o f Aix la Chapelle and the Congress o f Trappeau in 
1820, revolutionary ideas spread in Spain, Italy and Poland. The Congress o f Trappeau 
met to discuss this threat, with Britain and France attending as observers. At this 
Congress, the Quintuple Alliance was transformed into a conservative police force to 
quell revolutions and maintain the status quo in Europe. Britain immediately rejected the 
idea that other powers could intervene automatically into the affairs o f other states to 
quell revolutions. As Castlereagh noted in a private letter, "When the territorial balance 
o f Europe is disturbed. She (Britain) can interfere with effect, but she is the last 
government in Europe which can be expected to or can venture to commit herself on 
any question o f an abstract character.... We shall be in our place when actual danger 
menaces the system o f Europe".'’^  This, therefore, was the beginning o f the end o f the 
Congress System. Because the values and perceptions o f threats to the system varied 
from one state to another, consensus became impossible.
The British rejection towards such interventionist policy did not prevent 
Metternich and the Tsar from pursuing it. The Congress o f Verona in 1821 was 
designed to support the conservative tide further. Revolutions were quelled by Austria in 
Naples and Piedmont with Russian armies standing in reserve. France intervened in the 
Spanish liberal insurrection, though without any foreign assistance, but nonetheless
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much to the dismay o f the British. The Congress System slowly faded, although had it 
not been for the foreign policy o f Canning, the British Foreign Minister, the system 
could have continued along these lines for some time to come. (See Chapter IV, 4.1 for 
further details on the undoing o f the congress mechanism.)
Although the Congress System was the first European attempt towards 
collective security, it failed partly because each state employed the system for different 
purposes. The British used it to maintain territorial equilibrium, the Austrians to quell 
revolutions, the French to reestablish themselves on the continent, while the Russians 
hoped to incorporate themselves more firmly in the system, something that was 
sometimes regarded by other powers as attempts o f expansion. It was nearly impossible 
to harmonize these contradictions.
However, it should be mentioned that the system never abandoned the 
mechanics o f balance o f power. Britain and Austria hindered what they perceived as 
Russian expansionism. Metternich occupied the Tsar in series o f consultations that kept 
the Russian monarch from undertaking unilateral action. France received limited 
freedom o f  action. But the most serious threat to the system was the Greek W ar o f 
Independence, which occurred in an area where territorial equilibrium was absent. This 
unleashed the mechanics o f balance o f power. (See Chapter IV)
2.4 The Ottoman Empire and Europe : A Heterogeneous System
The previous pages examined and explained the European system until the 
1820s and how balance o f power mechanics maintained the structure o f the European 
security. As a general background, it provided insights into the mechanics o f the system
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and the means by which the states inside the system reacted to crises, as well as a general 
orientation towards their foreign policies. This section shall deal with the core o f the 
work and establish the position o f the Ottoman Empire within the framework o f the 
European system and how the different states reacted to its presence. The hypothesis o f 
this work is that the crises the Egyptian Question caused can only be understood within 
the systemic level o f analysis, therefore, understanding the position o f the Ottoman 
Empire in Europe is the only means to undertake an objective analysis.
The controversy o f whether or not the Ottoman Empire is a member o f the 
European system has remained to this day. As mentioned in Chapter I, the units that 
compose a system o f international relations are the states. The setting o f the boundary o f 
this conceptual framework is not fixed and does not follow clear cut criteria. (See 
Chapter I, p.p., 4, and 13-14). Therefore the task o f establishing the position o f the 
Ottoman Empire in the European system is not an easy one. However, what is assured is 
that once the Ottoman Empire is included in the European system, the latter’s relative 
homogeneity became in doubt. That could be attributed to the fact that the Ottoman 
Empire had a distinct cultural identity as a result o f the different religions, customs, 
ideology and practices. The relative homogeneity o f the system of Europe was partly a 
result o f sharing common Christian values, while the Ottoman Empire was perceived by 
them as a Muslim entity only. Moreover, it shared nearly no common links with a 
Christian Europe that functioned under the basis o f different cultural premises. The 
Ottomans and Europeans viewed each other as alien to the their own value systems. 
These facts were demonstrated by the refusal o f Congress members to admit the 
Ottomans into the system. The Ottoman Empire, was a member in the European
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system, by de facto  presence but not by what Aron calls the "European transnational 
cultural ensemble". Therefore, its presence was the reason for the transformation o f the 
system into a heterogeneous one as far as it was concerned. An example o f this was the 
fact that the existence o f the Porte was not a necessity in as far as some actors were 
concerned. France, despite all the anxiety and disequilibrium it caused, was still regarded 
as a member in the system and was therefore allowed to rejoin. However, the Ottomans 
were viewed differently and indeed Russia hoped to dominate this weak country. This 
could be explained by the heterogeneous nature o f a system that included the Porte.
This is not a unique phenomena in an international system and other 
examples come to mind. Israel was and perhaps remains, a good illustration. Sharing 
few cultural links with its Arab neighbors, it is nonetheless a de facto  member o f the 
system and a major pillar in its equilibrium. The Ottoman Empire was not different, and 
it is one o f the few states that forced its presence on the European theater since the 
fourteenth century, to the extent that its survival and membership in the system became 
the cornerstone o f equilibrium in eastern and central Europe. By the nineteenth century, 
it came to play an important role in the equilibrium of the European system.
It is difficult to establish the exact date the Ottoman Empire became part o f 
the European system. However, a suggested date would be the moment the Ottomans 
set foot on European soil during the rule o f Orhan in the early decades o f the fourteenth 
century. This step towards Ottoman expansion into Europe continued through his 
marriage to the daughter o f the Bulgarian king.“*^ As time progressed, the military 
conquests o f subsequent sultans allowed the Ottoman Empire to expand throughout 
eastern Europe. With Suleiman the Magnificent, the Ottoman Empire reached its peak.
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threatened Vienna in 1529. By the end of his reign, Suleiman had extended Ottoman 
dominions from Buda, the capital o f Hungary in the north to Basra in the south, and 
from the Caspian in the east to the west Mediterranean, thus forcing the Ottoman 
Empire on European affairs.
Although the Ottomans did not belong to the same cultural ensemble o f the 
system, they were active participants in European political and military affairs. The 
constant wars between the Ottomans and some European powers, primarily the Holy 
Roman Empire, became an integral part of European politics.'*“* There are various proofs 
o f this; the formation o f the Holy League in 1570 to expel the Ottomans from Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans or the Battles o f Lepanto in 1571, the 16th century wars with 
the Venetians, the Battle o f St. Gothard in 1663 and the Second Holy League in 1684 
against the Ottomans. These aforementioned events verily the hypothesis that the 
Ottomans were accepted into the European system even though their presence 
transformed it into a heterogeneous one that influenced the outlook and actions o f the 
other members to its presence.
The Ottoman Empire remained a member in the system as well as an 
integral part o f the general mechanics o f balance of power. Wars with many o f these 
states in the Balkans and Eastern Europe were not the only marks o f its presence, but it 
also had allies among them, making it clearly a member o f the power mechanism in 
Europe. Perhaps the best example o f this development was the alliance between the 
Ottoman Empire and France in 1535. Marriot, for example, believes that the privileges 
accorded to the French in the Ottoman Empire "...established the foundation for 
diplomatic friendship which operated so powerfully in the 16th century against the
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dominance o f the Habsburgs and for more than 300 years continued to be an essential 
factor in French diplomacy."“*^ The Ottomans were to present a balance for the 
dominance o f the H absburgs,som ething  that the French foreign policy was eager to 
achieve until it succeeded through the Treaties of Westphalia and Pyrenees. Even during 
the second siege o f Vienna in 1683, the French did not feel threatened and refused to 
give assistance to the Habsburgs. Perhaps the most striking evidence was the Ottoman 
full support o f the Protestant movement in Europe.'*’ Even Sweden began to be 
interested in the Ottoman Empire as an ally against rising Russia by the beginning o f the 
18th c e n t u r y . T h u s ,  from all o f the above, it may be concluded that the first link o f the 
Ottoman Empire to the European system came as a natural result o f its presence in 
eastern Europe and its continues wars, peace and alliances with the French, Habsburgs, 
Russians, Swedes, British and the other powers as well.
A second important factor that linked the Ottomans to the European 
system can be traced as well to the Ottoman-Russian rivalry. The rise o f Russia under 
Peter the Great, marked the beginning o f a new era in the European balance o f power 
especially in eastern Europe. As a result o f establishing itself as a strong power with 
interests in eastern and northern Europe, the Russian factor joined the European power 
calculations, therefore boosting the role of the Ottoman Empire in European affairs 
more and more, especially with the Russian aim to extend their control over the 
Ottoman Straits. This fact alarmed many European states, primarily Britain, France and 
the Holy Roman Empire, certainly not for the sake o f the Sublime Porte, but rather the 
fear o f Russian over-extension that could distort the European equilibrium, as well as 
trade. This fact remained a very important element throughout the next two hundred
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years. This factor constitutes probably the second link between the Ottoman Empire and 
the other European units in the system, thereby making the Ottoman Empire an integral 
and organic part o f the European system. (Further details and analysis will be viewed in 
chapter IV regarding the Russo-Ottoman rivalry).
A third factor that stimulated the growth o f the Ottoman Empire's 
European identity could be traced to the problems of the Straits. As mentioned before, 
as long as the Ottoman Empire maintained the Black Sea as its mare nostrum, there was 
no problem. However, as Russia began to have access to this sea, immediately an 
international concern among the different actors in the system began to appear. At this 
stage, the question o f the Straits became a geo-political reality in the European 
equilibrium. This was not only due to the fact that these straits represented a main artery 
o f trade in the whole region, but had very important geo-political and strategic 
implications.''^ Simply, the fall o f these Straits in Russian hands, meant their practical 
preponderance in Eastern Europe, as well as giving it access to the Mediterranean. 
These made the problems o f the Straits a very important component in the European 
equilibrium, through the denial measures exercised by the great powers to check foreign 
expansion, primarily Russian.
The tide o f history played a very important role in the reshaping o f these 
three factors mentioned previously -the presence of the Ottoman Empire in eastern 
Europe as a major power, the Russian-Ottoman rivalry and the problem o f the Straits. 
Victorious as the Ottoman Empire was throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century, the curve o f its success began to decline and with it the whole calculations for 
the equilibrium o f east European security, within the general framework o f total
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European security. I f  peace was maintained because of equilibrium and the functioning 
o f balance o f power on the European continent, the problems that rose in the nineteenth 
century in eastern Europe was a result o f precisely the lack o f this equilibrium. That is 
due to the fact that the Ottoman presence transformed it into a heterogeneous system, 
thereby leading some actors to attempt eliminating it, causing disequilibrium.
2.5 The Ottoman Empire as an Actor in the European Balance of Power 
Mechanism:
The previous pages focused on establishing the political identity o f the 
Ottoman Empire in the European system, and in the following we shall view carefully 
the Ottoman Empire's role in the mechanics o f balance o f power in Europe, both 
through its presence as a European power and its possession o f the strategic Straits. This 
will be elaborated through understanding the position o f the Ottoman Empire vis-à-vis 
the other powers in the system, something that gave birth to what historians refer to as 
the Eastern Question.
A. The Eastern  Question:
Peculiarly, the Ottoman Empire played its most important role in the 
European balance o f power during the latter part o f the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, not when it was strong and potent, but paradoxically when it was weak and 
debilitated. Throughout the eighteenth century, although the tide o f defeat was going
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against the Ottoman Empire, it retained a very large proportion o f its Empire in Europe, 
Asia and North Africa. Even the treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 between Vienna and the 
Sublime Porte and that o f Passarowitz in 1718 which gave the Habsburgs substantial 
gains in the Balkans, were short lived, for the Ottoman Empire was capable o f retrieving 
them back some decades later. Thus, its possessions in Europe were not substantially 
usurped, perhaps because the Habsburgs and the rest o f the European monarchs were 
focusing more on the events in central and western Europe. What is important at this 
stage is the fact that the Ottoman Empire by the beginning of the nineteenth century was 
in possession o f major eastern European provinces, namely Morea, Bosnia, Silistria and 
Rumelia, while Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia were tributary states.^® This 
constituted in modem terms, mainland Greece, the Peloponesis, Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and a portion o f Montenegro. It was in control o f 283,000 
square miles o f European territory with eight million inhabitants.
I f  equilibrium was stable in Western Europe, things were different towards 
the east. The problem o f what is commonly known as the Eastern Question was already 
exploding prior to the imbalance that shattered the European system as a result o f the 
French crisis in the beginning of the century. It was this problem that created a severe 
imbalance in the European system to the east and south of Europe for some time to 
come.
The Eastern Question is a term used among historians to describe the status 
o f the Ottoman Empire in diplomatic affairs after its weakening in face o f the other 
powers in Europe. It is primarily linked to the problems o f how long the Empire was to 
live, especially when there were many ambitions from states inside the European system
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awaiting this moment anxiously. It was primarily the problem o f filling the power 
vacuum that resulted from the Ottoman weakness in controlling the territory that was 
under its sovereignty.^^ Brown believes the Eastern question began " ...with the decline 
o f  the Ottoman strength vis-à-vis Europe and the growing awareness by all the parties 
concerned o f this decline, a process usually held to have begun in 1774 at earliest.... 
Others view it as merely the relations between the European powers with the Ottoman 
Empire that began with the decline of the latter.”  As far as this study is concerned, the 
Eastern Question is used to mean the position of the Ottoman Empire in the European 
system after it reached a stage of continuous military and political weakness vis-à-vis the 
struggle o f the powers over its domains. Thus, we shall view it as a problem comprising 
two main elements, first, the inability o f the Ottoman Empire to protect the lands under 
its sovereignty against the ambitions o f the other powers and the problems o f the Straits.
B. Problems of the Straits
The Ottoman Straits were believed to be one of the most important pillars 
upon which the equilibrium o f Europe was based with geopolitical and strategic 
implications on the entire system. These Straits were the basic link between the 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The Straits are o f a very curious geographical nature, 
for they are two canals, the Dardanelles from the west and the Bosphorus from the east 
linked by the Sea o f Marmara in the center. The Dardanelles is a 40 miles long water 
canal varying in width from 1-4 miles; the Sea o f Marmara is 170 miles long while the 
Bosphorus extends for 18 miles with a width varying from 800 yards to 2.7 miles.^“* It
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was upon the Bosphorus that Emperor Constantine in the Fourth century built his city 
Constantinopol, which was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth 
century and became its capital.
The geopolitical and strategic importance o f the Straits do not only lie in 
the fact that it links the Mediterranean with the Black Sea, but also because it was the 
key to the southeastern gate of the European system. The state which controlled it had 
perfect access to the Balkans and thereby the southeastern gates o f Europe. 
Furthermore, it represented a key to the east o f the Mediterranean as well, especially for 
Russia. In addition, it was a very important waterway for the trade route linking Europe 
with Asia, and with the advent of colonialism, its importance increased tremendously. 
Therefore, if this key was to fall in the hands of any of the European powers, it could 
easily permit it to disturb the equilibrium. However, as long as the Straits remained in 
the custody o f the Porte, there was no immediate danger, for it had no power to cause 
disequilibrium in the system.
Problems regarding the possession o f the Ottoman Straits was practically 
non-existent until the eighteenth century, primarily due to two factors. The first was the 
fact that it was an internal waterway, leading to territories under Ottoman sovereignty, 
for both the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea were Ottoman seas. The second 
factor was that the Ottoman Empire was strong enough to defend it. As soon as these 
two factors diminished, the problems of the Straits began to appear and became a very 
important element in the foreign policy o f at least three major powers; Russia, Britain 
and the Habsburg Empire.
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The Ottoman Straits were an important element in Russian foreign policy 
beginning with Peter the Great’s hopes of transforming Russia into a naval power. By 
the time of Catherine II's rule, Russia had achieved Peter’s dream and extended its 
territories to include much of the north of the Black Sea. Russia’s interests in the Straits 
could be summarized as follows:
First, the Straits provided Russia’s military and trade vessels the access they 
need to the Mediterranean. Such freedom of movement translated into naval access to 
the heart of Europe. This became a very important factor in Russian calculations and its 
leaders eventually saw the Straits as a navigation resource it had to possess.
Second, by control of the Straits, Russia could move forward its lines of 
defense allowing for the defense of its southeastern flank to begin at the Mediterranean 
and Istanbul Russian control of the Black Sea would be unchallenged as it would not 
be vulnerable to any foreign battleships. In strategic terms, this would eliminate any 
future naval threat by Britain and France, forcing these powers to attack through central 
and eastern Europe. Since Russia had already secured Poland and extended its frontiers 
to the Dniester it would become almost invulnerable. The Crimean War 1854-1856 
proved that if the Straits had been in Russian hands, the British and French campaign 
would have become nearly impossible.
Third, domination of the Straits would place east and much o f south 
Europe at Russia’s mercy. That is basically because the Russia would possess the military 
springboard from which it could lead its attacks on this area.
For all these reasons, the control of the Straits would practically provide 
Russia with access to nearly half the European system without fear o f a maritime
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challenge. Such a state of affairs could be a mortal threat to the European equilibrium, 
giving Russia the power to overcome an alliance against it. Therefore, since the entire 
system functioned on the principle of balance of power to maintain equilibrium, it was 
impossible to permit simultaneous Russian expansion and invulnerability. Thus 
European foreign policy for the next century aimed at opposing Russian attempts to 
secure the Straits.
The history of Russian indirect attempts to control the Straits may be 
traced through the treaties it attempted to enforce on the Porte. With the Treaty of 
Ku^uk Kaynarca in 1774, Russia guaranteed passage of its trade vessels. The treaty of 
alliance in 1798 during the war in Egypt to expel the French invasion permitted the 
passage for the first time of the Russian warships through the Straits so as to join the 
alliance against France in Egypt.. The treaty of 1805 between the Porte and Russia 
allowed the latter’s warships to pass through the Straits in time of war. This treaty also 
stipulated joint defense of the Straits.’* Fortunately for the Porte, this treaty was 
terminated unilaterally by 1806 when the Russo-Ottoman war erupted as a result o f 
French intrigues By so doing, the Porte remained under the sole obligation of 
permitting the navigation of Russian merchant vessels through the Straits.
Britain was another power interested in the safety o f the Ottoman Straits. 
Britain secured the right of passage of its merchant vessels through the unilateral 
declaration o f Sultan Selim III in 1799.”  British foreign policy primarily aimed at 
maintaining the status ^uo of Ottoman sovereignty over the Straits. There were, 
however, some instances during the Napoleonic wars, when London disregarded this 
principle, to allow Russia to participate in the war efforts against France. This was
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entirely due to the fact that the Porte began to shift alliances towards France in 1805, 
therefore forcing the British to abandon their traditional policy and supported the 
Russians against the Porte.
The British hoped their initiatives would protect their commerce in the 
Levant from Russian encroachment.^* At the same time, they would be able to check 
Russian advancement in the Mediterranean.*^ Since the battle o f Trafalgar and the 
destruction of the French fleet, London considered it essential to maintain the 
Mediterranean at a minimum, under the control of one fleet, and at a maximum, 
including the possibility of a French force in future when circumstances allowed. The 
addition of a Russian fleet would not be permitted Finally, Britain needed to secure its 
communications with India. This became a more important priority following the French 
campaign in Egypt. It was very important for Britain to maintain the trade routes to 
India open through both the Straits and Egypt at any cost, and a Russian control over 
there meant risking control over these trade routes. Following the collapse o f French 
preponderance Britain's commitment to its efforts to prevent the Russians from gaining 
control of this critical area continued.
The Habsburg Empire and France shared Britain’s fears of Russian 
intentions to capture the Straits. These fears played a role in efforts to maintain 
equilibrium in eastern Europe. However, it should be noted that the degree of interest o f 
both states were not identical. The fact that Austrian territories were adjacent to Russia 
made the issue a greater priority for Vienna.
The interests of different states regarding the Straits converged on two 
issues: to keep the Russians from controlling the Straits and restricting the passage of
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Russian warships through the Straits in peacetime. At the same time, the various states 
did not want to see the Straits closed to their naval forces.
C. Ottoman’s European Diplomacy:
Ottoman diplomacy during the end of the eighteenth and the nineteenth 
century was marked with the gradual decline of its power vis-à-vis most European 
powers. As mentioned before, this decline resulted from poor internal administration as 
well as the rise in the power of the other European powers. The conjunction of these 
two factors forced the Ottoman Empire into a labyrinth of alliances to secure its 
dominions in Europe and north Africa, against any preponderant power. Furthermore, it 
opened the way for encroachment by other powers to its territories, a problem that 
confronted the Ottoman Empire until its dissolution in the twentieth century.
Although Russia was not the only state in the European system with 
ambitions on Ottoman territory, it played perhaps the most important role in weakening 
the Ottoman Empire.^*’ Since the time of Peter the Great, the seeds for conflict between 
Russia and the Sublime Porte were laid. His plan of incorporating Russia into the 
European family required (in his view) ports such as those on the Black Sea, at the time 
an Ottoman lake. In 1695 Russia attempted to gain access to the Black Sea through the 
conquest o f the port of Azov was the first step in this effort. Peter the Great’s failure 
provided inspiration to expand the small Russian navy. By 1700, Russia secured access 
to the port o f Azov in the Black Sea. Peter’s war against Sweden in the Great Northern
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War deflected his attention from the Ottoman Empire, thus preserving peace on the 
Ottoman front.®*
Peter’s successors lacked the vigor or character of their illustrious 
predecessor and it was not until the rule o f Catherine the Great in 1762 that Russia again 
looked south and hoped to expand into Ottoman possessions in eastern Europe. The 
acquisition of Ukraine brought Russia in direct confrontation with the Porte. The 
labyrinthine nature of the European alliance system in the second part o f the eighteenth 
century i.e., the relationship between the Ottomans and France, encouraged the Porte to 
initiate hostilities against Russia in 1768. War began along the Danube in Eastern 
Europe but soon spread when Russia, assisted by the British, dispatched its Northern Sea 
fleet to the Mediterranean to carry the war to the Ottoman coast.®” British support to 
Russia does not deny the fact that France and other powers considered Ottoman 
dominion a natural buffer against Russian expansion as well as a good market for trade. 
With Russia turning its forces on eastern Europe, the Porte was the best option to check 
Russian expansion within the framework of the mechanics of balance of power, a policy 
even the British government adhered to in general, and abandoned under strictly special 
circumstances, that caused disequilibrium in the system, as when Britain supported 
Russian war efforts against the Porte and France.
The war proved catastrophic for the Porte and it suffered defeat both at sea 
at the Battle of Cesme in 1771 and on land as well. The Porte was left with no 
alternative but to sign the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, which dominated its 
relations with Russia for a long time to come. Russia increased its gains in the Black 
Sea region and the port of Azov, obtained useful trade and diplomatic concessions and
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the Khanate of Crimea became an independent state. Moreover, Article XI granted the 
Russian merchant ships " ...a free passage from the Black Sea into the White Sea 
(Mediterranean) and reciprocally Generally, this treaty is regarded as the beginning 
o f the dismemberment o f the Ottoman Empire, as well as a suggested date for the 
beginning of the Eastern Question.®“* Though it is widely believed that this treaty 
granted Russia the right to mentorship and representation of the Orthodox citizens of the 
Ottoman Empire, recent works proved that this is incorrect. But in general, the 
Russian Tsars worked hard for the establishment of the principle o f intervention on 
behalf of the Ottoman Orthodox citizens.
Following this treaty, Russia increased its moves on the Slavic population 
o f the Ottoman Empire, primarily in the Balkans and Bulgaria, and assisted those who 
rebelled against the Porte. "Russian objectives were to dominate the Balkans,... Tsars... 
viewed southeast Europe as essential to Russian national security and the stability of 
Russia's frontiers in Europe."** The Tsars considered this region a natural and cultural 
extension o f Russia and were eager to extend influence if not absorb these territories. 
This effort not only brought Russia into direct conflict with the Ottomans, but led to the 
establishment of the Ottoman Empire as the primary defense against Russian 
expansionism.
The Russian ambitions in Ottoman territory created fear in Vienna that the 
real danger could be Russian expansionism and their great designs in eastern Europe, 
were bound to affect the status of the Habsburgs there. This fear was further augmented 
as a result o f the intriguing policy of Russia in the Balkans, something that was 
considered as the backyard of the Habsburg Empire, and foreign intervention by a strong
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power was not appreciated at all. This was the main policy of Vienna during the rule of 
Maria Theresa, who resented Catherine of Russia and her schemes. She was reported to 
have exclaimed in a letter that, "The partition of the Ottoman Empire would be the most 
hazardous of enterprises and most dangerous for its consequences. What shall we gain 
by pushing our conquests even to the gates of Constantinople ?, ... save some fatal and 
inevitable combination of circumstances. I shall never lend myself to the partition of the 
Turkish Empire and I hope that our grandchildren will not see them expelled from 
E urope" The weakness of the Ottomans as it became imminent from the treaty o f 
Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, led to the exaggeration of these fears in Vienna to the extent 
that it suggested concluding a secret treaty with the Porte to work together to halt 
Russian expansion.^*
The French, though traditionally the allies of the Ottomans, had also 
special interests Their interests were trade as well as the guardianship of the Catholic 
clergy in the Ottoman provinces. Furthermore, they invested in good relations with the 
Porte when it was strong, to check the positions of the Habsburgs. However, these 
traditional policies changed drastically when the French Revolution took place. The new 
expansionist France embarked on a course that was bound to collide with the Porte and 
by 1798 the French began their expansionist policy to the detriment of the Porte by the 
expedition to Egypt, which was part of the Ottoman Empire (See Chapter III). 
Napoleon believed that the Ottoman Empire's days were numbered but it was only a 
matter of when and how.
If three out of the four major powers began to have an interest in the 
Ottoman empire, it was very normal to see Britain gradually involving itself. This was a
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natural prerequisite for its foreign policy based on balance of power, for it was too 
dangerous to leave the other powers to determine the fate of such a large empire by 
themselves. It is true that the British had trade interests in the Ottoman lands that 
extended back to the sixteenth century.®^ However, their interests also developed as a 
result o f their overall foreign policy orientation of freeing the continent from a single 
preponderant power, whether it was France or Russia. To this end, Britain began to 
develop stronger relations with the Porte in the last two decades o f the eighteenth 
century particularly since Pitt the Younger , as a means to check Russian growing 
influence in eastern Europe.’® Thus It became the British policy to maintain the 
Ottoman integrity in face of other powers' ambitions.’* With the French preponderance 
in the early years of the nineteenth centuiy, France substituted Russia as far as Britain 
was concerned and it became the British policy to check the growing French influence 
in the Ottoman empire.
The problem of the Ottoman Straits also occupied the minds of British 
and French politicians. However, French aggression diverted attention from this issue 
and instead British and allied interests were aimed at checking the French. This was 
achieved in part through an alliance with the Porte. Traditional allied aims were focused 
on defeating France and expelling it from’Egypt in an alliance including Britain, Russia
and the Porte.
The obvious interests o f these states, especially Russia, marked the 
beginning of the internationalization of the Eastern Question and made it an important 
element in the European balance of power structure. Ottoman inability to defend its 
possessions in Europe automatically pushed it into the labyrinth o f European balance of
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power mechanisms, though not as a folly recognized actor by all. From this time on, 
weakness forced the Porte to ally itself with one or more European power to protect its 
territory.
The French invasion to Egypt in 1798 could be considered among the first 
French attempts to dismember the Ottoman Empire. This move was undertaken within 
the general context of post-revolutionary Franco-British rivalry. The French expedition 
to Egypt was a calculated effort to threaten British control of India by cutting the trade 
route going through Egypt. Egypt was under the suzerainty of the Porte and thus the 
attack boosted the Ottoman Empire’s position within the European system. Britain and 
Russia assisted by the Ottomans, cooperated within the framework o f the mechanics of 
the system and collaborate against French preponderance to expel the French from 
Egypt This was in 1801 and the French lost hope of a strategic position in the southern 
Mediterranean Britain recognized the importance o f the Porte and its dominions and 
hence opposed any attempt to divide it. In addition, the French loss of prestige with the 
Porte, pushed an Anglo-Ottoman rapprochement.
The alliance proved brief and by 1806 French intrigues in the Porte 
resulted in a change of the Hospodars or vassals of the Ottoman provinces o f Moldavia 
and Wallachia The Porte s decision to dépose these Hospodars led to a breach with 
Russia for this act violated the 1802 Ottoman commitment with Russia. The result was 
protracted war, something that the Porte hoped to avoid but could not. The British 
supported Russia in its Danubian and Mediterranean war efforts, believing that a long 
conflict would distract Russian war efforts against Napoleon.’  ^ Britain engaged 
immediately in an act of coercion against the Ottoman Empire through Admiral John T.
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Duckworth’s unsuccessful bombardment of Istanbul. In addition, the British landed an 
expedition to the shores of Alexandria in order to invade Egypt. This force failed as a 
result o f their successive defeats by the Egyptian Vali Mohammed Ali. (See chapter III)
Such actions on the part of Russia and Britain threw the Porte in to the 
arms of Napoleon, with the latter hoping to create a defense pact with the Ottoman 
Empire and Persia against Russia. However, the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 reversed the 
situation once again, and the Ottomans were stunned to learn that Napoleon and 
Alexander I were preparing for the division of the Ottoman Empire. Once again, the 
Porte found its back against the wall. As Tilsit faced operational problems regarding the 
division of the Ottoman territory between France and Russia, the Ottomans gradually
moved towards alliance against France.
The only hope for the Porte was British assistance against the Russians and 
French The result was the Treaty of the Dardanelles in 1809, which included several 
important articles including British assistance in case of a French attack and an 
agreement to close the Turkish Straits to foreign warships in time of peace.’  ^ This made 
the Ottomans an important ally for the British against Russian and French ambitions.
Peace between the Ottomans and the Russians finally came in March 1812, 
as a result o f the Russian fears of an imminent French attack. Alexander I prompted 
peace to prepare for the coming war with France. Following the Treaty of Bucharest, 
the provinces of Wallachia and Moldova, as well as some Russian held territory in the 
north o f the Black Sea and the Caucasus, were returned to the Porte while Russia 
retained Bessarabia.’“* From that moment onward, the focus of the major powers were 
directed towards France and the Porte gained breathing space.
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By 1814, the Ottoman role in European settlement was unnecessaiy, not 
because it was not a member in the European family, but rather since it had no place in 
these talks. The Vienna convention directed attention towards the containment of 
France and reshaping Europe territorially, a task that did not require Ottoman presence. 
Moreover, the Porte could not play any role with regard to the future containment o f 
France, since it did not have any borders with France, except for the Ionian Islands. This 
however did not prevent Castlereagh from unsuccessfully suggesting an invitation to the 
Ottoman Empire. Other Europeans courts did not recognize the European identity o f 
the Porte This did not prevent them from dealing with the Ottomans as a European 
state in the coming decades, for it was still considered that the "...{Sultan} had one leg 
over the European fence, since he controlled the Balkans (and some territory in Eastern
Europe).”"'^
The role of the Ottoman Empire in the European structure gradually 
increased from this point. As the Congress system soothed possible sources o f friction 
among the European powers, the Ottoman Empire asserted itself as an active member of 
the European family. The problems of imbalance in the eastern parts of the continent 
resulting from Russian ambitions and indigenous revolutionary movements 
overshadowed the Ottoman Empire. Relations with the major powers remained 
consistent and each secured good relations with the Porte. With the exception of 
Russia, none of the powers could benefit from the dismemberment of the Ottoman 
Empire, though at some stages some countries were sympathetic to the revolutionary 
movements in Ottoman-held territory.
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This chapter analyzed how the European system developed and functioned 
since 1648 and how the Eastern Question fit into this framework. In the following 
chapters questions on how the Egyptian question developed and affected the European 
System, and how the mechanics of balance of power maintained the status quo o f the 
Ottoman empire during the active phase of the Egyptian Question will be taken up.
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Chapter HI
The Egyptian Question 
Europe, Egypt and Mohammed Ali
1. What is The Egyptian Question ?
The work o f Shafik Ghorbal entitled The Beginning of the Egyptian Question and 
the Rise o f Mohammed Ali represents a pioneer effort to understand the significance o f 
the Egyptian Question. Historians who studied this issue encountered the same problems 
as other historians attempting to define the Eastern Question. Some Egyptian historians 
that deal with the era o f Mohammed Ali appear reluctant to even use the phrase Egyptian 
Question. That may be understandable given the fact that this historical episode is not dealt 
with on the same level and importance as the Eastern Question. Nevertheless, it 
constituted an integral part of the Eastern Question,* due to the fact that it emanated from 
the lack o f Ottoman control over its territories, and since Egypt was part of the Ottoman 
Empire, ipso facto, the Egyptian Question was to be a part of the Eastern Question (See 
Chapter II, 2.4).
In simple terms, the Egyptian Question is regarded here as the impact o f events in 
Egypt during the first forty years of the nineteenth century on the European system of 
interstate relations. During this period, there were certain patterns o f relations between 
Egypt and the European system, whereby each impacted on the other.
72
There are several reasons as to why events that took place in Egypt during this 
period were regarded as a "Question". To begin with, Egypt could be considered like any 
other Ottoman vilayet, or tributary state, in that it attempted revolts and achieved 
temporary practical independence from the Porte. But what turned developments in Egypt 
into a "Question" was that unlike any other vilayet, Egypt achieved de facto  independence 
from the Porte during the second decade of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, it 
actively threatened the equilibrium in Europe as a result o f expansion into Anatolia and its 
subsequent threat to Ottoman existence. It was also a "Question" because there was more 
than one power interested in the threat Egypt posed to the European security structure in 
1833 and 1839. All of the above gave the issue and events in Egypt the international
character required to receive the title of the "Egyptian Question".
The timeframe of the Egyptian Question is believed to have begun in 1798 with the 
French invasion of Egypt,^ and ended with the Treaty of London whereby the European 
powers arrested Mohammed Ali's expansionist policy in 1840-1.^ Within this timeframe, 
the Egyptian Question could be divided into phases, in accordance with political 
developments in Egypt and the European system at those historical intervals. Therefore 
the Egyptian Question here is divided into three phases. The first phase covers the events 
from the French campaign in 1798 to the failure of the British campaign against Egypt in 
1807. This phase could well be defined as the passive phase of the Egyptian Question, 
primarily due to the fact that Egypt was unable impact on the European system. On the 
contrary it was the epoch characterized by the impact of developments in the European 
system on its fate. The second phase, referred to as the preparatory phase, begins when 
Mohammed Ali established himself as sole ruler of Egypt and initiated reforms, particularly
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those o f a military character, so as to shape Egypt to play the role he wanted in 
international affairs. The preparatory phase ended in 1825, just prior to the Egyptian 
involvement in the Greek War of Independence. This phase in turn is characterized by 
Egypt's march towards de facto  independence from the Porte, building an empire, and 
acquiring the strength to influence the future of the geographic neighborhood. The third 
and final phase, which is the active phase, began with the involvement in the Greek War o f 
Independence and extended through the Egyptian-Ottoman War in 1831 and ended with 
the evacuation of Egypt from Syria in accordance with the Treaty of London in 1840, 
thereby marking the demise of the Egyptian empire. Of these three phases, the active 
phase of the Egyptian Question will be emphasized, for it characterized the highest level of 
interaction between Egypt and the European system.
This chapter, however, shall focus on the first two phases, in order to give the 
necessary background for the rise and development of the Egyptian Question. The next 
chapter focuses on the how the Egyptian Question was settled in accordance with the rules 
o f the European system, /.^ ■ the balance of power.
3.2 The First Phase of the Egyptian Question:
A. Egypt under the Ottomans and the Shaping of European Interests:
The victory of Sultan Selim I in the Battle of Marc-i Dabik (Marg Dabek) in 1516 
marked the demise of the Mameluke Sultanate in Egypt, as well as the last of their Sultans, 
Konsowa El Ghorei. From then onward Egypt became an integral part of the Ottoman
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Empire and among its most valuable far flung possessions. The Ottomans imposed upon 
Egypt a policy of near seclusion, severing its relations to some extent with the outside 
world, with the exception of some trade and limited European consular activities that 
began in the eighteenth century.
Throughout that period, Egypt was ruled by the Ottomans with a Mameluke 
administration. The defeat of the Mamelukes did not terminate their presence and rule in 
Egypt, for the Ottoman sultans retained them to administer the country. This was not a 
unique case in Ottoman administrative system, for after all some of the vilayet including 
some of the important ones in the Balkans, like Wallachia and Moldova were administered 
in similar ways.'* Such administration was visible from the very beginning as reflected in 
the decision to delegate the administration of Egypt to Khaier Bek, the Mameluke who 
betrayed Konsowa El Ghorei to the Ottoman Sultan Selim and spied for him.^ This 
administrative system established by Selim I, was followed by sultans after him whereby 
the Mamelukes administered Egypt under the de jure sovereignty o f an Ottoman Vah 
(Viceroy) who represented the Ottoman sultan and was supported with an Ottoman hamia
garrison.^
Over time the Ottoman Empire began its military decline, the Mamelukes 
accumulated sufficient power to be called the real masters of Egypt though rarely 
relinquishing their allegiance to the Sublime Porte. Often enough the Ottoman Vali was 
just the shadow of the Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt. A1 Djabarti, mentions the year 
1188 hijra, 1774 A .D ."... began with the Vali Khalil Pasha being totally isolated, with the 
exception of his title (as ruler o f Egypt) and the seal, while all responsibilities and affairs 
were entirely in the hands o f the Great Emir Mohammed Bey Abou El Dahab and his
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Mamelukes".’ Once again this was not unique to Egyptian politics, for similar events 
occured in other vilayet in the Ottoman Empire. Certainly this did not prevent the Sublime 
Porte from periodically gaining the upper hand, such as after the revolt o f Mameluke 
leader Ali Bek El Kabier. In 1769 El Kabier, with Russian assistance, declared himself 
sultan over an independent Egypt and sent forces to Syria. The treachery o f one o f his
generals prevented him from attaining power and, despite Russian financial and military
8
support, he was defeated in 1773.
Although the Sublime Port permitted the Mamelukes to pursue their affairs 
provided that they send an annual tribute, the Haraç, (kharag) to the Sultan. There were 
even years when the Ottoman Vali was unable to do this because o f Mameluke 
intransigence and greed. It seems that Mamelukes consolidated their power in Egypt and it 
became difficult and costly for the Ottomans to send armies to defeat them and regain de 
facto  power ® The only exception to this was in the late 18th century when an Ottoman 
army was dispatched and defeated the Mamelukes who nevertheless managed to come 
back stronger than before. Their strength accumulated as a result o f their constant 
acquisition o f slaves from the Caucasus to keep their race intact and stronger since they 
did not intermingle with the Egyptians. Thus, the Sublime Porte had to be satisfied by 
these conditions since by then it was too difficult to remove the Mamelukes from power in 
Egypt.
Prior to 1798, Ottoman Egypt had under these circumstances almost no 
interaction with the European system of interstate relations with the exception o f some 
limited consular and trade activities. This isolation came to an abruptl end as a result of 
renewed European interest in Egypt, and the impact of such interests on the conduct of
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Egyptian politics before and during the rule of Mohammed Ali. These elements were to 
constitute the cornerstones of the link between Egypt and the European system. It should 
be noted that there may have been a cultural link between Egypt and Europe (the result of 
the 1798 French invasion), but that is outside the scope of the present study.
Because European interaction with Egypt was limited, any state wishing to 
establish a diplomatic presence in Egypt had to deal with the Porte, for the Ottoman Vali 
in Cairo lacked the authority to permit the establishment of diplomatic legations. The 
Porte was reluctant to open Egypt to foreign diplomatic missions. It took the Austrian 
legation in Alexandria, for example, eighteen years, from 1763 to 1781, to gain the 
consent of the Porte for officially opening a C o n su la te .W i th  the exception o f some 
trade, Egypt was not an attraction for any of the European powers. Even Britain did not 
view Egypt as a priority in its foreign policy until after the French campaign in 1798. The 
French however, were perhaps the most interested powers in Europe to secure good trade 
relations with Egypt. Russia showed some interest during the reign of Catherine the Great 
within the context of its policy to subdue the Ottoman Empire. (See Chapter II, 2.4 ) 
Catherine II's aim was to strike the Ottoman Empire from the south, by establishing an 
alliance with the Mamelukes and secure an independent Egypt under its sphere o f 
influence.C atherine 's attempts failed, and with it faded any possibility to use Egypt to 
undermine the Ottoman Empire. This was perhaps the only way in which Egypt fitted into 
European interests, and thereby the system.
When Bonaparte mentioned that geography is the only constant factor in history, 
he could not have been more correct, especially in the case of Egypt vis-a-vis Europe. 
Egypt's geographic position imposed on it certain conditions that influenced the way some
77
European powers perceived its presence and importance. Possessing an important geo­
strategic location in North Africa, and representing a bridge between Asia and Africa, and 
with the Ottomans' inability to defend it, Egypt was bound to attract European political 
and strategic attention. Furthermore, its control of a strategic trade route that reduces 
travel around Africa by half as compared to the Cape of Good Hope route made it even 
more appealing. Despite all of this, it took the Europeans nearly three centuries to take any 
active measures to translate these interests into action. This occurred as a result o f the 
French Revolution and subsequent trans-European conflict. It was only then that Egypt’s 
strategic importance was perceived, especially with regard to France.
Active and vigorous European pursuit of their interests in Egypt appeared only 
with the French campaign in 1798. This was the beginning of European active interference 
in Egyptian affairs and since then began to excersise an influence over its fate. The French 
were the first to realize the value of Egypt as an important geostrategic location that, if 
acquired, could enhance their war efforts against Britain. The strategy of the French 
Directory in 1798 focused on a naval invasion against England or to deal a blow against 
British interests abroad as the primary means to emasculate the Second Coalition. (See 
Chapter II, 2.2) The French determination to break Britian from the coalition produced 
the French campaign in 1798, being a more attractive option to a risky invasion of 
England. Bonaparte believed that gaining Egypt would give France negotiation space in 
any future talks aimed at terminating the Second Coalition. Therefore he suggested to 
Talleyrand that, "If it happens and we find ourselves obliged to acquiesce to the loss of 
Cape o f Good Hope, then it will be necessary for us to acquire Egypt" In addition 
France believed that, "Egypt would replace the Antilles; and as a route it would secure
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to...(France) the commerce of the Indies. "*'* Such a policy was in perfect harmony with the 
general conviction that France needed colonies to replace its losses in the Americas, and 
Egypt seemed attractive. Moreover, such a move could allow the French to instigate 
trouble for Britain in India as a result of Egypt's relative proximity to the treasured colony 
and its trade route.** This in itself would seriously affect the overall British position. It 
should be noted that France attached such importance to undermining the British position 
in India that in association with Russia, contemplated a joint campaign against India in 
1801. (See Chapter II, 2.2). Furthermore, such a step would give the French fleet a great 
deal o f maneuverability and power in the Mediterranean Sea, if Alexandria could be 
transformed into a French naval base. For all of the above reason, France embarked on a 
campaign to take over Egypt.
The French campaign under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte was dispatched 
to Egypt in the summer of 1798. This campaign marks the beginning of the Egyptian link 
with the European system. The French did their best to avoid the British fleet in the 
Mediterranean and, after a brief stay in Malta, landed safely in Alexandria in June. 
Bonaparte quickly issued his famous declaration whereby he claimed that the French were 
friends o f the Sultan and came to Egypt to defeat the Mamelukes who were treating 
French merchants improperly and, that the French had accepted Islam.** The French, 
aided by their superior military power, easily defeated the Mamelukes in the Battle o f the 
Pyramids, forcing them to flee to upper Egypt and Syria.*’
This move led to hostilities between the Porte and France, as well as giving the 
opportunity to put into action an alliance to get the French out of Egypt. Britain, without 
coordination with the Porte, initiated hostilities against the French. The British fleet under
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the command of Admiral Horatio Nelson destroyed the French fleet in the Battle o f Abu 
Keir in Alexandria, thereby isolating the French in Egypt. A final maneuver undertaken by 
Napoleon to conquer Syria failed. The hopelessness of the French position led Bonaparte 
to flee to France, leaving the French expeditions in the hands of General Kleber.
The situation did not improve. The French were exhausted, demoralized, struck by 
the plague and surrounded by hostile forces. Kleber realized that the only option was to 
undertake a difficult attempt at evacuation. The chance occurred through the Treaty o f El 
Areish with the Ottomans in January 1800. The British refused to sign the treaty because 
according to what Sir Sidney Smith, the commander of the British naval forces, reported 
to Admiral Nelson, "...the execution of the articles depended solely on the Turkish 
Government and on the discipline which may be preserved in the Turkish army".^*
The Porte realized that they could not expel the French without foreign assistance. 
By 1800 the Porte, entered into an alliance with Britain and Russia to achieve this end. 
(See Chapter II, 2.2) Fortunately for the British, the treaty was short-lived and Kleber 
soon resumed hostilities against the Ottomans. The result was the Battle o f Ein Shams, or 
Heliopolis, which saw the French defeat of the Ottoman army. Some weeks later. General 
Kleber was assassinated and General Menou, the third in command, assumed command o f 
the desperate French force.
To make matters worse, the British landed in Alexandria and the Ottomans 
gathered a new army to expel the French from Egypt. This army consisted o f several 
ethnic groups from the empire, the strongest of which was a unit o f Albanian Ottomans 
under the leadership o f a Tahir Pasha and included a young Albanian officer that came to 
be known as Mohammed Ali of Kavala.
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By 1801, the French were confronted by a British force in Alexandria, an Ottoman 
army, a regrouped force of Mamelukes, and a British Indian army that landed (too late as 
events would prove) on the Red Sea coast. These armies moved towards Cairo while 
some British forces surrounded the French in Alexandria. The French were defeated in 
Cairo and surrendered. In Alexandria, General Menou accepted the terms o f surrender 
that his commander in Cairo signed with the Ottomans and the British. Before the end o f 
the year, the remaining French forces were provided safe transport to France, ending the 
French campaign to Egypt, but not their hopes to conquer this land again.
The French invasion revived the link between Egypt and the European system by 
breaking the near isolation that Egypt endured under the Ottoman rule. The revival o f 
dormant European interests in Egypt became another established channel by which it 
began to be actively linked with the European system. Major powers such as Britain and 
France recognized their interests in the affairs of Egypt and were willing to pursue these 
interests. Furthermore, the French campaign incorporated Egypt as a geographic square 
in the European chessboard. The competition between Britain and France to conquer, or 
influence the affairs, added a further value to this square. Egypt continued after the French 
evacuation to be among the focal points of British interest. The British even attempted an 
unsuccessful campaign in 1807. Egypt was becoming a battleground in the European 
wars, and it continued to be so until the Vienna settlement that ended the conflict in the 
system.
In addition to these facts, the impact of the French campaign and the contact it 
established between the European political ideas and culture affected the Egyptian political 
culture, though this did not manifest itself for at least five years later. This explains why
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Mohammed All’s reforms were accepted to some extent smoothly by the Egyptians. In 
general, the functioning of the European system, as well as the ideas and culture within it, 
affected Egypt from this point onward as shall be seen in the power struggle that occurred 
in 1801-1805.
It is for all these reasons that the Egyptian Question began in 1798 and continued 
for decades to come. Once events reestablished links between Egypt and the European 
system, it was impossible to restore the status quo ante.
B· The Power Struggle in Egypt and the Failure of British and French Policies:
Egypt was now under the control of the British who occupied the country until 
1803 During that occupation, a serious power struggle erupted in Egypt between different 
parties that raged until 1805. Several factions contended for power on the eve o f the 
British occupation in 1801 which included the Mamelukes, the Ottomans, and Ottoman 
Albanian troops in the Ottoman army lead by Mohammed Ali. Moreover, the British 
played a war by proxy through supporting one of the different contenders. A review of the
contenders shows the following.
The Mamelukes:
The Mamelukes considered themselves the real owners of Egypt. They were a 
military oligarchy which depended on slave importation to maintain their race. Imported 
young slaves were transformed into strong fighters." Wars was to be their trade ... From 
their earliest years they were trained as horsemen and warriors, ... as a military clique". 
The latest blood injected into the Mameluke body was a slave shipment numbering about
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12,000 that arrived just before the beginning of the French campaign.Their  rriain sources 
of wealth were custom duties from the large amount of trade passing between Europe and 
far East through Egypt, as well as taxes levied on Egyptian citizens. Both revenues 
vanished with the arrival of the French.
On the political level, their solidarity suffered as a result of internal divisions. There 
were two factions; one followed the leadership of El Bardeissy Bey who, in turn, handed 
over his powers to Ibrahim Bey, while the second accepted the leadership of Mohammed 
El Ally Bey. As events proved, each chose a different path. Treachery further 
weakened their cohesion. A1 Djabarti provides a full description of this phenomena.^“*
Mameluke strength diminished further as a result of the defeats by the French.^^ 
They were subsequently dispersed over Greater Syria, Upper Egypt and the Sudan. By 
the time they returned to Egypt it proved difficult to reunite them, since many did not 
return and those who did were too weak to restore the status quo ante 1798. Although it 
is very difficult to estimate their numbers in Egypt by 1801, it is safe to assume that their 
numbers had diminished considerably.
The Ottomans:
The presence of a rare powerful Ottoman military force in Egypt at the time o f the 
French evacuation further weakened the Mamelukes. The Ottoman army in Egypt was 
estimated to be around ten thousand soldiers -excluding those of Albanian origin.^® 
Although this army was defeated at the Battle of Heliopolis in 1800, it nonetheless was 
more powerful than the Mameluke forces, which at the time formed a part o f this army
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Husrev (Khusrev) Pasha, the new Ottoman Vali, was determined to exterminate 
the Mamelukes as soon as possible. A1 Djabarti reports that after his accession to power he 
attempted to exterminate the Mamelukes by killing and pursuing them all over the country. 
His efforts included a battle between the forces of El Alfy Bey and those of the Ottoman 
army, which witnessed the former’s defeat and escape.^’ Only the presence of the British 
forces prevented the extermination of the Mamelukes. One major, but common problem 
facing Husrev, as well as most of the leaders at the time, was the unstable and corrupt 
nature o f the often unpaid army. This force became worse than the Mamelukes, looting 
and theft were commonplace and the Egyptian population was left in a worse situation
than ever.
The British:
British involvement in Egyptian affairs occurred after the French campaign 
triggered a new principle in British foreign policy: Egypt was never to be permitted to fall 
into the hands of another power, especially France, given its location on the strategic trade 
route from Egypt to India. This became the British primaiy objective vis-a-vis Egypt that 
continued uninterrupted until the British occupation in 1882. The British Minister of 
Defense explained this idea to Lord Grenville, the Prime Minister, stating that "the 
possession of Egypt by any independent power would be a fatal circumstance to the
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interest o f Britain.
The British faced a complex situation after the French evacuation. However, the 
most pressing factor was the time element for they recognized that the continuation of 
their military presence in Egypt could possibly cost them the war in Europe, or could turn 
some old allies, such as Russia, into foes. The main British objective at that time was to
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ensure that Egypt would not fall under the occupation or influence of the French or any 
other power. Therefore, if they were unable to secure Egypt through military occupation, 
arrangements had to be made to prevent any other European power from doing the same 
and to guarantee a pro-British attitude on the part of Egypt.
The policy alternatives for Britain were limited. They could either (1) continue the 
conquest of Egypt and suffer the resulting repercussions on the European system or (2) 
establish indirect rule over Egypt through the Mamelukes while maintaining Ottoman 
sovereignty or (3) gamble on the Albanian faction inside the Ottoman army or (4) hand 
over the matters to The Porte.^'' The situation was difficult.
The British had little choice and decided to gamble on the Mameluke horse. 
Strange as it may first appear, this choice was the most rational among the available 
options, for the Ottomans would have certainly aimed to tighten their grip on Egypt to 
prevent future foreign intervention. In addition, there was always the possibility o f a 
rapprochement between The Porte and France. The weak and undisciplined Ottomans of 
Albanian origin were the worst choice available since they were alien to the Egyptian 
people and could not be trusted. After some initial hesitation, the British opted for the 
Mameluke card and provided them full support, especially to El Alfy Bey. Once again the 
European system decided the fate of Egypt.
The Egyptian People:
Although it may be very difficult to accept that the Egyptian people were a 
significant power themselves, they nevertheless played a vital role in deciding the outcome 
o f the power struggle. Ignorant, devoid of political experience or nationalism for more
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than seven centuries, and above all, lacking an organized military machinery like the other 
parties, they remained the anonymous force in the arena.
Underdevelopment was a dominant factor. The French were shocked when they 
first entered the ancient and historical city of Alexandria. One member o f the expedition 
wrote that "The streets were unpaved and filthy, except for few date palms...there were no 
trees... the yearly epidemic of bubonic plague had just run its course".^® The rest o f the 
country was much the same. Cairo was described by the French officer Denon in the 
following terms, ".. .except for Esbekiya square,...the city was a warren of narrow unpaved 
streets Rubbish lay all about on every side, the haunt of scattering dogs and cats in the 
worst slums"; another wrote that there was, "not a single beautiful building... they build as 
little as they can help, they never repair."’ ’ There was no sign of the riches or civilization 
of ancient Egypt and the once heart of the Islamic world lay in despair. Veiy often the 
writings of A1 Djabarti mentions that a certain year was to begin with a state of drought, 
famine and economic hardship for the people. Fatal diseases such as the plague were 
widespread and local rulers made no effort to remedy this situation. Perhaps the state of 
isolation imposed on the Egyptians for centuries lead them to believe that "this was the 
best of all possible worlds .
The Egyptian people were victims of a corrupt and barren political system. 
Education was limited to A1 Azhar and minor local schools. The people bore increasingly 
heavy taxes. As was the case with most of the Arab states under the Ottoman rule, the 
general idea was that the unity of the gamaa, or the Muslim community at large, 
superseded any sense of nationalism. Faith, obedience and loyalty to the Caliphate system 
was like the Trinity to a Christian. The Sunni idea of uniting the community o f Islam
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under the leadership of the Caliph dominated the minds of the people. Thus when the 
Ottomans took control in 1801, the Egyptian people shouted in the streets once again, 
"God grant victory to the Sultan.
These ideas were bound to change in the face of the French political-revolutionary 
ideas and liberal customs. This developed further as the people endured the inefficient 
bureaucracy of the Ottomans and the Mamelukes once more. Moreover, the spirit of 
political passiveness that had plagued the Egyptian political life ended as a result o f their 
first revolt in centuries, against the French. After the French campaign the Egyptians were 
never to be the same. A split had occured between unquestionable obedience to the Sultan 
and Caliphate system on the one hand, and Egyptian nationalism and a sense of patriotism 
on the other This was perhaps the strongest manifestation of the cultural link the French 
campaign introduced between the Egyptians and the Europeans.
Though weak and disorganized, they possessed the keys to power through their 
uncovered strength: revolts and tax paying. This fact was recognized only by a young 
Albanian officer in the Ottoman nizam-i-jedid named Mohammed Ali.
Mohammed Ali and the Ottoman Albanian Faction'.
The final bidders for power in Egypt were Mohammed Ali and the Ottoman forces 
o f Albanian origin. There is some controversy as to the date of the arrival o f the Albanian 
troops to Egypt. Some historians claim that it was in March 1801.”  However, some 
historians refuse to commit themselves to any fixed date.”  It is, however a fact that by 
March 1801, Albanian forces were present in Egypt. It was in this month that the British 
entered into an alliance with the Ottomans and defeated the French at the Battle o f El
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Rahmania.^’ It was during this battle that Mohammed Ali impressed the Ottoman 
Commander and the leader of the Ottoman-Albanian group by his courage.^^
The total number of their forces is also unclear and most historians devote little 
attention to this issue. Some suggest an overestimated figure of forty thousand men, 
including Ottoman Turks, Syrians, Albanians, Acreans and other ethnic forces. 
Nevertheless, they were a strong force, and as soon as the Ottoman force diminished in 
size they assumed control of the city. The Albanian group was led by a Tahir Pasha, an 
ambitious man who hoped to be designated Vali by the Sultan. However, he was 
assassinated by the mobs in Cairo and left the Albanian force to Mohammed AJi Bey and 
returned home.
Mohammed Ali was an Albanian bom in the city of Kavala, near Salonika.^* He 
was the only son to survive among his 17 brothers and sisters. He joined the nizam-i-jedid 
in his adolescence, and then left it to become a tobacco salesman. Later, he was chosen by 
the governor to be among the three hundred soldiers sent to Egypt to join the Ottoman 
army against the French.^^ He was second in command to the governor’s son, a certain Ali 
Agha, who shortly after their arrival left command to Mohammed Ali.
As a result o f the courage he displayed at the Battle of A1 Rahmania, he was 
promoted to the rank of General {liwaa) by the Captain Pasha of the Ottoman fleet in 
Alexandria and introduced to Husrev Pasha, the appoineted Vali o f Egypt.“*® This 
promotion provided the young man with sufficient seniority to become the second in 
command to Tahir Pasha, the head of the Albanian division in the Ottoman army in Cairo. 
From that date onwards, this young Albanian began his quest to overcome his opponents 
and assume the viceroyalty of Egypt.
88
The power struggle:
With Egypt under the de facto control of Britain, the affairs were left to Yusuf 
Pasha El Vezir, commander of the Ottoman army in Egypt, France's influence on the 
events waned following its evacuation, although it later grew when Paris sided with the 
Mameluke faction led by Ibrahim Bey.
Although the British accepted their relationship with the Mamelukes, this policy 
was not without difficulty. The first problem was that of the division between El Alfy Bey 
and Bardeissy Bey. At the same time, British opinion was divided regarding the extent o f 
British assistance to the Mamelukes. In 1801, the British government proposed to the 
Sublime Porte a policy in Egypt which included, inter alia, the restoration of the 
Mamelukes to their original role, as long as they paid tribute to the Sultan, the creation of 
an Egyptian army to be trained and headed by a British officer, as well as other 
institutional and administrative reforms which could strengthen Egypt’s position.“**
However the Sublime Porte rejected this offer in the hope o f ridding itself 
completely from the Mamelukes. The British assured the Porte that they had no intentions 
o f encroaching upon its sovereignty over Egypt, and at the same time, tried to reconcile 
the Ottomans and the Mamelukes. Immediately after Husrev Pasha’s appointment as Vali 
in Egypt, he began a large scale persecution of the Mamelukes. It was alleged that he 
organized a gathering in order to apprehend the leaders of the Mamelukes in Cairo 
including Ibrahim Bey and Bardeissy Bey, while at the same time he dispatched Tahir 
Pasha at the head of the Albanian forces in his army to capture El Alfy Bey in Upper 
Egypt.“*2 The British reaction was swift. Hutchison, the British Military Commander in 
Giza, mobilized his forces to move against Cairo, and sent Husrev Pasha an ultimatum
89
demanding the immediate release of the Mamelukes.“*^ Hilsrev had no choice but to 
release the Mamelukes to the British at which point they were confined to Giza before 
going to Upper Egypt to regain their strength, much to the dismay o f Husrev. This 
temporarily removed the Mamelukes from the scene, but neither eliminated them nor lost 
them British support.
At this point the situation in Cairo worsened. The Ottoman army and its elements 
were unpaid and began massive looting campaigns in the city. What made matters even 
more critical was Husrev Pasha’s practice of demanding more taxes than the Egyptians 
could pay. Popular resentment began to increase.
Not only had Husrev lost faith with the British, but he endured guerrilla warfare 
by the Mamelukes, resulting in a series of major defeats for the Ottomans throughout 
1802 In 1803 Husrev committed the worst mistake by refusing to pay the Albanians and 
announcing that he planned to send them home.“*“* This triggered a mutiny among the 
Albanian soldiers, forcing him to flee Cairo with some of his forces. The Albanians were 
now independent of the Ottoman army. Tahir knew that he needed an ally to repel 
Husrev the only choice was to ally himself with the Mamelukes. Thus an alliance between 
El Bardeissy and Tahir Pasha was established, probably to the delight of the British.
As Tahir Pasha attempted to secure the legitimate title through a Ferman from the 
Sublime Porte, he was attacked and assassinated amidst the political and military chaos in 
Cairo. Some believe that he was assassinated by the Ottoman soldiers, who demanded 
their salaries, and when he refused to pay, they decapitated him in hope his head would 
win a reward from Husrev Pasha. Instead, they were seized and murdered by the 
Albanians.'*^ With Tahir's death, the leadership of the Albanians fell to Mohammed Ali
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who began to plan how to eliminate the contenders for power. When fate eliminated Tahir 
Pasha, Mohammed Ali was left with the Mamelukes and Hu'srev as the only contenders.“*^
The British were in a state of confusion. Events had taken them by full surprise 
and none of their officials bargained for Mohammed Ali. He was rarely mentioned in the 
reports o f their diplomats or consuls in Egypt or Istanbul prior to the death o f Tahir Pasha. 
This should not come as a surprise, for he was not even mentioned by most historians, not 
even A1 Djabarti’s daily and monthly accounts of the history of Egypt, except around the 
year 1803, when he appeared as a potential bidder for power. El Alfy Bey left Egypt with 
the British This decision by the British commanding officer upon his evacuation of Egypt 
was described as one of personal initiative without the prior consent of London.“*'' 
Although this assertion may or may not be true, the British nonetheless kept him for some 
time Some claimed that the British planned to land him when the time was appropriate to 
facilitate their reoccupation of Egypt, or to declare him viceroy and through him rule 
Egypt indirectly. In the meantime, British policy was to render assistance to the other 
Mamelukes, who were also in contact with French consuls in Cairo and Alexandria in the 
hope of gaining further support.
Mohammed Ali moved to benefit from the power struggles between the different 
factions, as well as instigating dissension every now and then. Another policy of his was to 
align himself with the Egyptian population, especially Naquib El Ashraaf "The Dean of 
Nobles", Omar Makram, who organized local resistance in Cairo during the two revolts 
against the French. He portrayed himself as champion of their cause by appealing to their 
misery and aspiration. He accepted the terms of Omar Makram by accepting the right of 
the Ulema and Aeyan to depose him if he proved to be unjust. What made him more
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popular was the means by which he was able to exploit eveiy event to increase his popular 
support, with such examples as publicly denouncing HusreVs new taxes while breaking the 
grain embargo imposed by the Mamelukes on Cairo for personal gains.
The alliance between Mohammed Ali and Bardeissy, effectively the sole leader o f 
the Mamelukes in Egypt at the time, was immediately established. Together they fought 
Husrev who fled Cairo to the port of Damietta. The result of the battle o f Damietta was 
the defeat of the Ottomans, the arrest of Husrev Pasha and his deportation to Cairo as a 
political prisoner in the Citadel.'’^  Though this seems to end the rule of Husrev in Egypt, it 
by no means terminated the struggle between him and Mohammed Ali. As HusreVs star 
began to reappear in the years to come, so did Mohammed Ali. Both these men were 
essentially enemies throughout, and the former did not forget the fact that Mohammed Ali 
curbed his powers in Egypt and threw him out in a very humiliating manner. This fact 
remained a very important element in the relationship between Mohammed Ali and the 
Porte especially when Husrev was appointed Commander of the Navy during the war in 
Morea, and when he became Sadrazzam during the second Ottoman-Egyptian war in 
1839. (Chapters IV, 4.1 and V 5.2)
The Bardeissy - Ali alliance, continued until the latter found the moment to 
maximize his political benefits and terminate the relationship. The Sublime Porte quickly 
issued a Ferman appointing Ali El Gezairley Pasha Vali over Egypt.^® Bardeissey was 
once again put to use by Mohammed Ali, whereby he was convinced to refuse this new 
Vali. Shortly, he asked the new Pasha to come from Alexandria with only 200 men as was 
the custom while entering Cairo. He refused to accept this and was unable to enter Cairo. 
As he faced these problems, the Mamelukes, according to A1 Djabarti, developed a
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conspiracy that cost him his life.^‘ The Sublime Porte was forced to issue a new Ferman 
appointing Hursh (Khourhid ) Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt.
The British, watching the developments in Egypt, decided that the time was ripe to 
restore El Alfy,^^ and landed him on the shores of Alexandria in February 1804. El 
Bardeissy was determined not to have any competition, but at the same time unwilling to 
start a war. It was left to Mohammed Ali to convince him to show animosity against El 
Ally Bey. The combined forces of Ali - Bardeissy crushed El Aliy's forces shortly after he 
landed and forced him to escape, temporarily ending the danger.
The time was ripe to break the pact with Bardeissy, and therefore he immediately 
began demanding paying the Albanian soldiers, which in turn instigated a general 
resentment against the Mamelukes. Bardeissy responded by levying taxes and the people 
rebelled This gave Ali the opportunity to rise up and defeat him. However, he was then 
faced with Hursit Pasha and the renewed power of A1 Aliy Bey.
Hursit Pasha not only represented a threat to Mohammed All's aims in Egypt, but 
any attempt to obstruct his presence would lead to problems with the Sublime Porte which 
could crush his ambitions. In addition, Ali had yet to gather the necessary support to lead 
him to an indirect struggle with Istanbul. Therefore, he continued to align himself with the 
legitimate ruler o f Egypt while biding for time. In doing so, he liberated Htisrev Pasha, 
then a Mameluke prisoner, and displayed signs of obedience to the Porte.
Hursit Pasha was unlike his predecessor, in that he was more cautious and planned 
to rid himself of the the Mamelukes and the Albanians as well. Thus upon his arrival he 
requested the military support of nearly five thousand Delis, who were ruthless and 
undisciplined Syrian warriors, to assist him in his struggle against the Albanians and the
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Mamelukes. ”  Mohammed Ali preoccupied himself fighting the Mamelukes who began an 
economic blockade over Cairo. Although he defeated them and lifted the blockade, he 
could not end the Mameluk threat since he was forced to focus on Hursit Pasha and his 
new Delis.
The lack of political talent of the Vali and the extent of the anarchy which existed 
in Cairo as a result of the undisciplined Delis, was the major cause for the establishment of 
Mohammed Ali in the hearts of the Egyptian people. Amidst these events, Hursit Pasha 
appointed Mohammed Ali as vali to the Vilayet of Jedda, which was by that time boiling 
as a result o f the Wahabby movement. Mohammed Ali intelligently enough, accepted the 
appointment from the Egyptian Vali, though he was determined to remain in Egypt.
The Egyptian people, lead by Omar Makram, reorganized themselves in military 
forms as they did during the French campaign and prepared for possible combat. The 
leaders of the Ulema and Aeyan entered a pact with Mohammed Ali, whereby they 
established him Vali instead of Hursit Pasha, provided that Mohammed Ali would be just 
and pious. It was agreed that the new Vali would impose no taxes without their consent 
and if he did, they would impeach him. In this way they could check his powers.
Refusing to recognize the Feman, the leaders began a popular movement to install 
Mohammed Ali as Vali. On the twelfth of May 1805, Cairo witnessed riots in the form of 
popular rebellion. The French consul reported that Cairo resembled Paris during the first 
days o f the 1789 revolution.^'* They demonstrated in the streets and asked for the Vali's 
removal. To add legitimacy to this decision, whether on the part of Mohammed Ali or the 
rioting leaders, the latter requested through letters to Istanbul, a Ferman appointing
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Mohammed Ali as Vali over Egypt. In the meantime, Hursit was surrounded in the 
Citadel.
Hursit being an obstinate man, refused to give in. The stalemate broke when a 
Ferman arrived appointing Mohammed Ali Kaymakam over Egypt. Hursit refused to 
accept it under the pretext that he was awaiting replies for his own letters to the Sublime 
Porte. Mohammed Ali refused to wait and attacked Hur^it’s main forces, thereby taking 
his differences to the battle field. Notwithstanding the internal struggle in Cairo, the 
Sublime Porte dispatched its fleet under Ramiz Pasha with two thousand five hundred 
soldiers to Alexandria in order to officially instate Mohammed Ali. However, Ramiz Pasha 
was instructed to judge who should rule Egypt, and if necessaiy aid Hursit Pasha.”  There 
were signs of British negotiations with Ramiz Pasha, as well as Hursit. Mohammed Ali 
also began formal talks with the Ottoman captain immediately.
After fending off an attack by the Mamelukes, Mohammed AJi counterattacked the 
Mamelukes at Giza, liberating the city by September 1805. Ramiz Pasha left Cairo after 
persuading Hursit Pasha to surrender and returned with him to Istanbul. As he departed 
Alexandria, Ramiz Pasha allegedly claimed that, "I have left Egypt in the hands o f a man 
that the state {the Ottoman Empire} will find  him to be one o f her greatest adversary. 
Our Sultans have not found a similar man {Mohammed Ali} in his cunning, firmness and 
will".^^ The battle with Hursit was over, but Mohammed Ali’s war for de facto  control of 
Egypt continued.
Mohammed Ali believed the final contender was A1 Alfi Bey who had arrived from 
Britain. Though defeated by the combined forces of Ali-Bardeissy, Ali pursued the 
Mamelukes of El Bardeissy viewing them as the stronger foe. Also Mohammed Ali
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focused on Hur^it. This allowed El Alfy sufficient time to regroup his army of Mamelukes 
and Bedouins. Furthermore, El Alfy was fortunate enough to learn that the Sublime Porte 
had substituted Mohammed Ali with a new Vali, Musa Pasha.”  Now Mohammed Ali was 
forced to fight El Alfy as well as the Porte’s new appointee, a task which proved to be too 
difficult considering his circumstances at the time.
Mohammed Ali's genius did not fail him. After considering his position, he 
approached the Ulema and Aeyans to obtain their support for his rule in Egypt. They in 
turn, wrote to the Captain in charge of the Ottoman fleet transporting the new Vali, so as 
to keep Mohammed Ali Vali over Egypt. He also procrastinated in executing the orders 
of the Porte and bargained for time. In the meantime, Alfy's forces were deployed in the 
delta to show the commander of the Turkish fleet Mohammed Ali's inability to control the 
situation at hand. However, he faced unexpectedly strong resistance from the delta city of 
Damanhour, and was unable to subdue it. ”  Viewing this failure, the commander of the 
Ottoman fleet in Alexandria reappraised developments in Egypt, and according to his 
instructions from Istanbul, sought to choose the Vali according to the circumstances.
At this stage Mohammed Ali employed bribery, a tool he mastered over time. He 
bribed both the Commander and the Sublime Porte. In the first case, he established 
contacts with Salih Pasha, Commander of the Ottoman fleet and through his envoys gave 
huge sums of money in form of presents to him and his crew.”  As for the Sublime Porte, 
Mohammed Ali pledged to send an annual tribute of four thousand purses, and left his son 
Ibrahim as hostage in Istanbul until he fulfilled his pledge. It should be noted that bribery 
was not the only means employed by Mohammed Ali, for Salih Pasha was disappointed at 
the attitude of the Mamelukes, especially with the lack of unity between both El Alfy and
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El Bardeissy, rendering them of little use to the Porte and himself. The Ottoman fleet left 
Alexandria with Musa Pasha as well as Ibrahim the son of Mohammed Ali in October 
1806, thereby giving a temporary, but crucial victory to Mohammed Ali, leaving the 
Mamelukes as his only foes.
The Mameluke problem was easier now that El Alfy was demoralized as a result of 
the Ottoman fleet’s failure to depose Mohammed Ali. Further, El Alfy’s troops deserted 
him as it became apparent there would be no British support. Moreover, El Bardeissy 
refused to provide assistance thereby weakening him further. In desperation, El Alfy 
marched against Cairo, lifting the siege on Damanhour. His army was still intact though 
not as strong as before. Here fortune once again intervened on behalf o f Mohammed Ali 
and El Aliy died as a result of cholera before he began combat with Mohammed Ali in 
Cairo His death most certainly led to the dismemberment of his force, which fell to the 
command of the new Mameluke leader, Shaheen Bey, who lacked the charisma which El 
Alfy used to hold the Bedouin together. This in itself was a major victory for Mohammed 
Ali who appeared more as the undisputed ruler of Egypt. The death of El Bardeissy some 
weeks before El Alfy further strengthened his position.
The British and French governments watched developments in Egypt with 
perplexity. France was totally outwitted by events and its gamble on Bardeissy and Ibrahim 
failed France's position with regard to the Porte was rather favorable in that Russia’s 
continued animosity towards the Ottomans forced the latter into the arms of the French. 
(See Chapter I I ) This increased British fears of a possible French invasion of Egypt.^®
Despite the general causes that might have led the British to undertake an invasion 
of Egypt, it seems more probable to attribute this campaign to two major causes besides
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the aforementioned. First, there existed a British fear that the French might try to regain 
Egypt. However, this should have been temporarily pacified given the lack o f French naval 
power after the battle of Trafalgar. Had it not been for the insistence o f Misset, the British 
Consul in Egypt, who in his reports continuously stressed that Mohammed Ali was allying 
himself further with the French Consul in Cairo, the British might not have taken this 
step.®' Furthermore, these reports offered a rosy picture on the possibility of an alliance 
with the Mamelukes. Second, British relations with the Sublime Porte worsened at that 
point in time, due to the rapprochement between Istanbul and Paris, resulting in a state of 
armed conflict and the attempt of the British fleet under the command of Admiral 
Duckworth to enter the Dardanelles. Therefore, there was no reason for them not to 
undertake an Egyptian campaign, which represented both a blow to Ottoman influence, 
and fulfilled Britain’s coveted ambititions to conquer Egypt.®"
The British landed a force of five thousand men on the beaches of Alexandria in 
March 1807 under the command of General Fraser. Alexandria offered little resistance, 
but acting on the advice of Misset, the General ordered a portion of his force to take the 
city of Rashid. This campaign resulted in a catastrophe. The British force was surprised 
and its soldiers were massacred in the streets of Rashid by the local population. The failure 
o f this expedition cost Fraser not only a great deal of men, but increased Egyptian morale 
and resistance.
At this point, Mohammed Ali suspended his chase of the Mamelukes and returned 
to Cairo to organize Egyptian forces against the British. His situation was difficult, but not 
critical. Once again his major allies, the Egyptian people and their leaders, furnished his 
army with money and materiel to resist the British advance. ®^ Fortunately for him, Fraser
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insisted on invading Rashid once again with a larger force, but, it was too late, 
Mohammed Ali had already dispatched a combined force o f Albanians and Delis to resist 
them. The result was a second British defeat. By September there were signs o f peace. 
The treaty o f withdrawal of the British forces was completed on September 14th, 1807, 
after negotiations between Mohammed Ali and two British officers. General Scherbrook 
and Captain Fellows.®'*
Once again fortune played a decisive factor in the withdrawal o f the British forces 
from Egypt and saved the rule of Mohammed Ali. Although some authors ignore the 
possibility o f an agreement between El Alfy and the British to combine forces and 
synchronize an attack against the Vali, nevertheless, there seems sufficient evidence to 
point to the opposite. To begin with, the British arrived on the 17th of March, and Alfi 
died on the 28th o f January 1807, that is to say, forty eight days before the arrival o f 
Fraser. It is doubtful that this was a coincidence. The number of British forces - 5000, 
was by no means sufficient to subdue Egypt, especially if one considers the fact that 
Bonaparte's forces exceeded thirty six thousand men. Hence it seems illogical to assume 
that General Fraser could have accomplished this task without a pre-negotiated settlement 
with El Alfy.
These were the reasons why the Fraser campaign, as it is known, failed. However, 
Ghorbal offers another explanation. He believes that the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 between 
Bonaparte and Tsar Alexander I, played a fundamental role in divorcing the Ottomans 
from France, thereby causing the British to change their policy towards the Sublime Porte, 
which influenced events in Egypt. (See Chapter II) Canning confirmed this policy on 
August 14th, 1807 by instructing Paget, his plenipotentiary on a mission to Istanbul, that.
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H.M .G was willing to recognize the government of the Porte in whatever part o f its 
dominions its residence may be established...and maintain with it the closest friendship and 
connections".®^
Regardless o f the analysis one makes of this campaign, it still shows that the 
international turn o f events in the European theater, as well as the fortunate timing for the 
death o f El Aliy and the two defeats of the British, all culminated in the strengthening o f 
Mohammed Ali's position in Egypt. In September 1807, after the British withdrawal, Ali 
remained the only victor in the power struggle in Egypt that lasted from 1801-1807. He 
was now the sole de jure  and the de facto  ruler of Egypt. The only remaining task was the 
destruction o f the Mamelukes o f Bardeissy and Alfi, as well as limiting the role o f the 
leaders o f the Ulema andAeyan, and ridding Egypt of undisciplined soldiers.
Skirmishes continued between the Mamelukes and Ali, the last o f which was the 
Battle o f El Bahansa in 1810 where the Mamelukes were defeated.®’ From then onwards, 
the Mamelukes were pacified. Most of them made peace with Mohammed Ali and 
remained in Cairo while others preferred to stay in upper Egypt. Despite the pacification 
o f the Mamelukes, Mohammed Ali wanted to expel them from Egypt. In 1810, he 
gathered what remained o f them in Cairo to celebrate the departure o f his son Toson 
Basha to fight the Wahhabis in the Arabian Peninsula. As the columns advanced from the 
Citadel to the streets o f Cairo, the Mamelukes were last in the parade, and when the last of 
the regular troops left, the doors of the citadel were closed and the trap sprung. Muskets 
appeared from every side against the Mamelukes who were exterminated to the last man,®* 
thereby ending a political existence that lasted for eight hundred years.
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Having terminated the Mameluke danger, the Mohammed Ali was convinced that 
any attempt to enforce his future plans in Egypt depended on ridding himself o f those 
leaders o f the people who represented a check on his powers. He put to use the principle 
of, "divide and rule", which was not a very difficult policy to employ, because the leaders 
themselves were disunited. Using money or privileges to foster division, he shifted their 
focus from public to personal affairs. He fabricated a crisis with Omar Makram and exiled 
him. By 1810 he succeeded in neutralizing the Aeyan and became the sole ruler o f Egypt.
This was the final result o f the power struggle in Egypt. As a result o f Mohammed 
All’s political talents and good luck, he alone stood undefeated. He later commented that 
"Fortune could be like a storm that leads the ship into the harbor quickly, but if the captain 
was not clever, his ship will be wrecked easily",'^  ^ thus implying that one requires more 
than hard work and consistency to succeed; he has to be clever. This man combined the 
three elements o f a successful prince according to Machiavelli. He was as shrewd as a fox, 
strong as a lion, and "fortuna" was always his ally.
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3.3 The Second Phase of the Egyptian Question: The Preparatory  Phase:
The second phase of the Egyptian question, or the preparatory phase, began just 
after the withdrawal o f the British forces from Alexandria in 1807. The reason this date 
marks the beginning of the second phase is because it points to the settlement o f the power 
struggle in Egypt, the beginning of a reform movement, and building an empire by 
Mohammed Ali. Unlike the previous stage, this one did not witness interventions by 
foreign powers. Moreover, Mohammed Ali reestablished relations with the main powers 
o f Europe, Britain and France, besides avoiding problems with the Porte.
A. The Foreign Policy of M ohammed Ali:
As events in Europe influenced the fate o f Egypt along the lines mentioned earlier, 
the new Vali did not attempt anything irrational. He understood that his survival depended 
on his association with a European state. He knew that he could not ignore the fact that 
the Porte wanted to get rid of him and at the same time, it proved difficult to obtain the 
support o f a European power.^** The European system at that stage was volatile as a result 
o f the disequilibrium created by France, which made the task of aligning Egypt with a 
power more difficult. The development of events in Europe left Mohammed Ali no choice 
but to bargain for an alliance with Britain. Though he never trusted them, he thought that 
they might be o f some assistance.
The conditions of the European system towards the end o f 1808 continued to 
affect the status of Egypt, yet there was no impelling factor that led either the British, the 
French nor the Ottomans to invade Egypt. A rapprochement between Britain and the
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Ottomans excluded the possibility o f a British invasion, (See Chapter II, 2.4; B The 
O ttom an European Diplomacy) while the British supremacy in the Mediterranean cost 
the French the chance for such an invasion. The Ottomans were consumed in the Russian 
front, to the degree that they had trouble defending themselves, least o f all prepare a 
campaign to depose Mohammed Ali. From then onward, Mohammed Ali did not fear the 
intervention o f the Porte or the French as much as he feared possible British involvement 
in Egyptian affairs in case Britain’s relations with the Porte soured. The end o f the Fraser 
campaign did not end Mohammed Ali's fears that Britain might try a new invasion, and he 
lived with this concern until the British actually orchestrated the downfall o f his grand 
designs in 1840.
Mohammed Aii's foreign policy with Britain was characterized by an approach of 
appeasement. This approach could be traced to the time of the Fraser campaign, for his 
farsightedness led him to permit the evacuation of their forces from Egypt without 
harassment and he did not mistreat British prisoners, for it was the custom then to 
decapitate them and hang their heads on sticks on the entrance of Cairo. This gesture 
aimed at keeping good relations with Britain for the future, since he was convinced that 
Britain, the sole maritime power in the world and in control of the Mediterranean, was the 
most influential power at least in as far as Egypt was concerned. Through 1840, 
Mohammed Ali feared a second British invasion, that is perhaps why he acted to terminate 
the Mamelukes as soon as possible to avoid a British war by proxy.
After the evacuation, he developed a policy of attracting them towards an alliance. 
By 1808 he proposed an alliance to their Consul in Egypt whereby Britain would help 
Egypt attain independence, while Egypt would provide facilities for its fleet.. 71
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Unfortunately for him, Britain was preparing for the Treaty of the Dardanelles, and 
therefore, prepared for its war efforts against France on the continent. For the time being, 
it hoped to seduce the Porte into an alliance against France and hence rejected 
Mohammed Ali’s offer. (See Chapter II, 65-8)
To maintain the friendship of the British, he began trading with them. He was 
convinced that this was the only means to avoid a possible future invasion. He supplied the 
British fleet with grain, and, fortuitously, grain prices and harvest sizes were high. This 
trade gave Mohammed Ali a profit o f 500% as well as the friendship o f the British, which 
fell short o f an alliance.’  ^Other initiatives of friendship by the Egyptian Pasha included his 
decision in 1808 to permit the British to have some temporary facilities in the port o f 
Alexandria. By 1812, he suggested to the British once again an alliance provided that the 
British would help him gain independence from the Porte. London's reply was 
unfavorable, for the Minister o f War emphasized, "...As long as the state o f peace between 
H.M  Government and the Porte is maintained, H.M can not authorize you to engage in 
any contractual obligations incompatible with good faith which it has to observe".
It was only then that the Pasha realized that this was the extent o f friendship he 
was to get from the British, who were unwilling to sacrifice relations with the Porte, 
especially during the war underway in Europe. Following the war, things remained 
unchanged since Britain had become the defender of the Ottoman integrity for strategic 
reasons. Any support for Egypt could foster a separatist movement in the Ottoman body, 
and be incompatible with their policy of Ottoman integration. (See Chapter II, 67-9) For 
this reason, relations with Egypt were unchanged for the next few decades and Britain 
refused Egyptian attempts at friendship. Indeed, there were even frictions with
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Mohammed Ali, especially during the Hijaz campaign when Egyptian forces subdued 
Yemen on behalf o f the Porte while the British attempted to secure the port o f Mocha for 
their trade route in India. Further problems appeared when Mohammed All’s forces 
reached the Persian Gulf, an area Britain consider out of bounds for Egypt since it affected 
its trade route to India. Mohammed Ali was forced to withdraw.
The French, however, were eager to consolidate their position in Egypt through 
diplomatic means, though at certain intervals they contemplated militarily conquet. Their 
Consul Drovetti was a very active man. He established good relations with the Pasha to 
the extent that the second language in Egypt after Arabic became French. Certainly, 
Drovetti and his colleagues played an important role in process of enlightenment in Egypt.
Mohammed Ali knew that attempts to obtain independence from the Porte 
depended upon either British or French support, therefore, he attempted to win the 
support o f both parties. His efforts to obtain an alliance with the French were as 
unsuccessful as those with the British. In fact, Cairo was not high on the priority list o f 
Bonaparte at this time. Their policy in Egypt was aimed at frustrating the British 
rapprochement with Mohammed Ali. Their Consuls constantly referred to the Vali when 
they felt increasing British influence.' '^* It is recorded that when the French Consul Drovetti 
learned that Egypt had granted facilities to the British fleet, he immediately sought a 
conference with the Pasha. In his letter to Paris, Drovetti claimed that the Pasha o f Egypt 
assured him that " He can not depend on the signs provided by the Britain... He swore 
upon the honor o f his sword that he refused any British condition placing him under their 
protection..."’’ French consuls maintained a presence in Egypt for the day when they 
could play a more effective role.
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However, the relationship between Egypt and France did not develop until after 
the Vienna Congress and the restoration of peace in Europe, once again showing the 
influence o f the ongoing events in Europe on Egyptian politics. Since the French 
withdrawal in 1801, no French trade ship entered the harbor o f Alexandria for years. This 
changed and soon European politics permitted the rapprochement between Egypt and 
France, especially after the reintegration of France into the European family. Mohammed 
Ali depended a great deal on France for the reformation movement in Egypt. He sent the 
Egyptian education missions to Paris and other French cities. His new army was 
established in the years that followed along French lines and their French assistance. The 
relationship developed new horizons to the extent that France sought help from 
Mohammed Ali in 1830 to subdue Algeria. (See Chapter IV) It would not be an 
exaggeration to suggest that Egypt could be considered the extension o f French interests 
in the south, during the 1820’s.
As for relations between Mohammed Ali and the Porte, he did what he could to 
satisfy the Porte to avoid its wrath and his possible dismissal. Since his armies were still 
undeveloped and his mercenaries unreliable, his position was too vulnerable for an 
sggressive posture. However, the Porte was focused on the Russian front and this 
provided the breathing space he needed. At the same time, he dreamt o f an empire o f his 
own, with Egypt at its center including the Arabian Peninsula, the Sudan, Libya, Greater 
Syria and if possible Anatolia. But he knew that the European system was not ready to 
accept these plans, and more importantly, his financial and political position was fragile.
So he continued to appease the Porte as well as Britain and France.
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It was within this framework that the new Pasha formulated his foreign policy. His 
relationship with the Porte was strained by mutual mistrust. The Porte viewed Mohammed 
Ali as a lawful usurper o f power in Egypt. While he was appointed Kaymakcm by 
official Ferman, the Porte was suspicious as to his ambitions, and tried unsuccessfully 
transfer him twice to another Vilayet^^ The failure of British attempt to invade Egypt  
1807 consolidated his position as Vali vis-a-vis the Porte. He saved Egypt and this fact 
strengthened his position in the Porte which could not assist him against the British.
By 1808, Mohammed Ali's intentions of independence was known to every 
Consul in Egypt and the Porte as well, though he continued to perform the act o f 
allegiance to the Sultan. Even the Porte depended on him in several occasions for 
assistance. He was asked to intervene to quell the Wahhabi religious movement in Hijaz in 
1807 on behalf o f the Porte. He was further requested in 1808 to follow the Porte's 
policies against France.’’ In June 13th 1809 the grand 'VezirYusuf Pasha wrote to 
Mohammed Ali requesting a considerable sum of money for the military preparations o f 
the Porte against Russia. This was not uncommon, in that the Porte frequently requested 
money from her vilayet, however, the words in this letter, as did other ones, reflected the 
true position o f Mohammed Ali vis-a-vis the Porte. It was not a letter from the superior to 
the subordinate, on the contrary, it was more like a letter between two equals. Youssef 
Pasha described Mohammed Ali as the savior of Egypt and the Porte, and very often 
referred to him as the "Friend of the State", "Minister of the State" and "Your 
Excellency". ’*
The policy o f acquiescence with the Porte continued, and as soon as Mohammed 
s position was consolidated, he asked for nominal independence. In 1810, he wrote to
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his envoy to Istanbul, Neguib Effendi, requesting him to convey to the Porte his request 
"... to declare Egypt free "serbest" like the Ojak o f Algiers and others, and in this case if 
hostilities breaks out between England and the Ottoman Empire, (he) shall be in harmony 
with the British, and could circulate five or ten big ships (trade vessels under the flag o f an 
Ojak... and send Egyptian provisions to the Porte through it''.’  ^The Porte refused to grant 
Egypt this status, even though it could have been conditional until the cessation o f 
hostilities with the Britain. On the contrary, his envoy to Istanbul Neguib effendi 
concluded that the Porte promised to fulfill all his requests if he fought against the 
Wahhabis.*® This was clearly an attempt to stall Mohammed Ali and persuade him to go to 
war in Arabia. Though he abided by the Porte’s decision, he was nevertheless, unhappy 
with the failure o f his scheme.
Carrying out the war on behalf of the Porte did not alter the Vali's desires, but 
merely represented the policy o f acquiescence he followed in the face o f the refusal o f 
European powers to offer their friendship. By the end of the Wahhabi war and their final 
defeat in 1818, the Porte gave the vilayet o f Hijaz to his son Ibrahim Pasha, then the 
commander in chief o f the Egyptian armies. Some believe that this was an attempt by the 
Porte to create a division between the Father and the son so as to weaken Mohammed Ali, 
especially since the Porte could not rid itself from him.** From then onward, the Egyptian 
Vali maintained a relationship of a semi-equality with the Porte. Moreover, the Porte used 
him further, especially during the Greek War o f Independence though at this time under 
his own conditions. As time progressed, Mohammed Ali was convinced that independence 
had to be obtained by force and not hy Ferman, leading to two wars with the Porte.
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As is evident, Egyptian affairs were closely linked to development in the European 
system. Mohammed AJi's policy towards Britain, France and the Porte was to a great 
extent controlled by the dynamics o f this system. In general, the Egyptian Question in this 
phase was less active than that during the previous one, because the system in Europe was 
more focused on the events talcing place in the continent unlike the period from 1798- 
1807. That is attributed to British, Russian and Austrian focus on and efforts o f restricting 
French activities on the continent. Nevertheless, the seeds for future crises and the 
development o f this question were laid at that stage as a result o f two main factors, the 
first o f which was the Egyptian expansionist policy and the expansion of the Egyptian 
military machinery along modern European lines.
®· Egyptian Expansion:
Egyptian expansion began as early as 1811 with the military campaign in Hijaz- 
Arabian Peninsula. Traditionally the Hijaz was a veiy important vilayet in the Ottoman 
Empire. That was not because it represented an important asset economically or 
strategically. On the contrary, its value was its control of the holy places o f Islam. Being 
the official Caliphs, the Ottoman Sultans needed sovereignty over it for political purposes 
and as a means to preserve Islamic unity among the different Islamic vilayet o f the Empire. 
The eighteenth century witnessed the development of a semi-theocratic state based on the 
preaching o f an extremist Mohammed Ibn Abd El Wahhab and his association with the 
Saud family. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, this new theocratic state 
overwhelmed the peninsula, to the detriment o f the Ottoman sovereignty.*^ Extremism 
oould be tolerated in the Peninsula, however, the political repercussion o f such a rightist
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movement had a negative effect on the Ottomans, for it spread to Yemen, Libya and other 
places, thereby jeopardizing the political legitimacy of the Ottoman rule over the Islamic 
states. What instigated the Ottoman reaction was the decision of the Saudis to prevent the 
annual pilgrimage from Syria and Egypt and the expulsion o f the Ottoman garrison 
stationed there in 1806.*^
The Valis o f Syria and Iraq were ordered to begin hostilities against the Saudis in 
Hijaz. Both failed, forcing the Porte to turn to Mohammed Ali to defeat the new 
theocratic state. Requests for the Egyptian intervention in Arabia were made for the first 
time in 1806-7, however, the unstable political situation in Egypt would not permit 
Mohammed Ali to embark on such a project. For the next four years, the Egyptian Vali 
procrastinated in following the orders of the Sultan. However by 1811 he was prepared to 
fulfill the orders of the Sultan and he dispatched a force consisting o f Albanians 
Moroccans and several other mercenaries under the leadership of his son Tusón.
There are several interpretations as to why Mohammed Ali accepted this order. He 
probably realized the strategic and political importance of the Arabian peninsula for Egypt 
It was what we may call the near abroad policy followed by many o f the other Egyptian 
empires, such as the Mamelukes. Moreover, if he was to have an empire, the time was ripe 
for him to begin expansion especially that he was acting under the umbrella o f the Porte 
Mohammed Ali also found this war a useful method of ridding Egypt o f his mercenary 
forces and to initiate a military reform movement for the establishment o f a modern army 
It could also be argued that the Egyptian Vali was in position to turn down the Porte's 
request but within the context of his policy of acquiescence he was forced to go
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The Arabian campaign was serious and bloody.*^ The Egyptian army suffered from 
several initial defeat, disease, and thirst but in the end they were successful as a result o f 
the leadership demonstrated by Ibrahim, another son of Mohammed Ali, who assumed 
command following the demise of his brother Tusón. It took the Egyptians seven years to 
destroy the first Saudi state. At the final battle of A1 Dereia (then capital of the Saudis) in 
March 1818, the leader o f the Saudi state, Ibn Saud, was captured and sent to Egypt. 
Mohammed Ali exerted a great deal of effort to spare his life of Ibn Saud, but according to 
the Sultan's will, he was sent over to Istanbul where he was condemned to death on 
December 19, 1818.*^ As a reward, Ibrahim Pasha was granted the vilayet o f Hijaz in the 
same year. Probably, the Sultan still needed to secure the area and therefore, he had to 
leave it to Ibrahim for this purpose, though some are of the opinion that he intentionally 
tried to sow dissension between hfohammed Ali and his son although this did not happen.
The next step of Egyptian expansion was towards south in Sudan. There were 
several reasons for Mohammed Ali's decision, among them the fact that the Sudan 
represents the geographic extension of Egypt from where the Nile river flows. In addition, 
he believed that there were possibilities of striking gold and other riches there. However, 
the most important reasons was to have black recniits for his new army.*’ In 1820 he sent 
a force o f five thousand men under the leadership of his son Ismail. Unfortunately, his son 
died during the campaign. This was followed by another force lead by his other son 
Ibrahim in 1821. Another force was dispatched the following year under the command of 
his brother in law.** These three campaigns extended the Egyptian rule in Sudan which 
was completely subdued in subsequent years.
I l l
Prior to the war in Morea in 1825, the rule of Mohammed Ali extended from the 
Persian Gulf in the East to the Libyan borders in the West and from Alexandria in the 
North to the southern borders of Sudan. It was a substancial empire, further strengthened 
by his acquisition of Syria in 1833.
C. Adm inistrative and M ilitary Reforms;
Mohammed Ali was entirely unlike the rest of the Valis that governed Egypt on 
behalf o f the Ottoman Empire. He aimed to establish a hereditary empire and recognized 
the need to begin establishing a competent and long lasting administrative system to 
guarantee prosperity and continuity. He had to detach the center of his future empire from 
the Ottoman legacy, and begin a massive development plan. That is why he is most 
commonly known to the Egyptian historians as the founder of modern Egypt.
To establish a strong army and establish an effective new system o f government 
administration, finance, and economy, Mohammed Ali began in 1814 to reshape the form 
o f the government. He divided Egypt into thirteen governerates Muduriet and these were 
divided into sections, Aqsam}^ The governors were Ottomans while the head o f the 
Aqsam  were Egyptians. In every govemerate there was a chief o f police to maintain 
security. In this way, the decisions of the Vali were to be enforced.
On the state level, Mohammed Ali initiated a system similar to that o f today’s 
cabinet system. He installed Xht Divaniya, or a ministerial system. Each o f the major fields 
o f the government was organized under a divan, or ministry, in charge o f executing the 
orders o f the Vali. As time passed, the number of divans increased until there was a divan 
for interior, army, navy, public works, finance, and foreign affairs. 90
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The decision-taking mechanism remained in the hands of Mohammed Ali. He was 
what we may call an enlightened dictator. On the top of the government was the Maiyya 
Saniyya or the (vice royal). That was later called the Sura Elmouana, or (Assisting 
Consultation). The function o f this body was to help the Vali make decisions, similar to a 
consultative council that did not limit his dictatorial rights.
Since the main aim of Mohammed Ali was to build an empire, he needed a strong 
army. However, being enlightened enough, he realized that this could not be achieved 
without a proper reformation movement in all the economic fields. He therefore initiated 
an effective economic reformation plan. In the agricultural field, he recognized that Egypt 
was an agricultural country above all. This led him to abolish the old agricultural system of 
the Ottoman Empire, commonly known as the Iltizam. Mohammed Ali declared himself 
the sole owner o f land, thus, he expropriated all the lands of the Mamelukes and the 
endowments as well. He gave the peasants land to cultivate and provided the seeds, tools 
and public works necessary for a good harvest. In turn, the peasants paid taxes in the form 
o f a percentage o f their products and crops such as cotton, wheat and other important 
products were bought by the government. That was the case for the major crops produced 
by Egypt such. Other products were left to the peasants. This was the system commonly 
known as the Nizam al Ihtikar, or system of monopoly. Peasants did not benefit as much 
from this system as the state which accumulated considerable wealth.
In the industrial field the new Vali made astonishing progress. The industrial 
revolution in Egypt was to serve the military machine and its needs. The main industry that 
was developed in Egypt was that of the cotton weaving and fabrication, and to this end he 
established around 15 factories producing approximately two million pieces a year. Cloth
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production flourished and its total production was around three million pieces a year 
Industries such as sugar processing, dyes, oil extraction, soap, paper, iron and steel 
production also prospered. Egypt was nearly self sufficient.
Agriculture and industrial reforms were complimented by a sound fiscal policy. 
Although Egypt was bankrupt at the beginning of his rule, by 1821 the budget was 
balanced on 2,200,000 Egyptian pounds per year. This figure reached 2,500,000 in 1833 
thereby scoring for the first time, a surplus of 500,000 pounds. This surplus reached 
1,000,000 in the 1838 budget.T hus, the 1838 budget o f4,500,000 was 135,000,000 
French Francs. To further understand the significance of these figures, it is sufficient to 
note that the losses of the entire Greek campaign (See Chapter IV) including the 
destruction o f the entire Egyptian fleet, cost the government around 750,000 pounds. This 
in crude terms could shed some light on the power of the Egyptian economy which could 
have tolerated another defeat equal in scale to that of the Greek Campaign, without 
accumulating severe debts. This success was not really reflected in the foreign sector, for 
Egypt endured a trade deficit that was around 15 % during the 1830's.
Regardless o f the criticism directed towards Mohammed Ali, his rule and 
administration, he transformed Egypt from total backwardness to a modern state that 
could easily match some European states at the time. He relied on foreigners for the 
development programs, but as time passed, Egyptians began to steer the different sectors 
o f the economy and Egypt gradually became independent and more powerful militarily. 
Perhaps, among the best judgments of the entire reform process of Mohammed Ali was 
written by F. Lutski who claimed that, "these reforms were like those o f Peter the Great in 
Russia, carrying the seeds of progress despite the fact that it was a heavy burden on the
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Egyptian population .... As did Peter the Great, Mohammed A li... destroyed the legacy of 
the underdevelopment of middle ages".**^
The different reforms undertaken by Mohammed Ali in Egypt aimed at 
consolidating and developing the power of the state. His industrial and agricultural reforms 
were a sine qua non to establish a military that could expand and defend his empire. A 
powerful army would also guarantee his personal safety. Being able to manipulate the 
different possible political groups was insufficient to maintain his rule in Egypt. His 
undisciplined army at hand, formed of Ottomans, ^ioroccans. Delis, Albanians, 
Axrïienians Caucasians and other mercenaries could not be trusted. To secure the 
allegiance o f the different factions and prevent their possible uprising, he needed a modern 
army.*’'* Such a force would also protect Egypt from a future French, British or Ottoman 
invasion. All of the above contributed to the creation of a disciplined army.^^ (See Chapter 
IV)
There seems to be no record on the date when Mohammed Ali began to think 
about establishing a modern disciplined army. However, his first attempt to establish a 
disciplinary military machinery occurred during his military campaign in Arabia. Upon his 
return to Egypt, Mohammed Ali pushed new ideas about discipline in the army. 
Undisciplined mercenaries immediately revolted in Egypt and a fatal conspiracy on his life 
failed.^® Insubordination and insurrection consumed the capital and took some time to 
quell. There was however an attempt by Mohammed Ali's secretary Katkhada Laz oglu 
Bek to gather some of the vagabonds and the unemployed of the cities and establish a 
paramilitary group. However, little is available on this movement that eventually failed. 98
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The first serious attempt by Mohammed Ali to create the core o f the modern 
Egyptian army was during 1820. Concerned about a possible rebellion, at a time when the 
bulk o f his armies were exhausted by the Arabian war, the Vali turned his sight towards 
Aswan where he granted to a French Captain called Seves (whom he mistakenly 
believed to be a Colonel) the responsibility of forming the first military school in Egypt in 
1820 To this task, Mohammed Ali provided around 500 of the Mameluke children (a 
number he later doubled) who became the core of the modem Egyptian army. It is worth 
mentioning that Ibrahim Pasha the son of Mohammed Ali was trained as an ordinary 
soldier in the Aswan military school among the Mamelukes.
It took Captain Suleiyman three years to create the first units of the modern 
Egyptian army. This was a difficult task because the Mamelukes were difficult to 
discipline and because they nearly succeeded in assassinating him on several occasions. 
Furthermore, the basic problem was in recruiting regular soldiers, for the Mamelukes were 
only to become officers. To overcome this problem, the Vali recruited Sudanese, and thus 
ordered his son Ismail, the commander of the Egyptian forces in Sudan, to send twenty 
thousand Sudanese for the purpose of recruitment.
The Vali's plan failed because the Sudanese were unable to adapt to the new 
environment, and the mortality rate among these recruits was very high. It became 
necessary to find another alternative. The only remaining choice was to recruit soldiers 
from the Egyptian peasantry. Thus, for the first time probably since the days of the 
Pharaohs, drafting was instituted in Egypt for an obligatory period o f three years. 
Unfortunately, the idea was too new for the Egyptians who rioted. However, the Vali 
controlled these riots quickly and the system was generally mandatory for peasantry.
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By 1824, the Aswan school produced the first regular and disciplined Egyptian 
army. It consisted o f six Alai each consisting of five Orates}^^ The French Consul 
Drovetti wrote to Paris explaining this new army in the following words, "This new 
disciplined and trained army along the lines of the French one, consists of Egyptians and 
Sudanese, while their officers were Mamelukes and Turks, has reached a very high level o f 
precision in maneuvers that gives a great deal of pride to the French Officers who taught 
them".*®  ^At this stage, the new disciplined army consisted o f twenty four thousand men in 
addition to ten thousand irregulars.
In the same year after the success of Captain Suleyman, a French expedition 
arrived to train the Egyptian army in other military fields. By the end of the 1820's, the 
Egyptian army was to be trained primarily by French officers assisted by Italians, Polish 
and Spanish. To expand, the Aswan School was not sufficient, therefore, the Vali 
established a series o f new schools in all the different military fields. They ran along the 
following lines:
* The Infantry School in Aswan:
This school was established by Captain Suleyman and graduated the first class 
three years after its establishment. It was later moved to Esna in upper Egypt and later to 
El Khankaa in near Cairo and was called Madraset E l Gehadia. It continued for another 
few years until it was replaced in 1832.
* The Second infantry School:
It was established in El Khankaa and later moved to the Port o f Damietta in 1834, 
and then back to Cairo in 1841. It aimed at graduating officers only and it had a capacity 
o f around four hundred students.
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It was established in Giza in 1831 upon the request o f Mohammed Ali. It was an 
essential part o f the military structure of the modem Egyptian army. On average, it trained 
around seven hundred soldiers and recmits. However, by 1841 the total number o f 
students and professors constituted around four Orat, around three thousand two hundred. 
The syllabus included nearly all the fields of military training, like other military schools - 
languages, geometry, natural sciences and military sciences. This school had a profound 
effect on the structure o f the modem Egyptian army and played an important role in the 
First and Second Syrian Campaigns of 1833 and 1839.
*The Artillery School;
It was established in 1831 by a Spanish officer named Antonio de Sequerra, who 
became its headmaster. It recruited both officers and soldiers with the full capacity of 
around three hundred and fifty students. As was the case with many other military schools, 
it had its own prints and library. The Pasha, focused considerable special attention on this 
institution, probably because of the fact that Bonaparte was an artillery officer.
* The Military Engineer School:
It was established as a section of the Artillery school, however, it was later 
separated. It trained cadets in building canals, bridges, military fortifications, and mines. 
According to the military formations, nearly every Alai, had several of these graduates.
* The Staff College:
It was established in 1825 and headed by a French officer named Blanna. It 
recmited cadets from different schools and taught military studies for three years.
* The Cavalry School:
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Since it was the aim of Mohammed AJi to establish an army along modern 
European lines, it was necessary to establish a military music school. It was headed by a 
Frenchman called M. Carre and it recruited around one hundred and sixty students. Its 
graduates were distributed among all the different Alai.
Military education was not only in the hands of these schools, for the Pasha made 
sure that some Egyptians were to be trained abroad as well, so that they could share their 
experiences with the new army. Beginning in 1813, he sent several military missions 
abroad. These missions studied military matters as well as military industry and other 
spheres o f interests related to the military aspects. Some of the members o f these missions 
held important positions in the Egyptian military structure.
In addition to schools and the training of new cadets, Mohammed Ali, realized the 
need for the development in the field of armament, ammunition and logistics. It is 
important to note that Egypt during the early parts o f the nineteenth century was 
backward in nearly all military industry. With exception o f some small powder factories, 
the country lacked any kind of military production facility. Given the state o f technology at 
the time, it was not an unthinkable task to bridge the gap with the European military 
production.
The policy o f military import substitution, by Mohammed AJi if we may call it so, 
was successful, but in no way did it impede the necessity of importing military equipment 
from the west, especially naval vessels and some pieces of artillery. Once again, European 
ex-offrcers and industrialists assisted him. During his reign, he built a factory for rifle 
production in the Citadel and in 1831 another was established under the supervision o f an
Military Music School:
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Italian called Senior Marengo. These factories, collectively, produced around thirty two 
thousand rifles a year, far Beyond Egyptian needs. Artillery production was also o f 
interest to him, so he established several high-quality factories, though these were not as 
efficient as their western counterparts. In the field o f heavy artillery the main productions 
were cannons of four and eight pounds caliber, as well as twelve caliber -anti fortification, 
howitzers o f twenty four pounds and hawns of three and a half inch caliber. Powder 
production also interested the Pasha, so he established several factories under the 
supervision o f certain Frenchman Mr. Martell. By the third decade o f the eighteenth 
century, Mohammed Ali had established a strong and well-equipped army.
Mohammed Ali recognized that he required a powerful navy, in both the 
Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Since he believed that any attempt to secure Egypt from 
foreign invasions would require a strong army and navy, he embarked on a plan to 
establish a such a fleet. What added to his conviction to build a strong navy was his belief 
that Egypt was invaded twice in less than a decade through sea, therefore Egypt required a 
naval deterrent to prevent future possible aggression. He also fortified the major ports so 
as to assist the navy in case o f an invasion.
The first attempt by Mohammed Ali to establish a navy occurred in 1810 during 
the wars o f the Arabian peninsula when he needed a naval line of communication in the 
Red Sea to assist his armies in the peninsula and secure logistic deliveries. He first built a 
small arsenal in Beaulac on the Nile where ships were built, dismantled and transported 
across the desert on camel to the port of Suez where they were reassembled and 
launched.^®*
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These primitive ships could serve the purpose of fighting the Wahabbis and 
subduing the pirates in the Red Sea, but could not face a strong enemy that might threaten 
Egypt, especially from the Mediterranean. Thus, the Pasha had to begin the establishment 
o f a true navy in the Mediterranean, primarily through the purchase o f several naval 
vessels from Marseilles, Triste and Genoa. These few ships, as well as the ones produced 
locally, formed the main components of the Egyptian Mediterranean fleet. This continued 
to be the policy o f the Pasha until the Battle of Navarino in 1827 where the Egyptian fleet 
was destroyed. (See Chapter IV). This defeat was actually the turning point o f the 
Egyptian navy, for in 1829 Mohammed Ali established a large arsenal in Alexandria under 
the command o f an Egyptian assisted by a Frenchman called Besson. Soon Egypt was 
producing warships that approached European quality. A naval academy was established 
in Alexandria to recruit Egyptian students for the new fleet. By the middle of the decade 
Egypt possessed a strong and well-trained naval force.
A strong army and navy required strong administration. Therefore, all the military 
affairs were supervised directly by Diywan E l Gihadiyya, or in modern terms the Ministry 
o f War. Its first minister, or Nazir, was the private secretary of the Pasha Mohammed Laz 
oglu Bek who was followed by Mohmoud Ezzat El Arnouty, commonly known as 
Mahmoud Bek Bakalim.'®® This Divan was under the supervision o f the Pasha himself 
because o f his special interest in military affairs. Despite the fact that the heads o f the 
different divisions in this new army were supervised by the Nazir al Gihaddiyya, they 
enjoyed access to Mohammed Ali himself Besides the job of supervising the military 
schools, the Nazir A l Gihaddiya was charged with supervising other non-disciplinaiy 
paramilitary forces, which constituted an important part of the army.
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These labors gave Egypt a strong and efficient militaiy machinery that eventually 
represented a threat to many powers in the area. There are several inventories o f the 
Egyptian armies along the years since the beginning of the 1830's."® El Rafei mentions in 
his inventories, that the Egyptian army in 1833 reached the figure o f 168,889 men 
including, regulars, paramilitary forces, the navy and soldiers under call. This number 
reached 235,880 in 1939 including all the previous c a te g o rie s .F . Mengin believes that 
the total number o f the Egyptian army was 159,300 in the year 1837. This figure 
excluded the navy and the soldiers under call and the non-regulars. Zaki's inventory was 
also close to El Rafei's and Claude Bek, for according to him the Egyptian army was 
123,225 in 1837 and it rose to 130,300 in 1839.**  ^ These figures also excluded the 
paramilitary forces, the navy and the soldiers under call. We are inclined to trust the 
figures o f El Rafei and Claude Bek, for they are very close to the other figures but include 
the irregular forces, the soldiers under call and others which played a role in the modern 
Egyptian army. Thus, we can comfortably conclude that the combined Egyptian forces 
reached around a quarter o f a million soldiers and included the different branches o f the 
military machinery in addition to the soldiers under call and the paramilitary .
As far as we are concerned at this stage, the Egyptian army represented a very 
important tool for the ambitions of Mohammed Ali's foreign policy. Egypt had surpassed 
the original master - the Ottoman Empire - in nearly every field. This moved the Egyptian 
Question from the passive phase to the active phase. Mohammed Ali's shrewd foreign 
policy and internal reforms that elevated Egypt to a high level. Egypt was now ready to 
play a role whereby its interaction with the European system became much more intense 
From this point on, the Egyptian Question assumed a new dimension, and for the first
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time, began to affect the European system, instead merely being affected by it.
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Chapter IV
The Egyptian Question and The European System 
War in Morea and Anatolia
The previous chapter focused on the rise and development o f the Egyptian 
Question between 1798 and 1825 and how it moved from the passive phase to the 
preparatory one. In this chapter and the next we shall focus on the third and final phase of 
the Egyptian Question. This chapter shall discuss the transformation of the Egyptian 
Question from the phase when it was subject to foreign influence to the stage where it 
influenced events and threatened European equilibrium through the expansionist foreign 
policy of Mohammed Ali. This chapter could be considered a prelude to the final 1839 
crisis when the European major powers united to confront the potential threat from Egypt.
4.1 The Greek Insurrection : The First Challenge by the Egyptian Question to the 
European System
The Greek insurrection of 1821 could have been a normal insurrection against the 
Ottomans, similar to the earlier Serbian or Saudi revolts, however, the fundamental 
difference was that the major powers began to have a vested interest in this affair. (See 
chapter II) The European system functioned on the premise of balance o f power 
mechanics enshrined in the context of the Holy Alliance and the Congresses. However, 
since this case included a major territoiy of the Ottoman Empire, the system became 
heterogeneous once again, especially as a result of the growing suspicions o f the major
powers with regard to Russian intentions in this crisis. Therefore, it was normal that the 
eight-years Greek insurrection drew the attention of nearly every major power in Europe, 
especially when it threatened to destroy the equilibrium in eastern Europe if Russia was to 
intervene.'
The revolution was triggered by Prince Yipsilanti, a Greek serving as a Russian 
officer in Moldova. Soon his Pan-Hellenic ideas spread into the peninsula of Morea, 
mainland Greece, and developed into a mass revolution against the Ottoman rule. It is 
argued in some cases, that Russia provided financial support for this movement to foment 
troubles for their traditional enemy - the Ottoman Empire.^ Nevertheless, it is contended 
that this was not true, for Alexander I did not in any way support this revolution.^ 
However, in reality, Russia was in a real dilemma. On the one hand, Alexander I was 
unable to accept the revolutionary tone of the Greek insurrection, and on the other hand, 
he believed it to be his duty to protect all the Christian Orthodox subject of the Ottoman 
Empire. This accounted for the fact that Russia did not seriously intervene on behalf of the 
Greek for a while. The Sultan’s decision to hang the Patriarch of Istanbul and some of his 
bishops generated widespread violence that magnified the European sympathy for Greek 
aspirations and further exacerbated the heterogeneity of the system regarding the Ottoman
Empire.
In addition to the emotional aspects of the issue, fear and suspicion o f possible 
Russian intervention on behalf of the Greeks and the danger this represented to the 
European system focused the attention of major European capitals. What triggered further 
worries was the fact that Alexander I contended later on that the Greek movement was 
nationalist and not revolutionary in nature; occurring partly on Ottoman domains, which.
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by his interpretation, was not part of the European System or the Holy Alliance/ This led 
him to take negative and rigid positions, to the extent of severing diplomatic relations 
with the Porte in the years to come.
Both Castlereagh and Metternich suspected possible future Russian unilateral 
intervention for the sake of aggrandizement. To them, this was an unacceptable threat to 
their interests in the region in that Russia would become preponderant in the affairs of the 
Ottoman Empire and jeopardize the equilibrium in eastern Europe. As Temperly correctly 
asserted, "(Britain) wished to maintain the Turkish Empire... for it held that if war 
occurred, Russia would gabble Greece at one mouthful and Turkey at the next."^ 
Moreover, Russian access to Istanbul meant the possibility of Russian involvement in the 
Mediterranean as, "Constantinople ...was the Turkish sentry which barred the back door to 
the Black Sea and the front gate to the Mediterranean".^ It was therefore imperative that 
the Greek issue be settled peacefully, without Russian interference.
At the same time, Metternich recognized the volatility of the situation in case of a 
Russian war against the Porte, something too dangerous even to be contemplated. He had 
his doubts regarding Alexander’s' temper, believing that "if one cannon is fired... then 
there will be no limits any longer as to what he will consider his divinely ordained law to 
do The situation was tense, neither could the Ottomans subdue the revolution, nor could 
the Greeks achieve their independence and the Russians were growing restless. Since war 
with Russia would prove costly and its outcome unpredictable, diplomacy was the best 
alternative for the other actors to avert a crisis.
In a typical Metternich move, with the assistance of Castlereagh, the threat o f war 
between Russia and the Porte ended, primarily through limiting the Tsar’s maneuverability
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by exhausting him in conference diplomacy to avoid Russian unilateral intervention and 
gain time. (See Chapter II) As Russian aims for the mentorship over Greece and 
suggestions o f joint military action by the powers were detailed by its diplomats, 
Metternich diverted Russia’s aims of using the alliance to spread its influence and 
simultaneously restrained it from any action. The Spanish revolution shifted the attention 
o f the Congress of Verona of 1822 but left out the possibility of a Russo-Ottoman War 
To exacerbate matters, Castlereagh committed suicide and the British foreign policy rested 
in the hands o f Canning, the new Foreign Minister.
Though he followed the general outlines of the British foreign policy inside the 
European system. Canning differed from Castlereagh in the sense that he did not support 
the Congresses to the extent of his predecessor. However this did not prevent him from 
sending a plenipotentiary to the Congress at Verona to discuss the Spanish and Greek 
questions. In a surprise move, he declared Greece a belligerent in 1823 in order to protect 
British Aegean trade from Greek pirates.* Furthermore he embarked on a more 
interventionist policy in the Greek affairs than Castlereagh might have followed. His 
general policy was to avoid force, so as to help the Russians restrain themselves.^ Finally, 
he wisely separated the Greek question from the Russo-Ottoman conflict.
In the midst of these negotiations and diplomatic maneuvers, a new factor shifted 
the attention o f the major European powers interested in a peaceful resolution o f the 
Greek affairs. This was the intervention of Mohammed Ali on behalf o f the Sultan to 
subdue the Greek insurrection, which not only shifted the course of the negotiations, but 
introduced Egypt as a new actor in the Greek affair.
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The Egyptian intervention in Morea was the result of a request by Sultan Mahmut 
II, a move that delighted Mohammed Ali. It should be recalled, however, that Egyptian 
intervention in the Greek affairs dates to 1821 when Mohammed Ali assisted the Ottoman 
fleet against the Greeks in the Aegean and successfully relieved Ottoman garrisons in 
Crete and Cyprus.*“ The Sultan did not trust Mohammed Ali, but had few options and 
was forced to promise his ambitious vassal with the rule of Crete and Morea.** 
Mohammed Ali hoped to transform the Eastern Mediterranean into an Egyptian lake by 
incorporating Syria into his empire. *^  Mohammed Ali was not opposed to the Pan Hellenic 
movement, on the contrary, he was sympathetic and permitted the Philiki Heteria to 
operate in Egypt.*“ But he was willing to sacrifice sentiments if he could acquire Morea or 
other spoils.
The results achieved by the Egyptian intervention in the ongoing crisis in Greece 
was amazing. After an initial stalemate, Ibrahim, in his capacity as ground commander of 
the joint Ottoman and Egyptian forces, inflicted severe blows to the Greek resistance. The 
campaigns were active and bloody, especially the Battles of Calamata and Tripolettzi in 
June 1825, and Missolonghi in 1826 which dealt the final blow to the Greek resistance. *“* 
Ibrahim established the necessaiy prerequisites for a total defeat of the Greek insurrection, 
though he quarreled with the Commander of the Ottoman-Egyptian navy, Husrev Pa^ha, a 
dispute dating back to the struggle in Egypt between Ibrahim's father and the latter in 
1804-5. (See Chapter III, 3.2 B. )
The Egyptian intervention shifted the military scales to the Porte's favor. The 
repercussions o f this shift were immediately felt on the European System. The Egyptian 
success produced a great deal of pressure on Alexander I. He was obliged to intervene for
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religious and emotional rather than political and state reasons to save the Greeks. As long 
as the Greeks prevail, he could avoid intervention and wrestle with the Porte over the 
questions o f the Danubian principalities only. But as the Greeks lost ground, he risked 
allowing the situation to revert to the status quo ante 1821. That partially meant delaying 
Russian possible plans until the next opportunity, if ever, as well as admitting the moral 
defeat this could cause to his Christian prestige. Simultaneously, Britain and Austria aimed 
to avoid a possible Russian unilateral intervention in the Greek affairs as well as 
confrontation with Russia. However, Canning did not trust Metternich and his methods 
and therefore, the system operated differently than if Castlereagh was alive.
Still believing in the future of The Holy Alliance, Alexander hastened to host a 
final Congress in St. Petersburg on the level of Ambassadors. His intentions were clear: he 
sought the same green light for Russian intervention in Greece as the Lailbach Congress 
gave Austria in Italy and the Congress of Verona to France in Spain. (See Chapter II, 
2.3) The circumstances may have changed, but Alexander I could not, or would not 
recognize a reality that could mean the end of his beloved Holy Alliance. British evasion of 
this Congress as a stratagem to spoil the Tsar's chances of success produced a rupture 
between Russia and Britain. This left Austria in practical control and in a series of 
diplomatic maneuvers, suggested the independence of Greece. Alexander I reftised, 
because this meant triumph for the liberal movement. This gave both Austria and France 
the pretext to deny him any other option. The ensuing rift between Alexander and 
Metternich buried the Congress System. Consultation was no longer part of the code o f 
conduct that the powers obeyed to maintain the general security of Europe and the system 
reverted to its pre-1789 characteristics. It became every state for itself and nothing for
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collectivity. The Greek affair was a point of diversion between the Russia and the rest of 
the European powers.
If  these events affected the entire system, it also had an impact on the Egyptian 
position with regard Europe. At this stage, Britain and Austria began direct negotiations 
with the Egyptian Vali to undo the repercussions of his intervention in Morea. During 
consultations between the Vali and the British Consul, Mr. Salt, the latter suggested the 
possibility of his withdrawal several times. Initially, Mohammed Ali was reluctant to spell 
out his price for abandoning the Porte. At the same time, he was not eager for further 
intervention, since he had already proven that Egypt was a power to be recognized. Also, 
he knew the powers were determined to solve the Greek problem and sought to avoid 
incurring their wrath. An indication of Mohammed Ali s price for cooperation could be 
found by 1825 when, as reported by Salt in a dispatch to Canning, Mohammed Ali noted 
that "...he is expecting assistance with regard to his navy and money to expand his 
Empire".** However, Mohammed Ali’s attempts were in vain since Britain was unwilling 
to sacrifice its relations with the Porte for his sake and his requests were refused up to the 
final Battle o f Navarino. This was in total conformity with the British foreign policy 
towards Egypt since 1807. Metternich's envoys, on the other hand, urged the Egyptian 
Vali to end the Greek affair as soon as possible to avoid interventions by the powers.
Meanwhile, the alliances in the European system were becoming increasingly 
unstable. Clearly the system of consultation and congresses were eclipsed by the overt 
application of balance of power mechanics after the breach between ^'letternich and 
Alexander I opened the way for possible British rapprochement with the latter. Russian 
acceptance of the British overture came as a precautionary measure in case it opted for
130
unilateral intervention in Greece. This meant that Russia needed to rely on at least one 
European power, e.g., Britain. The death of Alexander and the accession o f Nicholas I, 
who unlike his late brother, held no mystical illusions of collectivity, was immediately felt 
all over Europe. He was determined to intervene in the Greek affair within the general 
context of dismantling the Ottoman Empire if possible. He sent an ultimatum to the Port in 
March 1826, requesting the immediate withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from the 
Danubian Principalities, the abandonment of the appointment of the police there and the 
immediate dispatch o f plenipotentiaries to the Russian frontiers for negotiations.*’ The 
result o f these negotiations was The Treaty of Akkerman in October 1826 whereby the 
Porte submitted to the will o f Russia with regards to the Danubian Principalities as well as 
Serbia.**
This treaty temporarily settled the Russian aims in East Europe but not in the 
Greek question. This issue had to be resolved in accordance with the mechanics o f the 
system. The first step was to create the alliance, between some of the major powers at 
least. British overtures towards Russia were already under way, the result o f which was the 
signing o f a crucial protocol in April 1826 regarding to the Greek affairs. This agreement 
could be summarized as follows; first, a British mediation effort with the Porte should be 
offered, whereby Greece would become a dependency of the Porte with almost complete 
autonomy. Second, another British mediation would begin between the Porte and Russia, 
on the one hand and between the Porte and Greece on the other. Third, both parties 
renounced any ambitions regarding Greece. Finally, Prussia, Austria and France would 
issue a joint guarantee o f the settlement.
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Though this was the first step towards the creation of the alliance, this protocol 
failed to satisfy the other major European actors, primarily France which held a stake in 
the Greek issue and were not interested in allowing Britain to dictate the terms of the 
settlement in harmony with Russia. France wanted a larger role and demanded the 
transformation of this protocol into a European treaty, so that it may secure a role and 
possible dividends in the future. This represented no diversion from the rules o f a system 
functioning under balance of power premises, since no state may achieve rewards without 
sharing with others. (Rule of proportional aggrandizement or reciprocal compensation, see 
Chapter I, 1.6). Canning had no choice but to concede, though he did not trust French 
intentions. France, Britain and Russia signed the treaty of London in 1827 which 
embodied nearly all the points laid in the April protocol. Furthermore, the signatories 
pledged to enforce a settlement if the Porte refused a cease-fire. Also, in accordance with 
the treaty, the powers assigned consular agents to Greece to work between the conflicting 
parties.^® Thus, the alliance was achieved. The next step was intervention.
This was a pure manifestation of the first principle of balance o f power, that of 
coalition or alliance formation. It could be argued that this embryonic alliance lacked a 
preponderant opponent at this stage, for it was aimed primarily towards thwarting a 
single-handed Russian intervention. In other words it was a preemptive diplomatic move 
by France and Britain that hoped to restrict the Tsar to avoid Russian preponderance in 
Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean should it choose to act alone and force an 
unrecoverable fa it accompli - something it achieved six years later with the Treaties of 
Hünkar İskelesi and Muchengratz.. Therefore, the alliance was aimed at restricting the 
potential preponderance of a power. Canning’s words help explain this situation: "... If
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force was to be used, England must act with and restrain Russia", and that did not 
deviate from the basic premises of alliance formation. (See Chapter I, 1.6) In another way, 
it was in no power's interests to see Morea in the hands of Mohammed Ali in case of 
Ottoman-Egyptian victory. Such a victory would transform the Mediterranean into an 
Ottoman-Egyptian lake, and in case Mohammed Ali conquered Syria, as he did later, then 
the whole southeastern region of Europe, would be under the control o f Mohammed Ali, a 
clear breach to the equilibrium in Europe. Intervention was required to settle the Greek 
crisis.
The protocol and treaty were first steps towards a more complex and 
pQh^y Qf the powers in Greek affairs. It laid a heavy burden on the Porte 
as well as Mohammed Ali who had dispatched the elite of his newly formed forces to 
Morea and the fear o f European power's joint intervention was a shadow that haunted 
Mohammed Ali until the destruction of his fleet at Navarino a year later. He was in a very 
difficult position and had to act promptly for the powers would not allow an Ottoman- 
Egyptian victory. That forced him to approach Britain directly.
But Britain was neither willing to sacrifice the Porte nor pay the price for an 
alliance with Mohammed Ali. Instead, Canning embarked on a policy aimed at securing 
the Egyptian withdrawal from Morea that did not require the payment of compensation. 
Major Cradock, a diplomatic officer in the British Embassy to Paris and an old 
acquaintance of Mohammed Ali, was sent to Egypt to convince his friend to withdraw.^^ 
Mohammed Ali refused, for that would have meant conflict with the Porte without any 
gains in return. He was convinced that he retained more maneuverability than events 
actually permitted. For the first time he bluntly told Salt the price for his withdrawal. He
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stated that, "Syria and Damascus are within my reach. If your government should help, as 
I hope, and if it recognizes my independence as a sovereign prince,... I shall be fully 
con ten t".B ritain  refused.
Fate, misinterpretation and possibly conspiracy, denied Mohammed Ali the 
possibility of continued room for maneuver. On the single day of October 20, 1827 the 
Battle of Navarino saw the destruction of Mohammed Ali's Mediterranean fleet along with 
its Ottoman counterpart. This was the manifestation of the second principle of balance of 
power, that o i Intervention, (See Chapter I, 1.6). This time, intervention by the powers 
after the formation of the alliance moved from diplomacy in the first stages to military in 
the next. Many Egyptian scholars believe that the Battle of Navarino was a premeditated 
strike by the combined British, French and Russian fleet that was supposed to observe the 
interposition between the warring parties but not take sides. However, there seems to 
have been a blunder somewhere in the communication between the politicians and the 
military. Canning's instructions to Stratford Canning, his Ambassador to the Porte, were 
that, "The spirit o f that agreement was peaceful interference, recommended by a friendly 
demonstration o f f o r c e " . T h e  British Ambassador's instruction were misinterpreted by 
Admiral Codrington, the British commander and the Allied Admiral in Chief, partly 
because they were vague and unclear. The Russian Admiral also pressed for action and 
therefore, the entrance of the combined fleet to the Bay of Navarino could be interpreted 
both as a provocation and an act oigunboat diplomacy that backfired and developed into 
an act o f coercion. The result was war and the destruction of the Ottoman-Egyptian 
combined fleet. What remains true is that the news of the battle surprised politicians across 
Europe, but did not dissuade them from terminating the Greek affair peacefully.
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Wellington, who took office following Canning's death some days prior to the 
battle, was more cautious than his two predecessors, and he became relatively confused by 
events. This allowed both France and Russia the possibility to exploit the situation. Britain 
remained low key but later renewed its active role in the decision of Greek independence 
and delimitation of the borders of this state. Following Navarino, Mohammed Ali was 
forced to withdraw his troops from Morea. He refused to continue the intransigence and 
futile resistance that drove the Porte into another defeat by Russia and its acceptance o f 
the Treaty of Adrianopole, that guaranteed Greek autonomy and later independence. His 
sole gain in this affair was that Europeans henceforth treated him as a recognized semi­
independent power, though a formal declaration of this point was never made.
Mohammed Ali failed to show a grasp as to the functioning o f the European 
System. He should have realized that the European equilibrium was a paramount issue for 
all the powers involved, especially Britain and France. They had to settle the Greek issue 
in such a way as would not create Russian preponderance in Eastern Mediterranean and 
avoid making Greece a future Russian surrogate. As it became clear two years later, the 
settlement of this affair was a case for balance of power mechanics, whereby there was 
avocation o f the principle of reciprocal non compensation to maintain the European 
equilibrium. Thus, no state gained anything acceptable in as far as equilibrium was
concerned.
To this end, the French abandoned Mohammed Ali and nearly launched a war 
against the very army they trained. They occupied Morea with 18,000 men and as the 
tension was relieved after the Treaty of Adrianopole, they were withdrawn. Unlike France, 
Britain was more straightforward; they promised nothing to Mohammed Ali. Had
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Mohammed Ali learned the lessons from the Greek campaign, with regard to the balance 
o f power principles, especially the recognition of the factors affecting power distribution 
and preponderance of states, i.e. equilibrium, he may have been able to avoid the 
destruction of his own empire nearly a decade later. Nevertheless, the Greek War of 
Independence marked the establishment of Egypt as a supplementary or peripheral actor in 
the European system through its relationship with the Porte and in that it conducted 
independent relations with some European powers, especially France. Therefore, if the 
Porte was a part of the European balance of power system, Egypt was a fortiori a 
participant as well, since it had an important impact on the Porte’s future. This indirect 
correlation had a tremendous impact upon the outcome of the first Egyptian-Ottoman war.
4.2 The First Egyptian Ottoman War 1831-1833:
A: Mohammed Ali's Calculations with regard to Europe:
Mohammed Ali's strategic decision to withdraw from the war in Morea after 
Navarino was very wise, in that it kept his armies and what was left from his 
Mediterranean navy intact, ready for implementing his two primary objectives: that of 
independence and acquisition of Syria. Both such objectives practically meant war with the 
Porte, for it would neither permit his independence nor the loss of its own territory. 
However, the time was ripe for such an action by 1831 as the Porte had reached its nadir 
on all fronts. The Treaty of Adrianopole in 1829, left it with the loss of its army, a heavy 
indemnity burden on its treasury and a state of demoralization. The massacre of the
136
Janisseiy Corps in 1826 reduced its chances of promptly building up the military machine, 
in accordance with the Nizam-i-jadid. The time was ripe for Mohammed AJi to pursue his 
conquest o f Syria.
On the European level, Mohammed Ali knew that his expansionist policies were an 
anathema to the European system. But his success depended upon choosing the right time 
to force ^ fa it accomplis. By 1831 the opportunity arrived. Towards the end o f this year 
several changes had either occurred or were occurring in the European system that 
permitted him some maneuverability. Many of these transformations made the timing 
correct for such a war and helped secure a victory for Mohammed Ali over the Porte
As mentioned, Canning practically undermined the Congress System during the 
Greek Crisis, the system became more fragmented than before, functioning under his 
slogan "eveiy nation for itself and God for all of us".^* This meant that states were to act 
according to their own interests without having to resort to collective legitimacy or 
congresses; for such a process played a role in obstructing the lucid flow o f the mechanics 
o f balance o f power. In particular, events in Belgium and to a lesser extent, in Portugal 
helped revive this phenomena in the European system.
With such fragmentation, alliances and counter alliances were to a greater extent 
than before, the dominant phenomena in the system. This carried the system towards a 
conservative alliance that included Russia, Austria and Prussia against a liberal one of 
Britain and France. However, this was temporary and expected in a balance o f power 
system. Despite o f this each of the major actors retained the right to unilateral action 
Britain undertook efforts to secure its interests, primarily by guaranteeing the continent's 
inability to unify, and to secure its trade all over the world. France, reintegrated into the
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European system, took its place among the major actors by extending its influence in Italy, 
North Africa and the Levant (Syria). Austria, still following the taboo o f Metternich, 
became a conservative force that opposed revolution throughout the continent, a policy 
that nearly precipitated a crisis with France in Italy in Russia, pursued its interests
in Eastern Europe and the Ottoman Empire as before, but with renewed vigor and a new 
strategy. Thus, the interests of the states remained the same, but the means to achieve this 
differed as a result o f the change in the system's character.
The transformation of the system reshaped some of the actions o f the actors within 
the system. Britain, during the Wellington and the initial years of Palmerston’s era, was 
more concerned with the situation in Western Europe. The Belgium Crisis that coincided 
with the First Egyptian Ottoman War caught the attention of the new government 
consuming its foreign policy and naval efforts for the next three years. In essence the 
Belgian uprising, its declaration of independence from the Netherlands and the decision o f 
its Congress to declare the second son of Louis Philippe o f France as its king, required a 
serious British reaction. This crisis produced disequilibrium in Western Europe where 
France appeared to be ready to swallow Belgium, an action averted by the Treaty of 
Chaumont and later by the Congress o f Vienna. (See Chapter II) British fears o f French 
preponderance, in an area it considered its backyard, decreased and gave way to the 
development of close cooperation against the Netherlands. The alliance between these two 
states isolated Russia, Austria and Prussia regarding the Belgian issue. Both France and 
Britain did not want the involvement of other powers in this affair, and they were able to 
prevent this very effectively.^* The price of British involvement in this affair was the 
temporary neglect of its other priorities, especially in the Ottoman Empire, making them
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unable or unwilling to focus on the crisis that developed into the Eastern Question. Other 
than that, relations with Egypt remained unchanged and they declined an offer in 1830 for 
alliance with it.^^
France, on the other hand, expanded its foreign policy since the Greek campaign. 
Not only did it involve itself in the Greek affair, for the sake of its own interests and that 
o f Russian containment, but it gradually moved to consolidate its interests in the Ottoman 
domains. But other problems beckoned. In 1830, prior to the end of the Greek affair, it 
became embroiled in the Algerian crisis, the result o f the humiliation o f its diplomatic 
envoy by the Dey of Algiers.^® France contemplated the possibility of coercion and other 
alternatives. However, Drovetti the French consul in Egypt suggested the possibility of 
unleashing Mohammed AJi on Algeria to conquer it, and since the two states enjoyed 
good relations, this was a legitimate outcome. Negotiations between Pologniac the French 
Prime Minister and the Egyptian government began, but Egyptian demands exceeded what 
France was willing to accept. The final result was French invasion to Algeria in 1830. This 
gave France a very good position and interest in the Ottoman Empire, for after all Algeria 
was a part o f its domains. These events consolidated relations between Mohammed AJi 
and France which he interpreted as a positive sign for his future campaign to acquire 
Syria.
As for Russia, its foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire changed. The long 
traditions of Russian animosity with the Porte and its attempt to divide and conquer its 
domains had shifted. Tsar Nicholas was convinced, as a result o f the Greek campaign 
probably, that the other actors in the system would not permit him to achieve any o f his 
aims that could upset equilibrium in eastern Europe.^' Even Austria, the closest o f the
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allies to Russia hinted on several occasions that such Russian action would be a causiis 
belli. It became the policy of Russia to maintain the Ottoman Empire intact, but under its 
strict control. What Russia could not achieve by war and partition, it was to try to achieve 
by diplomacy and pressure. As illustrated in a secret circular by Russian First Secretary of 
State, Count Nesselrode:^^
A new era in our relations with the Ottoman Porte should date from  the Treaty o f 
Adrianopole.... Instead o f overthrowing that empire, Our August Monarch 
decided to follow only the noble impulsion o f his generosity..... I f  we have allowed 
the Turkish government to continue to exist in Europe, it is because that 
government under our preponderant influence o f our superiority, suits us better 
than any o f those which could be set on its ruins.
As noted, the Russian policy towards the Porte became that of influence until the time was
ripe for conquest, while at the same time seeking to exclude the influence other powers.^^
As Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister correctly asserted, the Russian choice was,
"either admitting the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as possible or finally admitting
its dissolution as inevitable,"^“* but they opted for the first since the second was out o f
reach.
This pragmatic foreign policy of Russia was much more successful, but for it to 
function, it needed to secure the affairs of the Straits. To this end, the Treaty o f 
Adrianopole opened the way for a free navigation for its trade in the Black Sea, yet did 
not settle their old principle of extending their defensive lines to the borders of the 
Ottoman Empire rather than their own frontiers. (See Chapter II) Since this aim was 
difficult to achieve in that it required their active control over the Straits, they opted for a 
new alternative, that of preventing the foreign warships from using the Straits to enter the 
Black Sea. Though this was a general principle, Russia needed assurance. Hence, the
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Russian diplomatic efforts were aimed at securing a treaty with the Porte towards this end. 
This they achieved in 1833 by the Treaty of Hünkar iskelesi.
Given the fragmentation of the system, British occupation in the Belgian and 
Portuguese affairs, Russian and Ottoman exhaustion from war, Austrian propensity for 
inaction and the French-Egyptian rapprochement, the way opened for the Mohammed Ali 
to begin his campaign to seize Syria and achieve his independence from the Ottoman 
suzerainty. All he needed was a pretext to initiate hostility.
C: The W ar:
The Egyptian conquest of Greater Syria that began in October of 1831 pursued 
several objectives. The first of which was the acquisition of Syria for strategic reasons. 
Syria had been traditionally a part of the Egyptian backyard since the dawn of time. Its 
importance to Egypt was beyond doubt crucial, given that Egypt generally faced invasions 
from the east. Therefore, occupying Syria meant safeguarding Egypt. Mohammed Ali 
himself admitted this to his envoy in Istanbul Naguib Bey when he stated that, "El Sham 
[Greater Syria] is very necessary for Egyptian security".^® This goal had followed 
Mohammed Ali since 1811 when he sought the cession of Syria to assist him logistically in 
his wars against the Wahhabis in Arabia.
Mohammed Ali's aims to form an Empire based in Egypt required a cultural and 
ideological basis. To this end, he adopted the idea of unifying the Arabs under one rule, 
and this practically meant the acquisition of Syria, the cradle of Arabism since the 
Ummayad dynasty in the seventh century. Ibrahim himself championed the Arab cause and 
proclaimed himself as an Arab. He asserted on several occasions that the ultimate aim of
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the Syrian campaign was to "...cut the links between the Arab speaking states and the 
Ottomans".^* Hence, Syria was politically a sim  qua non for his empire. Economic and 
demographic reasons were also part of his strategic and political objectives, for the Vali 
believed Syria’s wealth would enhance his power. He needed Syria as a source o f recmits 
for his army, timber for his Navy and taxes for his military improvements.
These different motives led him to initiate hostilities with the Ottoman Vali o f Acre 
on a trivial issue of extraditing several Egyptian peasants that escaped military service. This 
pretext provided the first step for the Egyptian invasion to Syria. In 1831, Ibrahim led an 
army to Syria. Initially numbering 25,000 men, the force gradually increased in the years 
to come. The Egyptian navy provided support from the sea. Since Acre was a well 
fortified castle, invulnerable to Bonaparte thirty years earlier, he forced a siege on it and 
expanded his invasion northward (following Bonaparte's plan) along the plains o f Syria 
Soon he sacked the major coastal cities of Saidon, Haifa and Jaffa, before overrunning 
Acre itself At this point, the rest of Syria fell or surrendered to his armies. These victories 
were achieved rapidly and astonished many. The speed of Mohammed Ali’s success may 
be explained in part by the fact that many Syrians saw him as the liberator from Ottoman 
tyranny and the hero of Islam after the war in Morea.'*® However, the Ottoman reaction to 
this campaign began to unfold in the beginning of 1832.
The Porte initially attempted to contain the crisis between the Valis o f Egypt and 
Acre, but these efforts proved futile since Mohammed Ali hoped to use the issue as a 
pretext to conquer Syria. The Porte attempted to convince Mohammed Ali to settle the 
affairs amicably. Their ultimate aim was to settle the issue so as the war would not spread 
at a time when Mahmut II realized that he lacked the necessary resources to withstand a
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war with the Egyptians. However his intransigence and arrogance in the proceeding 
months led him to believe that he could defeat the Egyptian armies. The next step was to 
declare Mohammed Ali a "rebel" against the legitimate order of Islam.
As a result o f the failure o f all these initiatives, Mahmut II decided to go to war to 
expel the Egyptians from Syria and proceed to Egypt to end the rule of Mohammed Ali. 
Mahmut II organized an army of sixty thousand soldiers under the command o f the hero 
o f the Janissery Massacres in 1826, Hussein Pasha and issued a royal Ferman appointing 
him Vali over Egypt and Acre. But the Ottoman army lacked armaments, homogeneity 
and integrity. In addition, Hussein Pasha made fatal mistakes in calculations and leadership 
that Ibrahim Pasha exploited.
The Syrian capital Damascus surrendered to Ibrahim as Egyptian forces 
approached in June 1832. He continued his northward march to meet the Ottoman army 
At first, Hussein Pasha divided his forces, giving Ibrahim the opportunity to attack each 
separately. In the Battle of Homs, Ibrahim defeated the advanced forces of that army. The 
main army remained in Alexandretta contemplating the next move. The second battle took 
place on July 29, 1832 close to the Billan Straits and inflicted a heavy defeat on Hussein 
Pasha, costing him a large number of men.“*' The southern gates of Anatolia were in the 
hands o f Ibrahim who immediately consolidated his powers along these lines. He 
continued his advance to Konya where he waited for instructions from his father as well as 
the arrival o f the Ottoman army being prepared by Mahmut II to save his Empire from the 
outlaw pasha of Egypt.
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C. The European Intervention and the End of the W ar:
It is taie that the European powers - France, Britain and Austria - had several 
other priorities than the Ottoman Empire, as long as its existence was secured from 
Russian threats, nevertheless, they played the most important role in terminating the 
Ottoman-Egyptian War in 1833. Britain was consumed with Belgium and Portugal, 
France with Italy, Belgium and her new conquests in North Africa, while Austria was 
involved in both Italy and consolidating her influence in Germany. These issues were soon 
to subside in favor o f the new priority involving the Ottoman Empire and the limitless 
ambitions o f an Ottoman subordinate. Unlike other internal revolts in the Ottoman 
provinces, this rebellion brought the existence of the Empire itself into question.
Initially, Britain abandoning her traditional policy of involvement, remained aloof 
until near the end of the crisis. This was not a result of any lack of interest in the Ottoman 
Empire or its role in Russian containment, but should rather be attributed primarily to its 
involvement in the Belgian and Portuguese problems. Also, the Cabinet of Lord Grey in 
office since 1830 (which included several pro-Greek Ministers), wished to avoid 
entangling the country in the problems of the Porte, at least in the short term. Certainly, 
Britain paid for her indecision in the ongoing crisis. Moreover, British inaction played a 
detrimental role in the failure of the actors in the European concert to put into action the 
mechanics of balance of power. If the traditional balancer was absent, there was little 
hope the system would function as should be expected.
Moreover, it appears that the Cabinet did not realize the implication of this war on 
the Ottoman Empire and European equilibrium; despite the fact that British envoy to
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Istanbul Stratford Canning on several occasions spelled out the dangers of a possible 
Russian-Ottoman alliance to thwart the aims of Mohammed Ali.“'^  Palmerston was a strict 
advocate o f the importance o f the Ottoman role in European equilibrium, but he did not 
grasp o f the gravity o f the situation until later on. He even thought he could use the crisis 
to his own benefits in his negotiations with the Porte. However, Palmerston's strict 
instructions to his Ambassador to the Porte was to convey "{British) ...general wishes to 
maintain and uphold him (Sultan) as an ancient ally and old friend and as an important 
element in the balance of power in Europe".
British aloofness caused them to decline a French offer to enter into joint 
mediations to terminate the war that was quickly spreading.'*’ The Porte lost no time to ask 
for British assistance in halting the advancing armies, remarking several times to Canning 
the importance of an alliance, and even went as far as sending envoys to London, the last 
of which was Namik Pasha. The two demarches were unsuccessful in persuading the 
British to get involved. Clearly Palmerston was not yet willing to take sides in this conflict 
under the present circumstances. British refusal of assistance were transmitted to the Porte 
by Namik Pasha after his demarche to Britain in the form of several letters, from the King, 
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.^’ In all cases, Britain merely promised to pressure 
Mohammed Ali to withdraw but refused to pledge military or naval assistance.
France on the other hand, though a traditional ally of Mohammed Ali, believed 
that its interests would be served better with the termination of the war that was disrupting 
its trade in the area and threatening a Russian advance on the Porte, something that would 
mean Russian preponderance in Southeastern Europe. However, the government o f Louis 
Philippe did not oppose the acquisition of Syria by Mohammed Ali and was ready to
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support him on that point. They were convinced that Mohammed Ali did not aim to 
threaten the existence of the empire.'*’ However, as the war developed, they changed their 
policy to restrict Mohammed Ali, yet never viewed him as an enemy.
The French position was clear; support for Mohammed Ali as long as he did not 
jeopardize the existence of the Ottoman Empire. As the war developed, the French Consul 
in Egypt received instructions from his Minister in 1832 that clearly explained the French 
position. The dispatch ran as follows, "...If Mohammed Ali wishes to consolidate his 
victory that he achieved, then he has to be cautious and moderate, or in other words, he 
should know when to stop and exploit his victory. ...The French government advises him 
to suppress his ambitions and accept Syria and go into negotiations with the Porte (to 
terminate the war)."
Similarly, Austria suffered from the Russophobia that spread in anticipation of a 
possible Russian intervention to exploit the situation and establish political regency over 
the Ottoman Empire. Austrian worries were actually rational for they would be the first to 
be affected in case Russian hegemony was established over eastern Europe. (See Chapter 
II) Already Metternich suffered tremendously as a result o f the Russian war 
aggrandizement in the 1828-9 war. Russian gains brought them across the Danube, the 
main arteiy that links Austria with the "outer world", and therefore, the Russians have to 
be denied any opportunity or pretext to cross into the Austrian neighborhood again."*® 
However, they were plagued with the conservative viewpoint which considered any 
revolution against the legitimate sovereigns unacceptable. This often led them into rhetoric 
that did not help their peace efforts, especially during negotiations with Mohammed AJi. In 
general, though interested, Austria never actually played a significant role in peace efforts.
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Their limited involvement did represent pressure on the Egyptian Vali that showed 
European consensus. Metternich uncharacteristically advised Namik Pasha, the Ottoman 
envoy seeking assistance in Vienna, to grant Mohammed Ali Syria and terminate the 
war.*° Metternich seriously wanted to avoid Russian intervention but this did not stop him 
from seeking and suggesting British support or even a congress to settle the Egyptian 
Question. The Austrian position could be understood in light of the fact that it was a 
continental power, its fleet less powerful than that of Britain and France, and they wished 
to avoid antagonizing Russia as long as this was possible. In addition, Austrian links to 
Egypt were limited when compared to France and Britain. The Austrian attitude did not 
represent a great pressure upon Mohammed Ali compared to those o f Britain and France 
for he knew that Austria was not the state that would act unilaterally so far from home.
Russia, on the other hand, hoped to exploit the war between the Sultan and the 
Egyptian Vali·, believing that this represented a route to their regency over the Porte. They 
pushed an alliance on Mahmut II, which he declined as long as he had the resources to 
continue the war. In addition, they urged him not to accede to Mohammed Ali, feeding his 
intransigence and arrogance at a time when all other powers tried to persuade him to 
accept a peaceful solution.’* Up to this point, Russia’s role was limited, as was the case 
with other powers, for the battlefield situation was not yet considered serious.
However, after the defeat of Konya, the situation reversed and Russia sent General 
Muraviev to Istanbul to offer Russian military assistance and its good offices to terminate 
the crisis. The Porte was in a state o f confusion, with the Sultan and aides opting for 
Russian assistance to protect his throne, while the divan advised the Sultan to refrain from 
accepting assistance from the traditional enemy which could prove costly. Although
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Mahmut II accepted the offer, he reversed his decision the next day.^^ Moreover, Russia 
tried to play a role in the peace efforts on several occasions, sending Muraviev with Khalil 
Pasha to Egypt to convince Mohammed Ali to initiate negotiations and accept peace terms 
offered by the Porte.”  At the same time, Muraviev’s aide du camp traveled to Konya to 
discuss military matters with the Egyptian general staff These diplomatic overtures failed 
as the Ottoman suggestion for peace were unacceptable, offering Mohammed AJi only 
Acre in compensation. In addition, Muraviev’s arrogant and threatening attitude 
stimulated Ali's intransigence, who knew other powers would not accept Russian 
unilateral military action.
What sparked European worries was the defeat of the second Ottoman army at the 
Battle o f Konya in December 1832 and the appearance that Russia was exploiting the 
situation. This defeat marked the beginning of the crisis for the powers, for it left the 
Ottoman Empire helpless facing Ibrahim, only 50 legions from Istanbul. The fall o f the 
Ottoman Empire was imminent and it remained to the powers to rescue it. What worsened 
matters was the inability of European powers to predict the next action of Ibrahim Pasha.
Ibrahim Pasha, unlike his father, was not a man of diplomatic skills and his 
incautious attitude on many occasions worried the powers. He often boasted that he would 
terminate the Sultanate and, when intoxicated by victory, declared that he would install his 
father as Caliph in the Arab world. Whatever the intentions of Ibrahim or Mohammed Ali 
were, they would certainly affect the future of the Empire. There is sufficient evidence to 
show that the European powers and Russia were the only barrier to the annihilation of the 
Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, it is certain that Ibrahim was often at odds with his father 
with regard to the fate of the Empire.
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Ibrahim's correspondence seem to bear out to these claims. Ibrahim hoped to
extend his conquests to Istanbul. He wrote to his father observing that
"...as long as he is on the throne (Mahmut II), we shall not be able to settle our 
cause along lines acceptable to us... fo r even i f  all the factors seem to be in our 
favor, he shall lose no opportunity to implements his treacherous tricks... Thus we 
shall do our best to abdicate this damned creature in favor o f his heir in 
accordance with our previous plans".
Mohammed Ali refiised to give his consent to Ibrahim in this regard. He 
maintained his course of action, and wrote to him along similar lines as a previous letter 
where he exclaimed that, "Every advance from Konya in these present circumstances, will 
not be regarded positively by the powers (Europeans)". Yet once again Ibrahim 
requested permission to pursue his victory and advance, and exclaimed in the end, "...why 
do you delay my advance, is it the fear of Europe ...?" However, this time, Ibrahim 
advanced to Kütahya, against the advice of both the French and Russians.
Mohammed Ali realized that the powers were not going to permit him to become 
regent over the Ottoman Empire. They distrusted his intentions. Mohammed Ali never 
actually gave up caution when dealing with the European powers in this regard, except at 
a later stage when he began diplomatic maneuvers to gain support for his different plans. 
With the French he communicated his intentions of establishing a new Caliphate that 
would substitute the Ottoman one, but his overture was rejected immediately. British 
reactions were even worse for they believed that this division of the Porte into two 
sections, one in Europe and Anatolia, while the other in Syria and Mesopotamia, meant 
that the first would become a Russian satellite while the second was to be a French
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surrogate.’’ This was unacceptable to them, yet still they were not actively involved as 
they should have.
Negotiations between the Porte and Mohammed Ali were at a standstill. A new 
factor that had a tremendous effect on the whole situation was Russian military assistance 
to the Porte. Despite initial Ottoman refusal of such Russian military assistance, it was 
practically a matter of time before they were bound to accept it. British decline to offer 
their naval assistance to the Porte left the Ottomans no choice but to accept the Russian 
offer. Russian forces advanced and landed in Istanbul on the 20th o f February 1833 to 
salvage the Ottoman Empire.’* Russian intentions were clear. For the first time they 
camped along the Ottoman Straits with an invitation to stay, and in case they ended the 
affair peacefully, they would seek a high price for their intervention and withdrawal. What 
they could not achieve over two centuries of war, they would achieve through diplomacy.
The Russian move sent a shock wave throughout Europe. The equilibrium in 
eastern Europe for which they worked so hard to achieve was undermined. Had not the 
British, French and to some extent the Austrians terminated the Greek insurgency to avoid 
giving Russians a military presence and springboard there? All these efforts were in vain. 
Equilibrium was shattered and Russia exploited the situation so as to become 
preponderant. It was able to elude all the arrangement and exercise of relative control on 
the factors affecting power acquisition by the others, to prevent a serious imbalance in 
power distribution that would affect the entire security structure of southeast Europe (See 
Chapter I, 1.5) In simple terms, it was able to achieve a relative preponderance with 
regard to the factors affecting power distribution. This it achieved due to the following: 
first and foremost, the Russians were able to extend their defensive lines to the Bosphorus,
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which meant their near invulnerability to any European power and no battle could be 
fought on their borders (See Chapter II); second, they held a strategic position which, if 
exploited in the future, could be used to extend their military presence in the Balkans and 
Southeast Europe, threatening to become a serious challenge to other states and their 
domains. Third, the fear of a possible scenario whereby the Egyptian Vali would reach an 
accord with Russia and divide the Empire amongst themselves, could represent a total 
redistribution of power in the region. In this case, Russian strength would have expanded 
significantly without any compensation to the other powers, thereby violating the 
principles oiproportional aggrandizement that functioned in the system. Though this was 
rather far fetched because the other powers were never going to permit this to happen 
under any circumstances, it still represented a menace. Fourth, Russia would achieve 
access to the Mediterranean, posing a serious threat to the interests of some powers, e.g., 
Britain and France, in the East Mediterranean.
Immediately after the news reached Paris of the Sultan's acceptance o f Russian 
military assistance, the French Ambassador to Istanbul Routine tried to dissuade him from 
such an action. He even went as far as assuring him that if this was to happen, he could 
guarantee a se ttlem en t.T h e  British also pressured the Sultan to remove the Russian 
military presence and concurrently increased pressure on Mohammed Ali to accept peace.
Theoretically, the mechanics of balance of power were supposed to have been set 
in motion. It was expected that a concerted action among the other European powers, 
Britain France and Austria, would come into force to remedy this disequilibrium at once. 
However, as mentioned in Chapter I, this is not always the case, for some statesman do 
not follow the rules of the system as expected. Britain, was engaged at this stage in a
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blockade over the Netherlands, Austria as usual could not act alone, and France remained 
distrustful o f Metternich. The atmosphere of distrust played a decisive role in hindering the 
motion of the mechanics of balance of power. However, the members clung to the last 
moment to the possibility of an alliance to terminate the Egyptian Question.
There were several several attempts by the powers to engage a congress as a 
prelude to an alliance which would settle the Egyptian Question as soon as possible. 
These attempts were conducted both by Palmerston and Metternich yet they failed to 
materialize as a result of administrative and procedural problems. To begin with, 
Palmerston, in accordance with the French -whom he did not entirely trust -wanted the 
congress to be held in London, while Metternich wanted it in Vienna. Moreover, they 
also disagreed on the principle of intervention. Whereas Palmerston believed in the 
necessity o f a mediation or interposition, Metternich supported the Sultan, and refused any 
action that did not treat the Egyptian Vali as illegitimate.^® This practically meant open 
war on Egyptian forces, something that did not coincide with British or French interests. 
To the French, Mohammed Ali represented an extension of their influence and they were 
not willing to sacrifice him for the Porte's sake. In addition, Austrian, Russian and 
Prussian attitudes towards the Belgian crisis did not encourage neither the British nor, to a 
lesser degree, the French to pursue a Congress. The initial response from France and 
Britain was to enforce their naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, but this was not 
an effective measure.®*
Amidst this atmosphere of distrust and British attempts to exert efforts to terminate 
the crisis, despite its late involvement, the prospect of joint European action was 
diminishing. Instead of forming an alliance and intervening to redress the disequilibrium.
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the powers presented a demarche to the Egyptian Vali urging him to give up his advances 
in Anatolia and accept a settlement.
The French, alarmed at the Russian presence and inability to reach consensus of 
action between the powers, raised the volume of advice to the level of a semi-threat to 
Mohammed Ali. France demanded Mohammed Ali compromise with the Porte. A French 
envoy was sent to Egypt in late February where he bluntly laid out the fears o f France. He 
exclaimed to him, "what do you want ? the Russians are there (in Istanbul) and it is 
important to send them back The treaty (being negotiated) is not a humiliating one...you 
will receive the vilayet o f St. Jean d'Acre and I do not doubt that with this, you will gain 
your independence Mohammed AJi tried to play on the French anti-Russian feelings, 
but they nonetheless refused to accept his point of view. At the same time, he worked to 
maximize gains from the Syrian campaign, which originally held the primary objectives of 
the conquest of Syria and his independence. He certainly abandoned his alleged plan to 
reform the Ottoman Empire, or, as he called it, the Rejuvenation Project!’^  Faced with 
European dissension, he was lucky to escape this entanglement with the vilayet o f Syria. 
To this end, he was willing to test the European powers' patience.
As matters worsened, the British, Austrian and French demarches arrived in March 
and April 1833. The first to arrive was the British representative in Alexandria, Colonel 
Campbell on March 26, and upon his audience with the Pasha, he informed him the desire 
o f Britain to see his evacuation from Asia Minor. Failure to do so would compel Britain 
to consider a possible embargo on Alexandria.^'* He explained to him the instructions of 
Palmerston, which boiled down to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In a classical 
gunboat diplomacy approach, Palmerston ordered the mobilization of some warships from
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Greece to Alexandria as part of a military demarche to pressure Mohammed Ali®  ^
Mohammed Ali eluded him as usual and insisted on the danger of Russian presence and 
the necessity of an acceptable settlement. He hoped the Sultan would bow to the pressures 
o f the Egyptian armies who now moved on Kütahya. The issue became a question o f who 
would back down first, the Sultan or Mohammed Ali ?
The Austrian representatives to Egypt, Prochek Osten had an audience with the 
Egyptian Vali on April 2nd, when he advised that "Austria will never transgress upon the 
principles on which the state exists (conservatism and legitimacy)... Austria is a friend of 
the Porte...and it does not want its dismemberment".Mohammed Ali responded as he 
did with Campbell and neither obtained a conclusive commitment from the Vali.
A few days after the arrival of the French envoy on April 29, the Sultan abruptly, 
accepted the terms of peace with Mohammed Ali. He agreed to cede to him Syria, Crete 
and Acre but denied him both independence and Cyprus. Ibrahim, by now demoralized as 
a result o f his inability to capitalize on his victory and sack the Sultan, accepted the terms 
o f the Porte. The pressures of the French and British on the two sides lead to an Ottoman 
acceptance. In a high-stakes battle of patience, Mohammed Ali outlasted Mahmut II who 
faced battles on his own territory and his own life on the line. It is recalled that upon 
hearing the news of the agreement, he cried for joy in front of the Foreign consuls.®’
The Peace o f Kütahya was reached .on the 3rd of May 1833, but it was not 
guaranteed by any of the major powers. In one way, Kütahya does not represent a treaty 
between the two parties, on the contrary, it was only a means by which the two opponents 
agreed on the terms to end hostilities. It consisted o f the several Ottoman Fermans 
granting Mohammed Ali the vilctyet o f Syria and the rest of his demands.®* It was
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certainly a relief to all the powers. For Britain, France as well as Austria, it meant saving 
the Ottoman Empire from collapse, thereby eliminating any prospects o f further imbalance 
in the equilibrium in Europe. The Empire was intact and in control of its European and 
Anatolian domains. Whether this control was nominal or not, was not important, for at 
least these territories were under the sovereignty of some power and not a terra nuilius for 
any power to dominate. The latter condition would represent a temptation that could lure 
one or more of the powers to the detriment of European peace.®® This point was for the 
first time touched upon by Palmerston when he insisted that his government, "is o f the 
opinion that any considerable encroachment upon the Asiatic territories of the Sultan, and 
a consequent defalcation from the resources which... (the Empire) might bring for the 
defense o f his European dominions, must operate in a corresponding degree upon his 
relative position with respect to neighboring powers, and must thereby have injurious 
bearing upon the general interests of Europe".’® Also, peace eliminated the raison d'etre 
for the Russian military presence on the Bosphorus. This was a very important factor in 
the European calculations, especially by Britain. The re-establishment o f peace between 
the Porte and its Vali reduced the possibility for further Russian exploitation o f the 
Egyptian Question, and this was another reasons for the powers to rejoice. Finally, this 
peace saved these powers from having to employ force to impose a settlement, particularly 
on Mohammed Ali.
The crisis was over, but its consequences remained. To begin with, Sultan Mahmut 
II was determined to retrieve the territories lost to Mohammed Ali, and to this end he was 
willing to enter a war against him as soon as circumstances permitted. This was 
undertaken in 1839. Furthermore, this episode proved that the Egyptian Question was not
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a matter o f an Egyptian and Ottoman concern only, on the contrary, it was more a battle 
o f diplomacy and deterrence between Egypt and the European powers. Clearly, 
Mohammed Ali was right when he realized that European security was the ultimate factor 
that controlled the outcome of any future wars between the Porte and Egypt. Moreover, 
this war established an observable link between Egyptian expansionist policy and the 
general balance o f power in Europe. As Palmerston pointed out to his consul in Egypt, the 
Porte represented a " ...material element in the general balance of power in Europe",’* and 
this practically meant that if Egypt was to affect the Porte, it affected the balance of power 
in Europe In addition, this episode produced a negative effect on the Egyptian position 
vis-à-vis the European powers, especially with regard to Palmerston (as we shall see in the 
next section), thereby rendering any future attempts for either aggrandizement, 
independence or threatening the Porte, unacceptable.
4.3 More Imbalance to the Equilibrium 1833-1839: Hünkar iskelesi and 
Munchengratz
The peace of Kütahya meant an uneasy peace in the east, but it marked the 
beginning o f a turmoil in the European system. The aftermath of Kütahya caused 
turbulence in Europe, for now Britain and France had to suffer from a Russian 
preponderance in the east, that began to threaten the equilibrium in Europe. Once again 
effects o f the Egyptian Question played a role in the functioning of the European system. 
Both were rather interdependent on each other. Whereas the Europeans denied 
Mohammed Ali some o f his aims in the Egyptian-Ottoman war as a result o f diplomatic
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intervention and the deterrent factor of their possible military intervention against him, the 
war further polarized the system along Eastern and Western Camps.
It is true that the Egyptian Question played an important role in this polarization, 
but there were other reasons behind this state in the system. The uprisings in Belgium 
Poland, France and Italy acted as factors in this regard. Britain and France, though 
classical rivals, were linked together against the Eastern Camp, composed o f Russia 
Prussia and Austria. Polarization was a result of ideological reasons, for the Eastern 
Powers clung to their conservative ideology advocating intervention to restore legitimacy 
while at the same time the Western Camp were protagonists of non-intervention combined 
with a sense o f liberalism.’  ^ The revolutions of 1830 marked the beginning of the 
divergence between the two camps, especially following the Belgian crisis, where Britain 
and France secured its independence against the distrust and opposition o f the other 
powers. As Palmerston's statement revealed, " The Three -Russia-Aiistria and Prussia- 
and the Two -Britain and France - think differently and therefore they act differently".’  ^
Certainly, within the premises of a balance of power system, such polarization does 
not necessarily mean the members of one camp would not use others in order to obtain 
favorable result in other affairs. This was true in the European system prevailing at that 
time. Russia for example used Britain as a temporary ally to quell the Prussian ambitions in 
Poland and Germany, while at the same time Austria used France to check possible 
Russian aggrandizement in the East. Such flexibility was always present when actors from 
different camps, whose policies might parallel on certain issues, could cooperate. Such 
cases certainly eased the polarization. However Russian actions towards the Ottoman 
Empire created an imbalance that intensified polarization along the lines mentioned earlier
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The general division of Europe along these two camps could have been contained 
or at least temporarily averted, had Russia avoided the policy of preponderance in the east 
Russian diplomacy took two steps that were liable to undermine the equilibrium in 
southeastern Europe, sending a shock wave through the Western Camp. These two steps 
were the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi and the Treaty of Munchengratz, only two months 
apart. These two diplomatic moves played a major role in cementing the coalition between 
France and Britain, while creating the same reaction in the Eastern Camp.
The Russian forces had to be evacuated as the Peace of Kütahya came into force, 
however, before their departure, on July 8, 1833, the Russians concluded the Treaty o f 
Hünkar iskelesi with the Ottomans.’“* The treaty contained several provisions of great 
value to Russia and included inter-alia\ the decision of the two governments to consult 
each other concerning their respective security and guarantee mutual support for each 
other’s defense, the Russian pledge to send naval and ground forces to the rescue o f the 
Sultan in case he fell under attack or whenever the need arose and, most importantly, a 
secret clause whereby the Porte would close the Dardanelles to any warships attempting to 
enter the Black Sea as long as it was in peace.
This treaty was considered to be one of Russia’s most valuable diplomatic victories 
the nineteenth century, since it obtained most of its long-standing aims regarding the 
Porte. To Nesselrode, this was a triumph of his policy of Ottoman integrity combined with 
Russian preponderance that he advocated earlier to Nicholas I. This treaty had a very 
dangerous effect on the equilibrium in the east precisely because it achieved nearly all the 
Russian aims. The main reason for this was that it ..gave Russia a decided political 
preponderance", while at the same time securing the closure of the Straits against all
in
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foreign warships.’  ^ This rendered Russian borders impregnable, thereby achieving their 
traditional aim of extending their defensive lines away from their own borders and giving 
them virtual control over the Straits. Also, Article III of the treaty gave them the right to 
send their armies for the protection of the Porte, and this could secure their presence once 
again in Ottoman territory without the need to go into international diplomatic maneuvers 
to secure such interventions. Thus, the shadows of a Russian presence in the 
Mediterranean and south east Europe remained as long as the Ottoman Empire felt its 
security jeopardized. This in fact was a recurring phenomena that increased as a result of 
Mohammed Ali acquiring Syria, something that haunted both Britain and France. For this 
reason they did what they could to avoid a second Egyptian-Ottoman war that could lead 
to another Russian military presence on the Bospherous. Finally, this treaty was considered 
by many as the guarantee of Russian guardianship over the Ottoman Empire. That by itself 
was sufficient to increase Russian political leverage over the Porte, and render it a Russian 
surrogate. Palmerston was right when he believed that the Russians, were taking the 
Ottoman Empire more "by sap than by storm".’®
From a strategic and military point of view Russia became the only power with 
overwhelming influence in the Porte and above all, became nearly impregnable to foreign 
naval assaults. Any future Russian military presence in the region could jeopardize the 
security structure o f southeastern Europe. Their forces would be hundreds o f miles away, 
while the other powers, would be forced to travel a long distance to oppose their march.
In practical terms, this meant Russian preponderance and gave them strategic advantages 
that rendered checking Russian military preponderance a very difficult task. That was a 
clear case o f disbalance in power distribution. (See Chapter I)
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Palmerston had a particular vision for the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi, for the real 
danger to him did not lie in the secret article blocking warships' entrance to the Black Sea 
something that he perceived as, "comparatively harmless, in effect, though abundantly 
objectionable in spirit and intent".’’ His main concern was the political preponderance o f 
Russia in the affairs of the Porte, whereby the "...mutual engagement between the two 
powers to consult each other confidentially upon all their respective interests and by which 
the Russian Ambassador becomes the Chief Cabinet Minister of the Sultan."’* The French 
though more furious than the British perceived the whole treaty to be a menace to the 
equilibrium in Europe, for regardless of whether Russian preponderance was political or 
strategic, the Porte was believed to have become a Russian surrogate. Furthermore, the 
French believed that Russian intentions towards the Porte were wicked and that this treaty 
helped them achieve their aims.’^
The British and French reaction to this treaty was instantaneous, and their 
Ambassadors to the Porte did their best to impede its ratification.*® The two governments 
presented the Porte and Russia with a near identical protest, wherein they declared the 
treaty produced a new pattern of relationship between Russia and the Porte to which they 
were entitled to object, and in case of Russian military intervention in the Porte in 
conformity of the treaty, the two powers held themselves at liberty to act as if this treaty 
were not in existence.** There were even speculation of making a naval demarches in the 
Dardanelles to further pressure the Sultan, but Palmerston was not very fond of this idea, 
though the French would not have obstructed such a course of action. It was expected 
that Austria would join the protest, but most probably Metternich needed to keep his 
bridges with Russia, especially given the polarization going on in the system between the
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two camps as mentioned earlier due to the crisis in Belgium and Portugal. In addition, he 
was partially seduced by Nicholas into a non-obstructive course of action as we shall see 
very shortly.
As expected, the Ottoman reply to the protests of France and Britain, though 
arriving late, reflected a mild response. The Porte stated that "the only objective of the 
treaty was to maintain tranquillity and that ” ... [it] does not have any offensive 
p u r p o s e s " . I n  addition the Porte emphasized throughout its reply that the treaty was 
done voluntarily by the Porte. The answer was simple, the Porte was now clearly in the 
Russian camp, though there were many officials that were not content with the present 
situation, including the Reis Effendi^^ The Russian reaction however, was more 
aggressive. Nesselrode stated to the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg that their 
objections towards the treaty seemed to show bad intentions of the powers towards 
dismembering the Ottoman Empire.
Who was to blame for the deterioration in the equilibrium in Eastern Europe? 
Certainly, the Egyptian Question triggered the major portion of the problem. But since 
there were other powers involved, the blame was distributed among them as well. France 
did its utmost to terminate the raison d'etre of the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, and so did 
Metternich, as much as the circumstances permitted. The Porte was in a very difficult 
position and could not afford to lose Russian protection at a time when no other power 
was willing to take effective measures to help. Much of the blame could be directed 
towards Britain and Palmerston himself for failing to assist the Porte when it needed. Had 
he pledged the naval assistance to the Porte, the whole affair probably would have been 
settled, but he did not, or could not. As he later regretted, "There was nothing that had
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happened since I have been in office which I regret so much as the tremendous blunder of 
the English government [in 1833]. But it was not my fault- I tried hard to persuade the 
Cabinet to let me take the step [send naval assistance to the Porte].... and so nothing was 
done in a crisis of the utmost importance to all Europe when we might with the greatest o f 
ease have accomplished a good result".*^ Repentance was not enough, even if was five 
years later, and both Britain and France faced another crisis in September 1833. This time 
the blow was delivered by Tsar Nicholas I as well as Metternich. The Treaty of 
MUnchengratz, signed by Russia and Austria, regarding the fate of the Porte, undermined 
the remaining equilibrium in eastern Europe.
Upon securing their military presence in the Porte by its own request in February 
1833, Nesselrode immediately realized the importance of incorporating another ally with 
him in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. He knew that even if his forces were to 
withdraw, a treaty of a sort was to be signed and he therefore began active consultation 
with Metternich to secure Austrian support. The choice of Austria was obvious. To begin 
with, the alliance structure in Europe at this juncture left Austria as the only potential ally 
due to the polarization between the EastCTti avid Ccvnps. In addition, Russia and
Austria were the only two states bordering the Ottoman Empire, and therefore, most 
concerned in the fate of this empire. *** From the previous experiences with Metternich, it is 
probable that he tried to use this alliance to restrict Russian unilateral preponderance in the 
Porte, in case Mohammed Ali was successful in eliminating it in the future.
The Treaty of Mllnchengratz was signed on September 18, 1833 between Russia 
and Austria among several other treaties, some of which Prussia was involved in. It 
consisted o f five articles, two of which were secret.®’ The treaty was not written
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eloquently, and carried a great deal of ambiguity. In essence the treaty stipulated that both 
states were to act together to secure the survival of the Ottoman dynasty, though not 
guaranteeing the integrity of the empire, which in essence meant refusing any successor to 
the Ottoman state. Also, they pledged themselves to confront any internal threat against 
the Sultan. This point was the key to one of the secret articles which stipulated that it was 
directed against Mohammed Ali's ambitions with regard to Ottoman European held 
territory. The final secret article confirmed joint action in case it became impossible to 
withhold the present order in the Ottoman Empire, whereby it was agreed that they would 
act in solidarity concerning Vestablissement du notivel ordre des choses, so that any 
change in the internal situation of the Empire would neither affect their security nor 
European equilibrium.
The reasons and repercussions of this treaty with regard to the Egyptian Question 
and the European system are of major importance. To begin with, it is certain that the 
treaty came as a result of the Egyptian-Ottoman war, and the widespread fear of the 
possibility of an Egyptian succession to the Ottoman empire. But why did this spread fears 
in Vienna and St. Petersburg? It is obvious that Metternich and Nicholas were worried 
regarding the future of the Empire now that it became under serious threat from Egyptian 
expansion. This fear in return triggered their action and the Treaty of Miinchengratz. 
There were two reasons for this, the first of which was a possible Egyptian takeover o f the 
Sultanate which could mean that it was the eligible successor of the Porte in southeastern 
Europe. The second was the presence of an Arab Empire on the European borders.
Such a situation was certainly something that worried Metternich, probably more 
than the Tsar, given that these territories were closer to Austria than Russia. In this, he
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probably followed the wise policy of Maria Theresa half a century earlier, (see chapter II 
2.4) There is sufficient evidence to point in this direction. To begin with, Metternich's first 
concern with regard to the rapprochement with Russia in early 1833, seemed to be 
directed towards the future of the Ottoman European territories. He conveyed this bluntly 
to Tatischeff, the Russian Ambassador to Vienna, that it was imperative to settle the fate o f 
these territories, whereby the Christian subjects were to be ruled by Princes while the 
Muslim ones by Khans.** This was one o f Mettemich's prerequisites for an alliance and 
while there is no evidence to show that Nicholas accepted this logic, he probably did so 
Concurrently, he wanted to ensure that these territories were not to become a battlefield 
for other states causing a probable war. Power vacuum in this area meant a strategic 
disequilibrium, something he would not permit.
In the same conversation with Tatischeff, he emphasized the fear of a new actor in 
the European system by proposing to him avoiding an Arab empire as the successor o f the 
Ottoman Empire. There are several reasons to explain this fear. First, as we have come to 
see, most of the European states had come to a modus vivendi with the Ottoman Empire 
even Russia accepted its existence just after the Treaty of Adrianopole. Was it really a 
wise idea to create a new powerful neighbor?. Secondly, this new successor, i.e. Egypt 
was not a weak state and by 1833 had amassed a well-equipped, modern military force 
surpassing one hundred thousand men, supported by a large fleet. The reports Metternich 
was receiving from Egypt, seemed to influence him as well, for in May 1833 he received a 
dispatch from Osten his consul in Egypt which stated among other things that " there are 
a number of evidences for... the idea of the establishment o f an Arab empire I see on the 
one side a weak Ottoman state, and on the other ...an Arab army and a veiy strong fleet
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To this we can add the awakening of the Arab World from its heavy s l eep" . Such  ideas 
worried Mettemich and Nicholas, especially since Ottoman armies were routed in the 
battlefield with relative ease. A third factor could be added and it is the fact that 
Mohammed Ali was fully supported by France, and with the Franco-Austrian tensions in 
Italy, it certainly did not want to permit the French access to its own backyard in Europe. 
Mohammed Ali's preponderance meant French preponderance to them and this was 
neither acceptable in Vienna nor St. Petersburg. Finally, the British position was greeted 
with enthusiasm in the two courts, during the Egyptian-Ottoman war. I f  British position 
was better known as to whether it would come to the rescue of the Porte if future events 
might require that, this would have certainly alleviated some of the fears and pressures on 
Metternich. If Britain was idle during Mohammed Ali's move into Syria, perhaps it would 
remain so if the Ottoman Empire s fate was at stake in future.
These were probably the reasons behind Munchengratz. Each of the two powers 
settled their differences and achieved what they needed in accordance to the system's 
mechanics. For both Russia and Austria, Munchengratz was a milestone in the 
preservation of the Eastern Camp against the Western Camp. Russia on the one hand 
realized that she needed an ally and the only possible ally was Austria. That stems from the 
fact that the way the system functioned almost guaranteed that any future unilateral 
Russian intervention in the Porte's affairs would trigger the opposition o f the other actors 
so as to maintain equilibrium. Moreover, such actions could be transformed into an 
alliance against Russia if it achieved further preponderance. Therefore, Russia needed to 
secure an ally so as to confront possible future alliances against it. As we mentioned 
earlier, the means to establish this was the application of the principle of reciprocal
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compensation. (See Chapter I, 1.5) That in turn meant, that Austria was to have the same 
privileges as Russia in the fate of the Ottoman Empire, therefore, Muchengratz could be 
considered the price Russia paid to sustain her preponderance in Ottoman Empire.
From all o f the above, we can clearly view a state of disequilibrium in the East of 
the system in that Russia and Austria were to be the preponderant powers controlling the 
fate o f the Ottoman Empire. For Palmerston, the situation was rather confused for he 
lacked a plan for the British policy towards the Ottoman Empire. His assessment of the 
situation, however, showed the volatility of equilibrium in the east when he stated that in 
Britain they "...were [are] averse to any great changes in the relative distribution of 
political power because such changes must either be brought about by war or must have a 
tendency when effected to produce war".®“ Certainly, disequilibrium was clearly perceived 
in London, but the course of action was still vague, the main aim remained the need to 
reduce Russian preponderance in the East.
He realized that coercive intervention by both Britain and France would prove 
both costly and risky, especially given other alternatives, such as attracting the Ottoman 
Empire back to Britain by proving that it was more advantageous for the Porte to "... look 
for aid to England instead of leaning upon a powerful and systematically encroaching 
neighbor".®’ Nevertheless, immediately after the Treaty of Mifnchengratz, Palmerston 
directed his attention towards another policy alternative, that of using Mohammed Ali to 
balance the matters.
As mentioned earlier, Mohammed Ali missed no opportunity to push forward for 
an alliance with Britain, even at the cost of selling out the French. He had communicated 
previously to the British and French consuls the dangers emanating from Russian advances
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and their attempts to control the Porte. He aimed to direct the interests o f the powers from 
his conquests in Syria and Anatolia to the Russian threat. But there seems no doubt that 
Palmerston was willing at a certain junction to use the Egyptian Vali to undo the 
disequilibrium in the East, a view shared by Ponsonby towards the end o f 1833
In a letter by Palmerston to his brother, dated October 6, 1833, he seemed to point 
out the basic pillars of his thoughts. He contends that at Munchengratz, Russia and 
Austria plotted the partition the Porte and that Britain and France would oppose such a 
project, "...and with the assistance of Mehmet Ali, [they should be able ] to offer a strong 
barrier against this accomplishment." His line of thought seemed to be moving towards a 
possible naval intervention in the Dardanelles, and to this end he wrote, that "...we should 
not find it easy to force the Dardanelles unless we had troops to land. Mehmet Ali to be 
sure, could lend us plenty and would be ready enough to do so".
Ponsonby on the other hand, believed that the internal situation in the Porte to be 
very vulnerable, especially that Mahmut II faced considerable internal dissension. He 
feared that any attempt to dethrone Mahmut II meant a possible Russian intervention in 
accordance with Hünkar iskelesi and Mu’nchengratz. He believed that, "if Mohammed Ali 
could come to Constantinople and dethrone the government of the Sultan, ... he could 
take the necessary measures to close effectively the Bosphorus in face o f the Russian 
forces".^^
Thus, for the first time, Egypt began to fit into the context o f British foreign policy 
as a necessity to remedy the breach to the existing equilibrium. Such a policy could have 
been welcomed by France, which believed Mohammed Ali to be her extension in the 
Mediterranean. But as events seemed to point in the future, this policy alternative was
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gradually dismissed as the dust of secrecy surrounding the Treaty of Munchengratz settled 
and Britain realized that the treaty did not include dismembering the Ottoman Empire. At 
this stage, the British and the French, though never willing to ignore the possibility o f joint 
military action, settled in favor of diplomatic channels and a policy of dissuading the Porte 
from leaning towards Russia. Thus their alliance decided that intervention would be on the 
diplomatic level. Therefore, Britain and France protested Munchengratz in St. Petersburg 
in October 1833 but to no avail.
In the meantime, Britain chose a threefold policy. First, it focused on keeping 
matters quiet between Egypt and the Porte. To this end, Palmerston instructed Ponsonby 
to do everything in his powers to prevent Mohammed Ali from breaking the peace lest he 
should become "the instrument of Russia, to work out his own degradation." Regarding 
the Porte, they should follow a similar direction for he believed that the Treaty o f Hu'nkar 
Iskelesi was but one step in the direction of Russian "...aggrandizement towards the 
South", that is to say, she might use this pretext to intervene in the Porte for her own 
benefits in future.^“* Second, he believed that the reasons for this disequilibrium, besides the 
Egyptian Question, was the fact that the Porte was too weak to improve and defend her 
territories. Therefore, he embarked on a policy of assisting Mahmut II in his reformation 
movement, something that was bound to remove the Porte from the Russian sphere of 
influence. In other words, he believed in a policy of containing the Russians by raising the 
influence o f Britain in the Porte. In this, the British policy was successful. Third, the 
British fleet had no clear instructions, but remained as a possible alternative to support this 
new policy if needed.^^
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France on the other hand maintained a policy of support for Mohammed AJi, and 
aimed to keep him as their source of influence, especially that he was in possession of the 
Levant and Egypt. They continued to support him militarily and financially. However, 
such a divergent policy between France and Britain was bound to create differences in 
case of an Ottoman-Egyptian war, as happened in 1839.
Meanwhile, Britain and France cooperated to remedy the disequilibrium in the 
system, in addition to the policies each conducted unilaterally. In a traditional balance of 
power mechanism, both developed a counter-alliance against the Eastern Camp which 
was considered to be the disturber o f the balance. (See Chapter I, 1.5 ) Renewed stability 
in Portugal and Spain allowed both parties to develop this counter-alliance. A Quadruple 
alliance was declared between Britain, France, Portugal and Spain immediately after the 
political turmoil settled in the latter two states. Palmerston did not conceal the real 
intentions behind this alliance, stating that it would "serve as a powerful counterpoise to 
the Holy Alliance in the East".^^ This was a manifestation of the balance of power
principles that dominated Europe.
Naturally, this policy produced tension, especially between Britain and Russia. The 
British-Russian rivalry extended to new horizons, particularly in Iran, Afghanistan, and 
over the Polish rebellion, and finally in the Ottoman Empire. Britain endured a bout of 
Russophobia in the years that followed 1833, and public opinion was very much against 
Russia. Many periodicals fostered the necessity of war to save the Dardanelles which some 
described as the "keys to Europe."”  Due to British rapprochement towards the Porte, the 
commission of David Urquhart searched for possible areas of cooperation with the Porte 
and played a major role in fomenting distrust between London and St. Petersburg. In
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addition, the Russians felt that the situation could deteriorate when Britain decided to opt 
for military intervention. Nesselrode's evaluation of the situation in 1834 was that, 
"Palmerston wants to avenge himself upon us for the sorry role he has played in the affairs 
o f the east.... However, everything is possible with men so enraged and so devoid of good 
sense, as those who rule England.... I shall therefore not be sorry to learn that we, at all 
events, are busily occupied in placing Sevastopol in a state of defense".Russian militaiy 
mobilization began and by 1836 the Black Sea was ready for any potential war. By 1837, 
all plans were laid down to sack the Dardanelles in case of British attack on the Straits.^® 
Nevertheless, the situation was contained. Palmerston was determined to avoid open 
hostilities, but it took some time for the situation to clear between the two states, 
something that the Second Egyptian-Ottoman war helped to develop.
From all of the above reactions, we can infer that the major reason for 
disequilibrium created in Europe was a result of the Egyptian-Ottoman war in 1833 which 
was immediately reacted against by Britain and France, together and apart. Both states 
followed the mechanics of balance of power collectively to counter it. But as each state 
began to develop its own policy in the years that followed, divergence began to appear, for 
Britain opted for friendship with the Porte while France for Egypt, and together they stood 
against Russia.
Finally, the disequilibrium in the European System had repercussions on the 
Egyptian Question itself Mohammed Ali became a source of trouble to most European 
actors who favored the maintenance of the status quo to avoid Russian intervention and 
further disequilibrium. His expansionist policies were perceived with disfavor in Britain 
and his constant appeal for British alliance was generally refused In 1834, he tried to
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convince Campbell that he could fit in the British policy of Russian containment. He 
boasted that he had a hundred and fifty thousand soldiers at arms ready to keep the 
Russians off the Ottoman Empire and Iran.*"® However, by that time Palmerston had 
reverted to the traditional policy of siding with the Porte, believing that any action towards 
Egypt would damage British relations with the Porte, and therefore, it was better to 
continue attracting the Porte to the side of Britain. In a tough reply, Palmerston wrote to 
Campbell that he was outraged by a proposal of Mohammed Ali which "...would be an 
infringement on the Sultan's right".*®’
The ethical or moral aspect of Palmerston's refusal was merely a convenience In 
reality he believed that he could use Mohammed Ali at a certain stage against the Sultan 
and his Russian ally. But he was concerned that the expansionist policy of Mohammed Ali 
brought the Vali closer to trade routes with India. Mohammed Ali's incorporation o f Syria 
left him a few days’ march of Mesopotamia, the backyard of Iran. Moreover, he was 
consolidating his position in the Red Sea, which practically became an Egyptian lake, and 
his armies were close to the Persian Gulf It became the policy of Britain to thwart 
Mohammed Ali's ambitions and use the first available pretext to settle the Egyptian 
Question in a way that would secure the trade r o u t e s . T h e  opportunity came in 1839 
with the Second Egyptian-Ottoman War.
During the four years preceding 1839, the Egyptian Question remained static 
Egypt was busy subduing Syria, which proved rebellious under Egyptian rule, and 
increased its military strength. France consolidated her position in Egypt, Britain was 
unhappy with Egyptian expansion, but her policy vis-à-vis the Porte was successful in 
improving her position in the Ottoman court. By 1838, the two sides concluded a treaty
171
of commerce to secure further cooperation. Russia was not content with this Ottoman- 
British rapprochement but could do little in response to Ponsonby’s diplomatic 
offensive. In the meantime, the British policy differed little from that of Russia or 
Austria. Palmerston continued to deter the Sultan from taking revenge on Egypt. He was 
convinced that any such attempt could provoke Russian intervention in accordance with 
the Treaty of Hiinkar Iskelesi. His instructions as transmitted by Ponsonby to the Ottoman 
Ministers were clear, "The British government will never allow itself to be ...forced to war 
by the caprice and wrongheadedness of another government, and would find means to 
protect her own interests by other means."'®“* Palmerston was convinced that another 
attack by the Porte on Mohammed Ali would result in an Ottoman defeat. Ponsonby in 
reply to Palmerston’s instructions pointed out that, "The British government will have no 
choice; it will be bound to act with arms in its hands..."'®^ However, Palmerston, by now 
detested Mohammed Ali and concluded that he was the main source of trouble and that he 
had to be forced out of Syria and back to Egypt, putting an end to the Egyptian Question.
Metternich had his hands frill trying to alleviate the tension between Britain and 
Russia, and creating a concerted action among the powers with regards to the Egyptian 
Question. At the same time he was worried about the possible outcome of a hostile 
outbreak, and therefore did his utmost to keep both the Mahmut II and Mohammed Ali at 
peaceful terms. This reality did not deter him from his favorite game of political 
constructions, whereby he began to pay more attention to the possible consequences and 
how to avoid the repercussion of another crisis. Finally he concluded that Greece would 
become the successor of the Ottoman European held territory.'®® Certainly, none of the
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other powers were ready to accept this solution, but nevertheless, his wishful thinking 
continued.
The Egyptian Question, as mentioned throughout this chapter, developed a pattern 
of activity unlike the other two previous stages examined in Chapter III. By now it was 
clearly influencing events in southeastern Europe. The inability of the balancer, Britain, to 
play its major role in containing the Egyptian Question, showed the vulnerability of the 
system and its susceptibility to Mohammed Ali’s actions against the Ottoman Empire. 
Clearly, he became a factor in the European system, though he should not be considered 
an actor in the system, for he was not linked geographically or culturally to it.
Clearly, the heterogeneity of the system, when the Ottoman Empire was involved, 
played a fundamental role in the power calculations and the outcome of the events taking 
place The entire struggle between Britain and France on the one hand and Russia on the 
other could be attributed to this fact. The mere fact that Russia was perceived by the other 
powers as a predator willing to digest the Ottoman Empire, forced them to act in a manner 
whereby they did their best to guarantee Ottoman survival. Hence, the Russian factor was 
the driving force behind all the actions undertaken by the other powers during the Crisis of
1833.
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4.4. Prelude to the Crisis: Egypt Contemplates Independence :
With regard to the Egyptian Question, most European courts continued to pursue 
the same policy as before. Britain and Austria, were both, for reasons mentioned earlier, 
unable to tolerate Egyptian expansion. Russia was the ultimate benefactor of these events 
for it had already established itself as the dominant guardianship over the Porte, and 
wished to maintain the status quo. France, believed Mohammed Ali was the extension of 
her influence in the Mediterranean, and therefore supported him wholeheartedly. As for 
Prussia, they were not actively interested in the Egyptian Question, in as far as it did not 
affect the general European equilibrium. Prussia was more focused on the events in 
Germany and Poland. Moreover, Prussia limited her activities with the Porte to military 
training and trade. In the military field they provided the Porte with instructors to replace 
the British ones following quarrels between the Porte and British instructors.
By 1838, British and Russian tension declined and Russophobia in London 
decreased. Anti-Russian feelings however, remained high in France. Louis Philippe was in 
total discord with Nicholas I, owing it basically to personal hatred between them. 
Therefore as long as Britain maintain an alliance with France, Russia was upset. Such 
ideas were often communicated to the British themselves, to the extent that Count 
Nesselrode bluntly stated to the British Ambassador to Vienna, "Let Lord Palmerston talk 
less to France and more to us and things will go bet ter" .Certainly,  the splits in the 
European concert encouraged Mohammed Ali to start a new round of the Egyptian
Question in 1838.
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Since the Peace of Kütahya, Mohammed Ali waited for the precise moment to 
declare his independence in order to rid himself of the political and financial pressures of 
the Porte on his domains, and to secure the hereditary rule of Egypt for his family. This 
last point became increasingly important after he turned seventy. It is true that the Peace of 
Kütahya gave him de facto  independence, but he continually sought ways to demonstrate 
complete independence. For example, he tried to avoid applying the Treaty o f Balta 
Limani in 1838 between the Porte and Britain yet he finally gave in and abolished some of 
the monopolies. He also worked to strengthen his military apart from the Porte.
Mohammed Ali and Mahmut II encountered several problems that marred their 
relations. Since the Treaty of Kütahya, the relationship between them remained volatile. 
On the one hand, Mahmut II awaited the right time when he could launch an attack on 
Mohammed Ali, retrieve Syria and possibly sack him from the vilayet of Egypt,'”® while at 
the same time, Mohammed Ali was unwilling to accept the status quo and prepared to 
declare his independence. It was only a matter of time before the situation exploded 
between these two men. Since 1834, the two parties tried to resolve some of their 
irreconcilable differences. To begin with, Mohammed Ali refused to pay the arrears of the 
tribute for the years in which he was at war with the Porte. This refusal developed into a 
crisis."” The audacity of Mohammed Ali went so far as an unsuccessful attempt to bribe 
the entourage of Mahmut II with the amount of one million kursh to remove Husrev pasha
from office.
Once again the European powers played an important role in the tensions that 
marked the Egyptian-Ottoman relations. French policy was directed towards securing 
Mohammed Ali from the Ottoman threat in the future while the British policy was the total
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opposite."* Britain did its best to encourage Mahmut II to refrain from yielding to 
Mohammed Ali’s demands. Yet both opted for the tactical maintenance o f the status quo 
each for different reasons. Whereas France wanted to keep Mohammed Ali in Syria 
Britain wanted him removed, yet knew that the weakness of the Porte made this 
impossible for the time being. The initiative however passed to the French who 
immediately did their best to secure a permanent solution to the crises arising between the 
two. Louis Philippe offered his good offices to the two parties, and eventually negotiations 
were held under French auspices.*’^  These negotiations failed to produce any permanent 
solution. Mohammed Ali insisted on maintaining Syria while the Porte wanted him to 
evacuate to the Vilayet of Acre. Another point of divergence between the two parties was 
the attitude o f the Porte towards the requests o f Mohammed Ali for hereditary rule in 
Egypt. Negotiations between the two reconvened in 1837 when Sarim Effendi was 
cordially received by Mohammed AJi, but his requests for an Egyptian withdrawal from 
Syria were denied.'*^
Mohammed Ali became frustrated with the Ottoman attitude in these negotiations 
as well as to the fact that they constantly offered assistance to Syrian rebels. Since its 
defeat in 1832-1833, the Porte attempted to foment trouble for Egyptian armies in Syria 
basically by supplying the rebels with weapons and money. **'' That was a major issue for 
Mohammed Ali and he was determined to sever all links with the Porte to avoid this
For this part, Mohammed Ali a meeting for the Divaniyya where he discussed this 
issue. Most o f those attending accepted his arguments except for Boughous Youssef Bey 
his Foreign Minister. He argued that this would trigger European intervention, and warned 
Mohammed Ali o f the consequences.**^ His first step was to gather the British and French
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mamconsuls in Egypt on May 25, 1838 and declare his independence from the Porte. His 
arguments were that he was getting old and wished to secure the hereditary rule o f Egypt 
for his family. His other argument was that he wished to maintain the developments he 
achieved in Egypt, claiming that a return of Egypt to Ottoman sovereignty meant the 
undoing o f all the developments."® Though this was true, but there is no doubt that his 
main aim was to assure hereditary rule for his family and terminate Ottoman assistance to 
the Syrian rebels. His gamble rested on the fact that there existed dissension among the 
powers in the European system, and he wished to exploit this to his advantage. 
Unfortunately he was misinformed, and Boughous Bey was correct, the European system 
with all differences between the actors, unanimously refused to accept his declaration.
Each o f the major powers in the European system had its reason to refuse this step. 
Even Egypt’s greatest ally France threatened Mohammed Ali in case he severed his legal 
relation with the Porte. The main reason for French animosity to this decision was that 
such an action could easily trigger a conflict between the Porte and the Vali with fatal 
consequences. Russia, on the other hand, was bound by the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi to 
offer Mahmut II any assistance he required, and was therefore prepared to send her forces 
and fleet to Constantinople upon the deterioration of the situation. As Nesselrode hinted to 
his Ambassador to London, Posso di Borga, the Russian position differed from the others 
because o f Hünkar Iskilesi."’ Mettemich was no different from the rest o f the group and 
believed Egyptian independence could cast doubt on future Ottoman integrity.
Palmerston on the other hand was furious. He was determined to block the 
implementation o f Mohammed Ali’s decision at any cost. By June 7th, the Cabinet 
convened in London to discuss the new phase of the Egyptian Question. It was agreed not
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to permit Mohammed Ali to declare his independence. In a letter to his Ambassador to
Paris, Palmerston explained the rationale behind this move in the following lines:
...they see that the consequences o f such a declaration on his part must be either 
immediately... or conflict between him and the Sultan. That in such a conflict, the 
Turkish troops would be defeated, than the Russians wotddfly to the aid o f the 
Sidtan and a Russian garrison wotdd occupy Constantinople and the Dardanelles 
and once in possession o f these parts, they wotdd never quit them. We are 
therefore prepared to give naval assistance to the Sultan against Mehmet Ali.
His instructions to his consul in Alexandria was unequivocally straight, and reflected the
decision of the Cabinet, for he stated that his government, "Feels itself bound... to declare...
if he should unfortunately proceed to execute his announced intentions and if
hostilities...break out, thereupon between the Sultan and the Pasha, the Pasha must expect
to find Great Britain taking part with the Sultan in order to redress to the Sultan and for
the purpose o f preventing the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire.
British logic was manifested by the letters and instructions o f Palmerston's 
dispatches to his diplomats. Certainly, such a move by Mohammed Ali would rock the 
equilibrium. Once again the Russian factor was the most fundamental and the fear o f their 
military intervention in the Porte caused further disturbance to the shaky disequilibrium in 
southeastern Europe. Once again the Ottoman Empire was facing a threat of 
dismemberment and most probably a threat to its existence if the situation developed into 
an open conflict with hiohammed Ali. More important at this stage was that once again 
Egypt was a disturber of the balance in Europe. The expected result to such a move was 
collective action by the major actors to contain and neutralize the threat posed by 
Mohammed Ali.
The system's reaction this time followed classical balance of power mechanics as 
expected. Though falling short of creating an alliance to handle the situation, a semi­
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concerted effort by Britain, France, Austria and Russia to dissuade Mohammed Ali from 
pursuing his aims o f independence immediately set into action. The first step was a 
collective demarche by their consuls to Egypt. Campbell and Couchelet the French consul, 
delivered their demarches and clearly emphasized the dangers of such a move by him and 
the intention that the European powers would intervene. The same thesis was expressed by 
the Russian Consul De Medem. But Palmerston was unsatisfied with his consul believing
him to be too mild.
Perhaps the most severe attitude came paradoxically from France. Mole, the Prime 
h'linister instructed his consul to inform hfohammed All that he was committing a grave 
error and that France and Britain would not hesitate to use efficiently...proper measures 
to make him repent". Couchelet, threatened Mohammed Ali with French naval 
intervention at their next meet ing .Perhaps  this could be explained by the probability 
that they were more sympathetic to him and therefore, feared the possibility o f a European 
alliance against him that would put them in an rather embarrassing position if they would 
refuse to help him. This seems the most logical explanation, especially as Couchelet 
several times warned him not to make an enemy of Britain.
Simple demarches were only a reflection and a fraction of what Palmerston and 
Metternich planned. Palmerston genuinely detested Mohammed Ali as a "barbarian" and a 
troublesome man, while Metternich, a slave of his conservative philosophy, considered 
him an illegitimate ruler. Both were willing to go as far as possible to thwart his plans.
Unlike Metternich, Palmerston was more precise in his actions. To begin with, 
Mettemich on his part, suggested an international conference to deal with Mohammed Ali, 
even before the declaration of independence, but that never formalized. Nevertheless, the
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burden o f what should be done was planned by Palmerston, at least as long as the 
Egyptian Vali refiised to give in to the demarches of the consuls o f the great powers To 
this end, Palmerston approached France, his ally, before initiating talks with Metternich 
and Di Borga. He suggested to Granville the possibility of creating an alliance between 
Britain, France and the Porte to deal with Mohammed Ali in case war erupted and 
requested him to clarify the issue to the government of Mole. This was his vision o f how 
to legitimize his entrance into the Porte's defense. Such a triple convention to him was 
necessary because he believed that he could not depend on Austria. In his dispatch to 
Granville, he stated clearly this purpose stressing, "I think all our eyes are open to the utter 
impossibility o f depending upon any active assistance from Austria against Russia ". He 
believed that "...such a convention ...would save Turkey and preserve the peace in Europe 
by its mere moral effects... it would (also) entitle the Sultan to let our fleets up to 
Constantinople and that of itself would be checkmate to Russia.
Though the government of Mole was willing to cooperate with Britain, and as he 
clearly stated, "Qu'il était importante que le France et l'Anglaterre agissent de concert,"*^^ 
the policies of the two states diverged on many issues. Hence, Granville was unable to sell 
this idea o f a triple convention to Mole. Though Palmerston had in mind containing the 
possible Russian threat in particular, this act meant in one way or another the possibility o f 
France entering into war with Mohammed Ali, in case war erupted between the Sultan and 
his vassal. Mole was not ready to cooperate to this extent for obvious reasons.
Some weeks later, Palmerston was forced to face French resistance to the idea o f a 
defensive alliance with the jPorte that included France. At the same time, it was practically 
impossible for him to initiate any step without an ally and it became clear that France
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would not pressure Mohammed Ali in any form, though it threatened him so as to 
maintain the status quo. The functioning of the system therefore forced him to begin 
exploring the idea o f a collective action -alliance- with the major actors of the system. But 
such an action needed the support of France, Austria and Russia. In the case o f France he 
instructed Granville once again to persuade Mole to accept this idea. He instructed his 
Ambassador to inform Mole that he requested him to "...authorize Sebastiani (French 
Ambassador to London) to cooperate with me in endeavoring to effect a joint 
arrangement on the subject between the five powers,” he rationalized his attempt by 
assuring him that "... if Mehmet Ali finds the least disunion between the great powers of 
Europe, he will endeavor to make himself independent and take his chance of the split 
which consequent events may produce among us.
Palmerston's efforts with Austria and Russia were underway and he suggested the 
alliance between the powers to Pozzo di Borga and Esterhazy (Austrian Ambassador to 
London). To further cement the deal, it was suggested that efforts among the alliance’s 
members be coordinated. British and French fleets would cruise together, while Austria 
was to supply infantiy divisions to save the Porte in case of war. There was however a 
problem of the Russian role, and therefore, Di Borga suggested the British and French 
force be sent to Egypt, to keep them away from the Straits and Constantinople, which 
by the Treaty o f Hünkâr İskelesi they were entitled to defend. Even Mettemich accepted 
this idea for after all it was both a means to alleviate the ongoing tension in Europe 
particularly between Britain and Russia, as well as giving Austria the necessary role it 
wished to play. To overcome British and French opposition regarding the roles of their 
fleet, whether it was to be coercive or bluff, approved the idea of, "sending an. English and
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French squadron to the Levant with orders in case of extremities, to blockade the Ports 
belonging to Mehmet Ali Moreover, he was correct in his belief that the combined 
actions of the powers was purely a formal necessity.
Just as Sebastiani was instructed to cooperate with Palmerston, for some reasons. 
Mole refused the idea of a joint British-French demarches in the Mediterranean and 
believed that Sebastiani acted outside his limits.*”  Some attribute this refusal to jealousy 
while others believe it to be a rational action for this meant uprising the French public 
opinion which supported Mohammed Ali. Palmerston realized at this stage that it was 
impossible to unite France with the other powers in this affair. Strangely to him, France 
was more stubborn than Russia. Melbourne was right when he claimed that, "France will 
be attending to her own interests and her own policy; what those interests and that policy 
may be in her opinion, it is impossible to say."*^*
Palmerston's good fortune came to his assistance. Mohammed Ali, though not 
declaring his intention, backed down from his claim of independence, by simple inaction 
Nevertheless, Palmerston did not miss this opportunity to use these events to counter the 
Russian influence in the Porte and redress the disequilibrium in eastern Europe, especially 
since the probability of trouble might reoccur between the Porte and Egypt at any time 
Through the efforts of Ponsonby, Palmerston was able to go ahead with his plans and 
instead of Anglo-French fleet cruising together, he substituted France with the Porte Thus 
the British and Ottoman fleet cruised the Mediterranean together as a show o f solidarity
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Mohammed Ali was completely disappointed with the ongoing European 
resistance, and eventually gave up the idea of independence for the time being He was
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surprised by the French attitude in this affair. He clearly stated to Couchelet that he "...did 
not expect that the European states will reach a consensus on this issue, but the French 
attitude surprised me veiy much in particular." Couchelet recognized this fact and wrote to 
Mole stating that, "it is true my Count, we were the only ones who presented him with a 
note o f threat". Trying to get the best out of the situation, Mohammed AJi attempted to 
reach a compromise with regard to the hereditary rule of Egypt to his family. This was his 
major focus after failing to declare independence. He humbly declared to Couchelet that 
he will be satisfied with settling this issue, "as for the means, it was basically through 
understanding and Negotiations (with the P o r t e ) " . B y  October, Mohammed AJi set out 
for Sudan where he spend nearly six months in a trip till March 1839.
Certainly, this episode set the stage for the future episodes o f the Egyptian 
Question. What is certain is the fact that this crisis did not threaten European equilibrium 
as much as expected, for Russia did not interfere and the Ottoman existence was not 
jeopardized. However, certain elements were becoming clear. France came to the 
conclusion, from this experience, as the only state against collective military intervention 
towards Mohammed AJi. More important was the Russian attitude towards this event. It 
seemed that they were willing to mend their ties with Britain, and even opened the door 
for possible Anglo-Russian rapprochement in the future. This was the backbone for any 
future alliance to curb the powers of Mohammed Ali and set in motion the classical 
mechanics of balance of power to avert the disequilibrium that might be created by the 
Egyptian Question. Finally, this episode united the powers in Europe to accept collective 
action in the future with regards to the Egyptian Question and the integrity o f the Porte.
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Metternich accepted the principle, Russia was on its way and Prussia represented no 
problem. Thus, France was the only power left out.
Throughout this chapter, we followed the active phase of the Egyptian Question 
and how it developed from the passive and preparatory phase to the active one and how it 
affected European security and action. We analyzed to a great extent the position of the 
different powers regarding their perception of crisis and how the system's actors turned 
towards unanimity of decision to curb Mohammed Ali's expansionist and seperationist 
policies. In the next chapter, we shall see how the Second Ottoman-Egyptian war led the 
system members to follow the mechanics of balance of power to settle the Egyptian 
Question once and for all.
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Chapter V
Balance of Power Mechanics and the Paciflcation of the 
Egyptian Question
5.1 The Second Ottoman Egyptian War 1839: The Crisis
Maintaining the status quo on the Egyptian-Ottoman front was among the major 
concerns for the powers in the European system given that war meant another disruption 
o f the equilibrium in southeastern Europe. However, this was not to be an easy task. 
Foreign Ambassadors to Constantinople and their Consuls in Egypt could neither persuade 
Mahmut II nor Mohammed Ali to divert from the collision course they followed. The 
differences and level of mistrust were too acute to be remedied by the requests of the 
powers. Both men had their own strategy and the means to implement it. Mahmut II’s 
plan was to recover Syria and, if possible, Egypt and dismiss Mohammed Ali. The 
Egyptian Va// planned to defend his new possessions and his empire, and establish 
hereditary rule over Egypt and Syria. It was only a matter of time before clashes between 
the two parties erupted.
Mahmut’s intransigence and his inability to realize the differences in power
between his own newly-trained army and that of Mohammed Ali was apparent. His only
goal was to take revenge on his insubordinate vassal and erase memories o f Ottoman
defeats in the crisis of 1832-3. However he recognized that he, and not Mohammed Ali,
^ *
had the backing of Russia by the Treaty of Hünkar iskelesi and the probability of British 
aid in case his army was defeated again. Events proved him correct on both points.
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Russia would come to his assistance to prevent Mohammed Ali from incorporating 
the Ottoman Empire into his rule. This policy was one of the reasons for its intervention 
in 1833 and the Treaty of Hünkar iskelesi. (See Chapter IV) Though Russia might have 
hesitated to provide immediate support, it would not permit Constantinople and the Straits 
to fall to Egypt. Although some observers, such as Ponsonby, believed Russia fomented 
trouble between Mahmut II and his vassal, such fears were incorrect. Ponsonby, the 
British Ambassador to the Porte, thought that Russia encouraged Mohammed Ali to attack 
the Porte, but his perceptions were colored by his obsessions with Russia. But Mahmut 
was fortunate in that Palmerston did not take Ponsonby’s dispatches seriously regarding 
Russian intrigues.* There exists sufficient evidence to show that Russia’s sole goal was to 
maintain the status quo. We need only recall that Russia did not support Mohammed Ali’s 
attempt to declare independence. At this interval, Nesselrode instructed his Consul in 
Egypt Count De Medem, to work to deter Mohammed Ali. The impact of de Modem's 
stand was obvious and Mohammed Ali responded that "the day when (he) will be 
guaranteed not to be attacked by the Porte will come, (he) shall redistribute 80,000 men 
from Syria into canalization projects.”  ^ In addition, there is no logical explanation why 
Russia would create trouble for Mahmut II at this time, since such a policy could require 
naval activities to defend the Porte and that could lead to a showdown with Britain, which 
unlike the crisis of 1833, was determined to act aggressively this time. That is why 
Mahmut II relied on Russian support, but was not sufficiently informed about the 
circumstances under which such support could be extended.
As for Britain, Mahmut II depended on its support as well, at least in a worst case 
scenario. Though Palmerston insistently refused an alliance or defensive treaty with the
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Porte and avoided being trapped next to Mahmut II into open conflict with Mohammed 
Ali, his choices were limited. His instruction to Ponsonby reflected the real position of 
Britain that if war occurred, ”..(he) will have no choice,... ( for he) will be bound to act 
with arms in hands.”  ^ He stated on another occasion that, "Coercion of Mehmet Ali by 
England if war broke out appear partial and unjust; but we are partial; and the great 
interests of Europe require that we should be so.”“* Palmerston knew perfectly well that he 
had to act when time came, at least to avoid the complications that resulted from British 
inaction in 1833. (See Chapter IV, 4.4) Mahmut II understood this point very well and 
these factors led him to depend on British support, even if they denied their readiness to 
confer it.
When Mahmut felt certain of the position of these two states, he began 
preparations for war with Mohammed Ali. He dispatched Re^it Pasha on a European tour 
that included Vienna, Paris and above all London to gather international support for his 
offensive.’ He was unable to gamer support from Metternich or Mole, but he had better 
luck with Palmerston. Initially aiming for a defensive treaty, he was only able to get the 
British cabinet to approve a draft treaty that stipulated joint cruising in the Mediterranean 
in case of future problems with Mohammed Ali. Mahmut worked quickly to prepare the 
new army that would attack the Egyptian forces. In 1836 he entrusted the army to Hafiz 
Pasha, assisted by Prussian officer Helmut Von Moltke who acted as Consultant.^ The 
entire Ottoman army numbered around eighty thousand men, with three hundred pieces of 
artillery.^ Mahmut spared no money or effort to supply the army with ammunition, money 
and the necessary expertise.* The bulk of the army was deployed in Malatya and 
Diyarbakır on the southern borders, ready for action when time was ripe to cross the
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Euphrates into Syria. But the army lacked homogeneity, for its members were from 
different ethnic origins and their morale was not as high as their adversaries. As Von 
Moltke later commented after their defeat, “.one has to accept the fact that with such an 
army it is impossible to win a war.
Mohammed Ali was aware of his situation. His son Ibrahim provided frequent 
reports and he advised his son to avoid instigating a conflict with Ottoman armies, but to 
take all necessary steps to defend Syria.*® Ibrahim lost no time in preparing his armies 
which were scattered across Syria to handle constant rebellions. At the same time, 
Mohammed Ali gathered the Consuls of the major powers to inform them of Ottoman 
mobilization and the Porte’s plans for war.** However, there was little the Consuls could 
do but sympathize. They had no instructions from their governments since the crisis 
erupted quickly and they were forced to act on their own.
It was well known to the major powers that the Porte was embarking on a war, 
and the only remaining questions was when the attack would begin. Ponsonby assured 
Palmerston that the war would begin by spring.*^ He attempted to avert hostilities but he 
knew Mahmut II, "would rather die or be the vassal of Russia than not to endeavor to 
destroy the rebel subject", while his entourage believed that "if (they) would be beaten 
(they) are still sure of the succor of Russia.”*^ This reflected the general attitude of 
Mahmut who ordered his armies to cross the Euphrates and engage the Egyptian army, 
despite constant warnings from Von Moltke that the army was not prepared for this war.*'* 
On the 21st of April the Ottoman army crossed the Euphrates into Syria.
This move showed that British, Russian and French efforts to maintain the status 
quo failed and that war was imminent. The Ottoman army did not attack Ibrahim but
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remained idle except for few skirmishes while Ibrahim massed his forces and fortified 
mountain passes to deny Ottoman advance. This caused Hafiz to transfer his forces to 
Nezib where he fomented revolts throughout Syria against Egypt. As Ibrahim prepared, he 
requested the immediate summoning of Ahmed El Manakeily Pasha, Nazir E l Gihadiyya 
or Minister o f War from Egypt. Mohammed Ali approved but Couchelet and his Austrian 
colleague, realizing that this meant war, requested an audience with him and asked that he 
postpone his decision. Mohammed Ali requested an international guarantee for the 
inviolability of his territories. Couchelet accepted, but the Austrian Consul could not 
commit his government. Mohamed Ali sent El Manakeily immediately as a sign for war 
preparations if necessary.
Meanwhile Ibrahim, unable to understand why the Ottomans fortified and did not 
attack wrote the following to Hafiz Pasha.
I f  your excellency received instructions to declare war, what is the use o f 
continuing these affairs o f intrigues and revolts. I f  you wish war, then let us go to 
the battl^ield openly and courageously. I  hope that you have not overlooked the 
fa c t that you are fighting real heroes who do not have fears in their hearts....
Obviously, the no peace no war situation would not continue for long and the pressures
o f the Consuls on Mohammed Ali to restrain himself declined in value and vigor.
On the 11th o f June Mohammed Ali sent a letter to Ibrahim in which he authorized
him to attack the Ottoman army in Syria. The letter stated:
The aggression o f our enemy has surpassed the level o f tolerance. I f  we fin d  him 
in our path we have to stop him because he is sowing the seeds o f revolts right 
and left The more we have held our patience with him, in an effort to avoid great 
powers' opposition, our enemy continues penetrating our lands... This requests 
action. M y advice to you upon receiving this letter is to attack the armies o f our 
enemy that entered our lands to expel them from it So do not be satisfied by this, 
but you have to continue to attack their main forces andfight it  With God's help, 
i f  you achieve victory, continue your march to Malatya Urfa and Diyarbakir.
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This letter was of such importance that the Consuls gathered the next day to 
persuade Mohammed Ali to intercept the message before reaching Ibrahim. Campbell, 
Couchelet de Medem and the Austrian Consul did their best to dissuade him from 
initiating hostilities. Couchelet wrote on the 12th of June to his government describing 
their efforts, stating that he:
...met Count o f Medem the Russian Consul General and we did our utmost effort 
to convince Mehmet Ali to change his mind, and we were informed that the British 
and Austrian Consuls have met him this morning fo r the same reason. So he 
informed us that the Turks have instigated fire in the house and we have to 
extinguish it, and otir reply was that the fire should not be spread in the 
neighbors' home. He replied by assuring that his son Ibrahim is wise in his 
attitude... So the ship left yesterday evening with the orders to Ibrahim.
In Paris, the new government of Soult, followed the traditional French policy of
avoiding the crisis by urging the two parties to settle the affair peacefully as they did with
the crisis o f independence twelve months earlier. Soult immediately sent his Aide du
Champs Callier, on the 28th of May, to Mohammed Ali with instructions to stop the war
at any cost. At the same time he dispatched officer Foltz to Constantinople to inform the
Sultan to end the state of belligerency between the two parties.
Callier arrived on the 13 th of June, too late to prevent the orders from reaching
Ibrahim He was given an audience with Mohammed Ali on the 15th and 16th of June.
During his discussions, he convinced the Vali to accept French mediation. The question
remained how to intercept the message that Ibrahim was about to receive. The only means
was for Callier to reach Ibrahim before hostilities broke out with the Ottomans.
Meanwhile, the mission of Foltz failed. This may be attributed to Mahmut's intransigence
and Ponsonby’s insistence that he could not assist him due to a lack of instructions from
his government.^® Though some Egyptian authors believe this was a premeditated British
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attempt to initiate hostilities in order to foster the conditions for intervention, the fact 
remains that Ponsonby could not involve his government in French mediation without 
Consulting Palmerston and receiving clear instructions in this regard.
Upon receiving the letter from his father, Ibrahim moved against the Ottoman 
army stationed at Nezib. Had it not been for the efforts of Suleiman Pasha El Ferensawy, 
Ibrahim might have led his army into a possible defeat. The Ottoman army was well 
fortified against the attack Ibarahim contemplated. Suleiman, conducted a reconnaissance 
to find means to overcome these fortifications. Had it not been for this move, Ibrahim 
might have lost the battle. Hence, he undertook a risky operation by outmaneuvering 
Hafiz and attacking from the unfortified areas of the city. Hafiz committed the worst 
mistake by not attacking Ibrahim during his march around the city. The Egyptian army 
certainly was in the better position, and on the 24th of June 1839, the Egyptian army 
inflicted a tremendous defeat upon the Ottomans. Total casualties -including dead, 
wounded and prisoners- numbered around fifteen thousand men.^' The extent of the 
Ottoman defeat could be understood from Ibrahim's letter to his father, where he stated. 
Here I write to you from the tent of Hafiz Pasha... We have bounted all their supplies, 
cannons and ammunitions. We have captured many prisoners and how much I would like 
to follow the rest but I find nobody." Unfortunately for Ibrahim, he received disappointing 
news when Callier arrived following the Battle of Nezib.
Though aiming to continue his war efforts in following the remainder o f the 
Ottoman army and advancing northward, he was instructed by his father to halt his 
advances The same scenario o f 1833 after the battle of Konya was repeating itself, but this 
time Ibrahim was more determined to follow the pursuit of his victories. Callier brought
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with him an order from Mohammed Ali that stated, "Keep your place, and do not 
advance.”^^  Ibrahim was frustrated and upon receiving these orders from his father, he 
screamed in Callier's face and shouted, "This is impossible, this letter was written before 
the victory,... therefore, I shall not abide by it., and I shall bear the responsibility of my 
decision. You have read history, have you ever heard about a victorious leader impeded 
from pursuing his march? If you have heard this, I have not."“^  It took Callier five hours to 
explain the situation and calm Ibrahim. He explained the dangerous repercussions of his 
decision to continue the war in that the European powers would not permit the defeat or 
annihilation of the Ottoman state. Thus the Egyptians halted all military activities except 
for the occupation of Urfa which was considered necessary for military and strategic 
purposes, other than this, Ibrahim promised not to cross the Taurus mountains.
A final point regarding the military situation was that some authors,^“* claimed the 
road to Istanbul was open for Ibrahim. Though this contains certain elements of truth, the 
fact remains that Ibrahim merely engaged the larger parts of the Ottoman army. The 
remainder o f the Ottoman army was still intact and located in Konya (25,000 soldiers with 
40 pieces of artillery) and in Malatya (20,000 men with 30 pieces of artillery).^’ Ibrahim 
could have defeated those armies in short order given that his army of 46,000 men was 
better trained and equipped than the remainder of the Ottoman army. In practical terms, it 
was only a matter of time before Mohammed Ali seized the Ottoman capital and the 
Sultanate had it not been for the French interference and his fears of a possible European
intervention against him as we shall see shortly.
Before the news reached the capital of the defeat at Nezib, Mahmut II died and 
was officially succeeded on the 1st of July by his son Abdul Mejid, a seventeen-year-old
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boy who lacked maturity and leadership skills. In reality, the empire rested in the hands of 
Mohammed Ali's old rival Husrev Pasha, the Sadrazam. (See Chapter III, 3.2 :B)
To make matters worse and even more alarming for the European powers, the 
Ottoman fleet defected to Mohammed Ali in Alexandria on July 14, 1839. The Ottoman 
fleet was lead by the Captain Pasha Ahmet Fevzi, who was supposed to have given naval 
support to the army in Syria. However, upon his arrival to the Dardanelles, the orders 
changed and he was instructed to go to Rhodes. Since Husrev was now in charge of the 
political affairs after the demise of Mahmut II, and the accession of Abdul Mejid, Fevzi 
Pasha perceived this as an attempt to remove him from his post, given past animosity 
between him and H us r ev . I n  addition, he believed the Russians would come to the rescue 
o f the Porte and therefore, he thought that this meant handing over the fleet to the 
Russians. To him as well as some of his crew, it was better to defect to Mohammed Ali 
rather than deliver the fleet to the Russians. The fleet included twenty ships, twelve 
frigates, several corvettes and some bricks.^’ The crew amounted to 21,000 men and 
16,000 soldiers but many escaped and refused to join Mohammed Ali.^*
Husrev was in a very difficult position and it seemed his rival had obtained the 
upper hand in nearly all aspects of the crisis. The Sultan was dead and the Porte defeated 
and demoralized. Husrev decided to accept the requests of Mohammed Ali and sent him a 
message assuring him the hereditary rule of Egypt and Syria to his family and requesting 
his help to develop the empire as well as the return of Ahmet Fevzi Pasha.^^ Mohammed 
Ali's response was insolent. He demanded the resignation o f Husrev, and refused to hand 
over Fevzi Pasha unless other conditions were met.^” As the divan met in Constantinople, 
Husrev opted for a policy of appeasement to Mohammed Ali. The major question
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remained: to what extent will the Egyptian territory extend? Should the requests of 
Mohammed Ali for Urfa and other southern provinces be accepted? These formalities 
formed the discussions in the divan. As the deliberations continued, the Ottoman 
government received a note by the European Ambassadors to the Porte instructing them 
not to close a deal with Mohammed Ali without their consent. This became known as the 
July 27 Note. This was the beginning of the European intervention in the Egyptian 
Question and ended with thwarting the rule of Mohammed Ali and the pacification of the 
Egyptian Question. Why this intervention occurred, who orchestrated it and how it 
proceeded was a factor of the European balance of power mechanism since the Egyptian 
Question threatened the equilibrium in the European System.
5.2 The Disturber of Balance and European Disequilibrium:
Throughout the previous chapter, we analyzed how the Egyptian Question of 1833 
caused disequilibrium in the European system by (A) threatening the existence o f the 
Ottoman Empire, (B) jeopardizing the position of the Ottoman Straits and causing Russian 
preponderance in southeastern Europe and (C) French preponderance in the east 
Mediterranean. The repercussions of 1833 lasted years. The Crisis of 1839 was an 
extension of the disequilibrium caused by the Egyptian Question in 1833. Like the first 
crisis it also held the danger of the rise of an Egyptian empire which appeared to be ready 
to inherit the Ottoman state if circumstances permitted. This section shall examine this 
disequilibrium and how it triggered balance of power mechanics to thwart, if not eliminate, 
the Egyptian Question.
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A. Threatening the Existence of the Porte:
As explained in Chapter I, the disturber o f the balance is the state that affects the 
power distribution in a system by actions that harm the equilibrium, primarily through 
affecting the factors that regulate the power distribution inside a system. Though Egypt 
was not a member in the European system, representing as it did an extension o f the 
Ottoman de jure sovereignty, it nevertheless became a disturber o f balance in Europe 
since its forces were in Anatolia, threatening either to inherit the Ottoman Empire or 
establish political preponderance over it. In other words, it threatened an important actor 
in the system as well the calculations of equilibrium by others in this system.
The Ottoman Empire was an essential factor, a sine a quo non in the equilibrium of 
Europe, particularly eastern Europe. (See Chapter II, The Ottoman Empire in the 
European Balance o f Power, and Chapter IV, Further disequilibrium in the system) This 
was a well recognized fact by all the actors in the European system, Austria France and 
above all Britain, with the only exception being Russia. British politicians were fiilly 
aware o f this premise and acted upon it, regardless of whether it was Palmerston or his 
opposition in the Cabinet, and never cease to mention it in any occasion. Palmerston for 
example, stated, "That the object to be attained (with regard to Ottoman integrity) is of 
utmost importance, for the interest of England, for the preservation o f the balance of 
power, and for the maintenance of peace in E u r o p e . H e  further admitted that his 
government's policy was to be "founded upon the basis of an endeavor to maintain the 
Sultan and to uphold the integrity of the Turkish Empire. Even his foe in the Cabinet,
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Clarendon correctly asserted with regard to their position in this crisis, that they 
"...wish(ed) to maintain the integrity of Turkey. Clearly the continuation of the Ottoman 
Empire was a major aim for the British policy, without any reservation.
In as far as France and Austria, were concerned, both shared the same view as to 
the importance of the Porte in European equilibrium. France in particular demonstrated 
this, by dispatching two officers to mediate between the two powers in June 1839 This 
was in full conformity with its position regarding the first crisis in 1833.^“* For the same 
reason, it followed the same policy and nearly succeeded in averting the war and crisis that 
followed. However, they were driven by a concern over possible Russian preponderance 
as reflected by cool Franco-Russian relations during the past ten years.^*
As for Austria, Metternich learned that the Treaty of Münchengratz was inoperable 
as a result o f the British and French opposition since its signature. Therefore, even his idea 
of what should be done with the Ottoman European territories in case of the dissolution of 
the Ottoman Empire, became inoperable. (See Chapter, IV, 4.5) Possible Ottoman 
dissolution worried Metternich since it would create a power vacuum that would result in 
either independence for the territories or Russian schemes to fill the vacuum Therefore 
the existence of the Ottoman Empire could not be compromised.
Russia did not remain aloof, sharing as it did the same concerns as Austria at one 
point, particularly regarding the future of the Straits and the possibility o f new power's 
preponderance over the Porte. This fear compelled Nesselrode to plan for the future of the 
Straits which Russia worked so hard to dominate during the last decades (See Chapter II 
2.5) In this regard, Nicholas I went as far’as to suggest European collective action 
regarding the possibility, in case of Ottoman dissolution, for Istanbul (Constantinople) to
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become a free city, while Russia was to hold the Bosphorus, while Austria and Britain the 
Dardanelles. That was a result o f his recognition that Hünkar iskelesi was obsolete along 
with the Munchengratz agreement. Another problem that worried the Russian statesmen 
was the possibility of Mohammed Ali inheriting or even showing strong preponderance in 
the Porte. This would render Russia’s efforts to dominate the Porte equally obsolete.
The 1839 Crisis presented European powers with the possibility o f the dissolution 
o f the Ottoman Empire and its substitution by an Arab Empire. As noted in Chapter III, 
the military might of Egypt was increased with each passing year. Egypt's strong economic 
and industrial structure indicated that this lack of capital could be overcome. The 
Egyptian military machinery was estimated to number close to two hundred thousand men, 
whereby at least one hundred and fifty thousand men could be massed. (See Chapter III, 
for details regarding the Egyptian military might) In addition, the army was well-equipped 
and trained along modem lines. Furthermore, its navy after the defection of the Ottoman 
fleet was the largest power in east Mediterranean, totaling nearly thirty two vessels,^’ and 
combined with the Ottoman fleet surpassed fifty vessels.^* This inventory includes only 
frigates, corvettes and other worthy battleships.
This power accumulation was considered a menace by Britain and Austria. It did 
not pass Palmerston's attention. In 1838 he instructed Campbell to convey to Mohammed 
Ali that there was no need for such a buildup and asked that the forces be reduced.^® This 
buildup concerned Metternich perhaps most of all in that should Mohamed Ali succeed, 
Austria would be in the shadows of a possible Arab Empire. (See Chapter IV) Moreover, 
if Egypt inherited the Ottoman Empire, this meant the addition o f a new and powerful 
actor in the European system, though not equal in strength to the five major powers but
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certainly possessing good prospects for the future. Interestingly, a comparison between 
the Egyptian army in 1833 and the Prussian army, shows that the Egyptian army nearly 
equaled the Prussian, at one hundred and thirty thousand men in 1830-1833.'*® If  Prussia 
was a Middle Power as Kennedy calls it, Egypt did not lag far behind. In addition, Egypt 
followed a course of development and reformation that if continued, it might have 
permitted it sustain its military victories.
However, this is a hypothetical argument since Ibrahim halted his militaiy advances 
at Urfa and was ordered to proceed no further. But this was a possible scenario that the 
major powers had to consider in planning for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, 
especially when Mohammed Ali threatened to march on Constantinople on 1833. Finally 
there was no guarantee this wouldn't happen again in the future. This was in one way that 
Egypt in 1839 became the disturber o f the balance and a possible preponderant power on 
the fringes of the European system should it inherit the Ottoman Empire or even extend
major political influence over it.
B. The Russian Factor:
Chapter IV reviewed the dangers perceived by the Western Powers and Austria 
regarding the Russian menace. Certainly the structure of the system was an important 
factor with regard to the Porte. The mere fact of the heterogeneity o f the system with 
regard to the Porte made it totally inconceivable that any of the major powers would allow 
it to fall prey to Russian influence. (See Chapter IV) That was due to the fact that Russia 
never considered it to be a member of the European system. Even Austria shared this same
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view, and that is why it attempted to limit Russian influence at the Treaty of 
Munchengratz. Thus, three powers, Britain, Austria and France, shared the goal o f 
maintaining the Ottoman Empire free from Russian influence.
Certainly, the Russian threat to the Porte, whether for influence or conquest, was a 
major factor that united Austria, Britain and France. Since the beginning o f the crisis o f 
1839, the British feared the Egyptian Question would trigger the Treaty o f Hünkâr İskelesi 
into motion, whereby Russian forces using their Black Sea fleet, would occupy the 
Bosphorus in less than a week; and once there, would never withdraw. This was precisely 
what Britain and France tried to avert and worked so hard to neutralize since 1833. 
Palmerston believed that to avoid this crisis, now and in the future, the Egyptian Question 
had to be pacified. "The maintenance o f the Turkish Empire," according to him "....is 
essential, for the preservation of peace, and for the upholding o f the independence o f 
eastern Europe. A partition of Turkey would be fatal to the independence of Austria and 
Prussia, when it was accomplished and it could be accomplished without a general war.”“** 
Writing to Palmerston, even Lord Clarendon, his worst enemy in the Cabinet, stressed the 
importance o f Ottoman independence, adding that it "will ... be able to resist Russia, for 
that is after all the real question.” Such comments clearly reflected the general thoughts 
o f Palmerston and the British policy towards the Egyptian Question. To prevent Russian 
preponderance, he was willing to create any alliance with whichever European power 
willing.
In 1839, the aims of the major actors were not different from 1833. For Austria, 
the question was also how to avoid the execution o f the Treaty o f Hünkâr iskelesi and a 
Russian presence on the Bosphorus. Metternich also recognized that Russia was extending
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its influence in the Balkans through Pan-Slavism.“*^ Though Austria was perhaps the only 
power in Europe with a contractual commitment to Russia on the fate o f the Ottoman 
Empire through the Treaty o f Munchengratz, it had doubts as to the future o f this treaty. 
Britain and France worked to neutralize both Hünkâr İskelesi and Miinchengratz, to make 
it the collective duty o f the European powers to secure the survival o f the Ottoman 
Empire. Britain, the main balancer in the system was not aloof as in 1833, and this by 
itself was sufficient to change the formula for action to Metternich. This meant that France 
would not be required to act alone as before. Therefore, the Western Camp would possess 
increased leverage over the situation at hand. These changes had their tremendous effect 
on Metternich in the months to come where he began calculating his position vis-à-vis the 
Western Camp.
France was also concerned over the Russian factor. In addition to the cool 
relations that existed between the two powers, Paris hoped to preserve the rule o f 
Mohammed Ali and his Empire.“*“* French goals in the 1839 Egyptian Crisis did not differ 
from 1833. This led Soult to try and contain the problem in May 1839 before it expanded.
C. Possible French Preponderance
In a balance o f power system, fear of preponderance is not necessarily limited to 
the common enemy, but can apply among allies as well. Russia was not the only actor in 
the system that generated concern, France also was not above suspicion. France was also 
becoming a preponderant power that could threaten the equilibrium by her own actions 
This was the case o f France in the Mediterranean as perceived by some o f the powers, 
especially Britain.
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In 1830 France annexed Algeria and three years later established its influence in 
Syria. France and Egypt were viewed by the other powers as the source o f preponderance 
in east Mediterranean. This worried Britain, which had vested interest in maintaining its 
naval superiority in the Mediterranean, and therefore Egypt as a new power, would mean 
an extension of French influence. It is even arguable that British concerns that Egypt 
could threaten the Levant and the Red Sea trade routes to India, dictated its response in 
the Egyptian Question,
In conclusion, if European powers believed that a state of disequilibrium existed on 
the eastern borders of the system, and that there existed a disturber of the balance capable 
o f further damage, it would be a natural outcome that balance of power mechanics would 
be employed. The major actors in the system did not fail to follow balance o f power 
mechanics to thwart the disturber o f the balance, i.e., Egypt, and remedy the 
disequilibrium that has been growing since the Egyptian Question entered its active phase 
eight years before. All the European powers -with the exception of France- followed the 
exact patterns of the mechanics of balance of power. They formed an alliance, 
orchestrated an intervention, and settled the matter with reciprocal non-compensation for 
nearly all the powers involved.
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5.3 Mechanics of Balance of Power in Motion: Forming the Alliance:
The story of the formation of the alliance to terminate the state o f disequilibrium 
that threatened southeastern Europe was materialized over time. That was due to the fact, 
that unlike the coalition formed by the Treaty of Chaumont in 1813 to remedy the 
disequilibrium created by the Napoleonic wars, (See Chapter II, 2.2), the choice over the 
type the means o f intervention and settlement was less obvious. This was primarily a result 
o f the defection of France from the coalition, to which it was much later admitted.
For reasons of clarity, the formation of the allaince will be divided into two main 
stages, the first dating from May 1839 until February 1840 (the date of the rise of the 
Thiers government in France). While the second extended from February 1840 to October 
1840 (the date of the defeat of Mohammed Ali and the settlement o f the Egyptian 
Question).
A. The First Stage:
There is no doubt the five courts of the major powers believed that the 
Sultan’s order for his army cross the Euphrates would inaugurate a new and dangerous 
phase in the Egyptian Question. However, each state had its own views on how to remedy 
this disequilibrium. Palmerston, representing the extreme position in the coalition sought
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an end to the crisis in terms of restoring Syria to the Porte. He believed in the necessity of 
creating a barrier between the sultan and Mohammed Ali and the latter's presence in Syria 
would mean the likelihood of future frictions. This meant that a buffer state was needed. 
According to Webster, Palmerston believed that "There was no barrier to the expansion of 
Mehmet Ali there (in Syria)."'*  ^ The best choice for a buffer zone was the Negev desert 
and its extension in the north. This meant returning Syria to the Porte.
France could not come to accept Palmerston’s position in that it believed Syria 
belonged to Mohammed Ali in accordance with the agreement of Kütahya in 1833.“’ 
Moreover, any attempt to evacuate Mohammed Ali from Syria meant diluting its influence 
in the east Mediterranean. Soult believed that "Mohammed Ali is in a position to get the 
best advantages. But there are limits to this advantage that could be handed to him, and 
this limit today as before, the death of Mahmut, is the one that could not be permitted, 
whereby the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire is threatened.”“* To 
France this limit was found at Anatolia, a line Mohammed Ali would not be permitted to 
cross But France continued to be concerned over the possibility of Russian aggression. 
The dilemma of France was how to use collective action to stop Russia, while at the same 
time securing the inability of this coalition to affect the status of Mohammed Ali regarding 
Syria and hereditary rule. This was the core and the crux of the French dilemma, where 
ends could not meet as events reflected.
As for Austria, Metternich advocated a compromise along the proposed settlement 
that Prokech Osten suggested to Mohammed Ali during the 1833 crisis. The Austrians felt 
Mohammed Ali could receive a part of Syria, while the sultan retained the remainder. 
But unlike France and Britain, who both had direct contradictory vested interests in the
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The major problem at hand was which path these states would follow given the 
polarization inside the system ?
The answer to this question was to be found by the veteran o f the Congress o f 
Vienna, Mettemich. Being an able diplomat, he realized the dangers o f the situation at 
hand, even before the Battle of Nezib. He also recognized that the Treaty o f 
Munchengratz soured his relations with Britain. His communication lines with Palmerston 
were not very productive, so he turned to France so as secure collective action. 
Metternich, by now, an expert on the formalities of how to launch collective action, 
suggested Vienna as the center for organized action on the Egyptian Question.*^ He 
believed such a program would not only settle the crisis, but would revive the Congress 
System that Canning had suffocated. In addition, Austria would once again be the center 
of the system. Ironically, the main supporters for this plan were the British Foreign 
Minister and Soult, while Russia remained cold..
Mettemich knew that he could not directly induce Palmerston to accept collective 
action with him least of all Vienna as its center. Thus, he used France to sell his idea to 
London. Soult proved receptive, believing such a plan would prevent Russian unilateral 
action, and since the plan originated with a main partner of the Eastern Camp, this 
automatically limited Russian maneuverability. Palmerston realized that he could not risk 
alienation, especially in that he distrusted France on any matter concerning Mohammed 
All. So he reluctantly accepted the proposal. He and the Cabinet, believed "Mettemich 
[to be] so feeble, timid, tricky and so much swayed by Russia, and by nature so prone to 
crooked paths... that I (Palmerston) greatly doubted whether the Vienna congress would 
lead to anything good. On the other hand, Russia might perhaps consent to a conference
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there and not else where.””  Obviously his choices were limited. At the same time, he 
issued instructions for the British fleet to intercept the communication o f Mohammed Ali 
in an attempt to support the sultan and strengthen his position so as to affect the outcome 
of the Vienna Congress by showing his will to act unilaterally if necessary.
Much to his surprise, the deliberations in Vienna between Metternich and the 
Ambassadors of Britain, France, Russia and Prussia, produced an impressive result. To 
avoid further exacerbating the crisis, the four Ambassadors and Metternich agreed to 
avoid any final settlement between the Sultan and Mohammed Ali without joint consent 
and knowledge. There was even discussion on the dispatch of a joint naval fleet to the 
Dardanelles. France and Britain had Austrian support, and the Russian Minister in Vienna 
tvas unwilling to challenge Metternich.^“’ Thus, instructions were sent to Constantinople 
for the presentation o f the Note of July 27 as mentioned earlier.
The obvious evaluation of the Congress was simple. Russia was denied unilateral 
action on its own, though it was obvious from the start that it did not want to be involved 
alone in this affair. French and British aims were fulfilled in as far as Russia was 
concerned. Metternich realized his dream of returning Vienna to the center o f diplomatic 
action and steering a concerted action against the disturber of balance, recalling his role in 
the Napoleonic wars. Only France was unhappy and criticized the performance o f its 
Ambassador to the Porte and his role in the Note of July 27, because he consented to 
niatters too far, but the damage was done in as far as France was concerned. .
French reaction was a byproduct of the political indecision of the government 
which was torn between Louis Philippe and Soult, and confusion should have been 
expected. Unknowingly, Soult had placed himself at the disposition o f Palmerston,
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through his efforts to achieve a concerted action among the European powers. Palmerston 
was rather generous when he claimed that "Soult was a Jewel" when suggesting joint 
guarantee and action for the Ottoman Empire.^^ Without Soult, the joint efforts would 
have never materialized. France embarked on a twin policy of supporting Russian restraint 
and Mohammed Ali as the hereditary ruler of Egypt and Syria. Though the two policies 
were not necessarily incompatible, the means to achieve them placed France in conflict 
with those who were not concerned with accommodating Mohammed Ali. In gaining 
international support to fulfill the first aim, they also gathered international opposition that 
obstructed the fulfillment of the second aim.
What began as concerted action, gradually transformed itself into a coalition 
against Mohammed Ali. But France was unhappy and unwilling to continue her support. 
Her first aim was fulfilled and it saw no need to remain in the coalition. But the coalition 
Soult created, haunted both him and his successor Thiers. The powers were determined 
that the Egyptian Question would be settled, although harmony did not prevail within the 
coalition. British and Russian animosity still existed. Britain did not trust Metternich, 
Russia was annoyed at the idea of a combined Dardanelles fleet and France was bound to 
withdraw from the coalition. The future of the Egyptian Question remained far from 
certain.
The first problem was the growing breach between England and France. 
Palmerston accused the government of Soult with lack of cooperation resulting in French 
inaction. He wrote to Bulwer the Secretary in Paris, "That it is evident that, either from 
their own notion o f French interests or from fears of newspapers, the French government 
will not willingly take the slightest step o f coercion against Mehmet Ali, either for the
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purpose o f getting back the Turkish fleet or in order to enforce any arrangement with the 
five powers.” He continued his dispatch claiming that "they must...take their choice 
between three courses, either to go forward with us, and honestly redeem the pledges they 
have given us and to Europe, or to stand a loo f... or lastly, to go right along and league 
themselves with Mehmet Ali and employ force to prevent us and those other powers who 
may join us from doing that which France herself is bound (to)..."^® Palmerston remained 
unhappy with French inaction and her subversive attitude towards the embryonic coalition 
and collective action. However, he and Metternich were more concerned at this time with 
Russian intransigence.
For Russia, the crisis occurred at the same time as it confronted problems with 
Britain in Persia and Afghanistan. It remained interested in terminating the crisis between 
the Porte and the vassal, and return to the status quo ante bellum without having to 
involve itself as required by the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi. However, failure to 
participate in a settlement could mean unilateral British intervention and the loss o f all the 
advantages gained to date.
Russia initially refused the Metternich initiative of Vienna being the center, but 
could do little about it without coming out openly against collective action. Strangely, 
Nicholas I and Nesselrode, instead of breaking down the concert by open action or refusal, 
preferred to take the path of passive inaction by delaying the return of Tatischeff, their 
Ambassador to Vienna, who was represented by his deputy. This position dealt a severe 
blow to both Metternich and the efforts of Palmerston to establish collective action. 
Moreover, Nicholas I believed that Austrian cooperation with the British and French on a 
maritime presence in the Dardanelles was a threat to Russia more than a deterrence to
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Mohammed Ali.’* Certainly, the breach between Metternich and Nicholas caught the 
attention o f Clanricarde the British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, who reported in 
August that "Mettemich is entirely wrong if he thinks he can guide the Tsar. On the 
contrary all the evidences at St. Petersburg shewed that the Russian government was 
aggrieved and irritated at his conduct. If  Austria would separate from England and France, 
Russia might lean towards her side in a difference of policy...But such would be the case 
...if England were to separate from France and Austria. ... Russia fears England more than
Austria...and is more inclined to court her."
Such complications made the establishment o f a coalition a difficult task. 
Nevertheless with the exception of France, all countries were inclined towards collective 
action and, if necessary coersion as well, against Mohammed Ali to remedy the 
disequilibrium. It should be noted that in a balance of power dynamic, coalitions are the 
product o f more than a simple decision. The Final Coalition against France took a long 
time to be established and had it not been for the policy of Metternich and Castlereagh, it 
may never have materialized. (See Chapter I, 1.5 and Chapter II, 2.2) Thus Palmerston 
and Metternich had to find some means to accommodate Russia and keep her in the 
concerted action until it develops into a formal alliance or coalition.
The Russo-Austrian breach gradually pushed the maintenance o f the unborn 
coalition into the hands of Palmerston. This shift was aided by Palmerston’s determination 
to revive his 1838 plan to make London the center for action on the Egyptian Question. 
Such role was understandable in that Britain was traditionally the balancer o f Europe 
when the mechanics o f balance of power were implemented. Immediately, upon 
Metternich's failure, Palmerston began to impose his character on the arena. He began
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with two actions; changing his tone o f protest to France to a tone o f threat, and by 
preparing for rapprochement with Russia.
Palmerston was willing to shift alliances provided that he would cement the 
embryonic coalition and pacify the Egyptian Question. This included mending bridges with 
Russia if necessary. Russia did not disappoint him and Nicholas sent him his emissary 
Brunnow with the goal o f winning Palmerston to his side. What explains this Russian 
move, especially given the relations o f animosity that existed between the two states during 
the past six years? (See Chapter IV, 4.4) The answer rested in the fact that Russia 
recognized it could not implement Hunkar Iskelesi and Miinchengratz and sought an 
international guarantee to prevent the passage of war vessels through the Straits. 
Obviously, animosity with Britain could not continue. In addition, she risked alienation 
after losing Metternich to the Western Camp, and a combined action without her could 
easily reverse all her accomplishments with the Porte she had achieved since 1829.
Brunnow arrived in London in mid-September 1839, and met with Palmerston on 
many occasions. He explained the new position of his government, primarily that she was 
willing to give up the Treaty of Hünkar Iskelesi, in favor of an international agreement in 
return for a guarantee that the Straits would be closed to any war vessels when the Porte 
was at peace.^° The full account o f Russian views were stated in Palmerston’s despatches 
to Bulwer where he explains that: ^
...Brunnow says that the Emperor will entirely agree to our views as to the affairs 
o f Turkey and Egypt, and will jo in  inwhatever measures may be necessary to 
carry those views in effect, and that he will unite with us, Austria and Prussia 
either with or without France.... i f  the measures ofMehmet should place 
Constantinople in danger and render necessary any naval or military operations 
in the Bosphorus or Asia Minor, he hopes we will leave that to him, and that we 
will ...undertake whatever is to be done in the Mediterranean and the coast o f
210
Syria and Egypt... (and )  that anything he will do...shall be held to be the residt o f 
concert, and not the resolve o f Russia. ...But he is ready to begin by signing a 
convention which shall define our object and determine our means o f 
accomplishment and assign to each his appropriate part
Russia sought to establish another Treaty of Chaumont to remedy the disequilibrium, 
while at the same time suggest a solution to the problems of the Straits. Palmerston did 
not respond quickly to Brunnow’s suggestion, since he had to deal with the Cabinet.
Unfortunately for Palmerston, who was inclined to accept Russian rapprochement, 
he faced strong opposition in a Cabinet unwilling to break the alliance with France in 
exchange for closer relations with Russia regarding the Egyptian Question. In addition, 
Brunnow’s suggestions meant that Russia could take unilateral action in the Bosphorus in 
case o f war against Mohammed Ali. The problem was to get Russia to accept joint action. 
The Cabinet rejected the Russian proposal and Brunnow left London having failed in his 
mission.®^
Palmerston had been annoyed by the French attitude since July. But as his lines of 
communications with Russia gradually opened, his tone toughened with France. 
Palmerston's thoughts were reflected in another despatch to Bulwer in Paris on September 
24 where he stated bluntly that "probability is that they (Cabinet) will resolve to proceed in 
conjunction with the three Powers whether France joins or not... If  Soult should hint that 
France would oppose the four powers, you might suggest that ...it could not be 
worthwhile to make war with the four Powers for the sake of endeavoring to give Mehmet 
a few square miles. France was left to make her choice.
Palmerston's bitterness towards France made him all the more convinced to begin 
developing the concerted action into a coalition. Metternich supported Palmerston's refusal 
o f Russian unilateral action in the Straits, and conveyed this to Brunnow, now in
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Johannisberg.®“* Fortunately for Palmerston, Russia accepted joint action for the fleets of 
the powers in the Straits.®^
B. The Second Stage:
This new situation opened the way for Palmerston to transform London into the 
center o f concerted action as well as providing additional ammunition to use in his 
arguments with the Cabinet. However, the question remained how to confront French 
opposition and to structure the rules for such a coalition ? He was aided by the fact that 
the other powers were willing to cooperate and terminate the state of disequilibrium that 
threatened their interests. The powers sent their Ambassadors to England to begin talks.
But before the Broadland Conference began, the issue of a French invitation had to 
be discussed. Metternich and Palmerston remained interested in drawing the French into 
the coalition. However, Metternich believed it imperative while Palmerston was willing to 
continue without her. Metternich’s overture to France at this point failed and the 
government o f Louis Philippe rejected the idea o f coercion against Egypt.®® The breach 
between Palmerston and France was obvious. Brunnow explained this in his famous letter 
to Nesselrode noting that: “The Anglo French alliance is already dead. England is still not 
with us; but neither is she with France...England is a widow. To marry her much skill and 
patience are needed, for she is a handsome and capricious woman”.®’ Everything 
depended on the attitude of Russia and Palmerston’s flexibility at this stage.
The Broadland Meetings as it came to be known were inaugurated towards the 
fourth week o f December. It was the essence o f the future coalition and much of its
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success depended on these talks. This perhaps explains how after his marriage in early 
December 1839, Palmerston spent his honeymoon negotiating in Broadland.
Brunnow arrived for the Broadland talks fully prepared, perhaps more than his 
Austrian and Prussian colleagues or even Palmerston himself Unlike them all, he carried 
strict and unequivocal instructions from Nicholas I. His instructions amounted to a dozen 
points summed up in his letter to Tatischeff, as follows:
A- That a solution to the present state between the Porte and Egypt had to be achieved by 
securing the former against the latter, because this state of affairs could easily have its 
affect on European peace.
B- The allies should grant Mohammed Ali hereditary rule of Egypt, and that he should 
accept the full sovereignty of the Porte.
C- Egyptian forces must withdraw from Syria and the Ottoman fleet must be returned.
D- If  Mohammed Ali should refuse, coercive measures would be taken as follows: the 
British and French fleets (if France joins) were to block the province of Alexandretta, and 
latter Candia (Crete)- A blockade on Egyptian shores -Allied Consuls were to be 
withdrawn fi'om Alexandria- The Russian forces were to intervene in Asia Minor in case 
Ibrahim decides to press against Constantinople.- Russian and allied fleets were not to 
come in contact with each other throughout the operation.
E- To sign a convention guaranteeing the closure of the Straits to any war vessel when the 
Porte was at war. And that this was a sine quo non.
These points came to be the backbone of the July 15th 1840 London Convention. 
Palmerston agreed to nearly all of them but there were several issues that needed to be 
resolved if a treaty was to formalize. Above all, the Russian proposal limited the allied
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naval presence in the Straits, but it imposed no limit on Russia. Moreover, Palmerston was 
unwilling to sign a convention on the Straits, though he accepted the principles involved. 
He was also worried about how to get the Cabinet to accept this plan, with French lobby 
certainly opposing it. Mettemich’s reservations were similar to those of Palmerston but he 
added another that would be a point o f contention between England and Austria on the 
one hand and Russia on the other. This was the necessity to include the Porte in any 
convention that required action in the name of the Sultan.
Since London hosted the meetings, Palmerston led the discussion. He modified 
Brunnow’s suggestion to include equal naval representation in the Ottoman Straits and 
adopted Metternich’s position to allow the active representation of the Porte by the 
Sultan’s plenipotentiary. Moreover, he campaigned through Neumann (Metternich's 
representative in these meetings), and Beauvale (Lord E. Lamb, his Ambassador to 
Vienna) to bring Metternich to the side of the allies in case coercive action proved 
necessary. Similar actions were taken through Clanricarde, his Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg to persuade Nicholas and Nesselrode to accept these modifications. Palmerston 
believed that the cabinet would not approve the plan unless he could show Austria as a 
full partner. While he encountered some success with Russia, Metternich remained
obstinate.
Russia was satisfied with the Broadland talks in general, but displeased with the 
idea o f bringing the Porte into the talks. Nesselrode stated that "it seems to us that its a 
false and dangerous move. If this Ambassador [Ottoman Representative] is destined to 
stay in this spectacle of peace,...then we have made him the witness of disunion of the 
powers.”™ His pretext was that this would affect allied credibility and offer an incorrect
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image that could lead the Porte to conclude a separate agreement if it felt the powers 
could not cooperate. Actually his real reasons were enshrined in the Russian attitude 
towards the Porte in general which led her to consider it a non-member in the European 
family. (See Chapter II, 2.4.) However, Russia was willing to consent provided action 
began as soon as possible, believing that any delay would serve the interests of France and 
Mohammed Ali and would complicate the possibility of union among the powers.’* 
Nesselrode instructed Brunnow to attempt to strengthen Palmerston’s position with the 
Cabinet and to remain in London as Russian Ambassador to the British court.
Palmerston's problems were now limited to Austria and France only. He attempted 
to convince Metternich of the need for coercive action if necessary. Metternich believed 
they could not force Mohammed Ali to back down without the support o f France.”  Even 
worse for Palmerston, Metternich began a unilateral attempt to bring France into the 
unborn alliance. This was in keeping with Metternich’s habit of not entering an alliance 
that could not be destined to succeed. This is very reminiscent of his actions in 1813-14, 
when Austria was the last to join the alliance and declare war against France while it 
continued to play the mediator between France and the powers. (See Chapter, II, 2.2 )
Metternich's timid attitude towards coercive action rested on his conviction that 
France might go to war to support Mohammed Ali, since he believed that for France the 
issue was, "not a party question but a national one.””  Unless this question could be 
resolved, the powers would face the possibility of French mischief in Europe, especially in 
Italy, an action Austria would face on its own. Moreover, the presence of the French fleet 
in the Mediterranean would require the use of two Allied squadrons, the first to block 
France while the second to confront Mohammed Ali.”  He informed the British
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Ambassador that, "It is against the maxims of a great central power to place a large 
proportion o f her army beyond her own country to employ it in operations when its lines 
o f communication with herself must depend on another power;" therefore he suggested a 
compromise in which Mohammed Ali would receive Syria for the remainder o f his life.’  ^
At the same time, he pledged sixty thousand men to defend Constantinople if this failed, so 
or a need to this would arise.
But immense pressures from Russia and Britain forced him to change his attitude. 
The confusion that dominated the Cabinet of Theirs, which came to office in February 
1840, convinced him that France would not go to war and encouraged him to unify with 
the powers. In addition, his change of attitude was affected by the renewed concern that 
Russia would interfere unilaterally. As Nesselrode communicated in a rather decisive 
manner that, ....there are only two outcomes, either the negotiations of London would end 
with agreement among the powers, or it should show that any action was impossible.”’  ^
The implication o f this statement was obvious; Russia hinted it would go the course alone. 
Once he realized that neither Egypt nor France would budge, he changed his position out 
fear o f isolating himself from Europe and/or Russian and British unilateral action. He 
therefore accepted a plan of coercion and contributed two Frigates to the joint force.”
Finally, it seemed that events were moving in accordance with Palmerston's plans. 
He had obtained Russian cooperation and lured Austria into the alliance. The Ottoman 
representative Nuri Effendi arrived in London by April with full authority to sign an 
agreement with the powers, including France if she consents, to "...assist the Sultan to 
carry into effect an arrangement with Mehmet Ali which shall confer upon that Pasha and 
his children hereditary government of Egypt.”
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By later spring, the problems of French cooperation and that o f the Cabinet 
approval still, confronted Palmerston. In the first case, he decided that he could go on 
without them, but needed to master the support of Austria. As Neuman stated to his 
minister correctly, "His colleagues -members of Cabinet- view always that cooperation 
with France is indispensable. It is a difficult solution with four powers only, but Palmerston 
will try it. ...It is essential that your Highness should prepare yourself for this request [four 
powers action] and Lord Palmerston seems to be decided not to postpone this affair to an 
uncertain f u t u r e . . H e  decided however, to change his tactics towards Paris and invited 
Guizot, the new French Ambassador to London, to attend the negotiations, so as to have a 
pretext for the Cabinet in case France refiases, and go ahead with his four powers 
coalition. During the new talks, Palmerston and Neumann attempted to find a solution by 
increasing Mohammed Ali’s holdings to include the Pashalik of Acre and other territories 
as well in return for his withdrawal from Syria. Guizot refused to commit his government 
and played for time to foster dissension among the alliance. Palmerston's options were 
dwindling as long as France procrastinated and Metternich did not consent to coercion in 
fear o f French attitude.. Certainly, time was his enemy.
Metternich's major problem as we have mentioned earlier were the fears of France 
and her reaction inside the system. Thus, when Neuman wrote to him in May that 
Palmerston assured him that he needed their flag and two battleships for moral reasons so 
as to show the union between the two states in this regard, Metternich's comments were 
rather far sighted as he approved by saying: "Yes the union between Austria and England. 
Is this not a demonstration of..the disunion between two courts and the three others ?, 
How can we be able to avoid this evil ?"*® Clearly, his logic was that this meant throwing
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himself into the arms of Britain, and this will ipso facto show the disunity with Russia, 
Prussia and France. To him this was a representation of an alliance inside the system, and 
such a move can have its repercussions on the future of the Austrian foreign policy. To 
this dilemma, Mettemich had no direct solution, but he knew that he had to continue in 
the concerted action or else witness the isolation of Austria with France, for he realized 
that Palmerston was not going to back down. Therefore, his solution was to accepted the 
establishment of a coalition and see in the future how to get around the problem of 
coercion, maybe the need to such coercion is not going to come.
Once Metternich agreed to accept a plan for coalition and his halfhearted approval 
to coercion if necessary, Palmerston’s position improved. The Cabinet, however, opposed 
any policy that would rupture relations with France and embark upon an alliance with 
Russia. At this stage Palmerston wrote to Prime Minister Melbourne on the 5th o f July 
assuring him that as a result o f this disagreement between himself and the members he 
would relieve them by "placing, as I do now, my office at your disposal.”*^  In addition he 
put the members of Cabinet into a precarious position by further stating that ....the 
immediate result of our declining to go on with the three powers because France does not 
join us, will be, that Russia will withdraw her offers to unite herself with the other powers 
for a settlement of the affairs of Turkey and she will again resume her separate and 
isolated position with respect to those affairs, and you will have the treaty o f Hünkar 
İskelesi renewed under some still more objectionable form."*^ He was further aided when 
Guizot, in an attempt to pull the Porte from the alliance, presented a note to Sekib 
Effendi (the Ottoman prime negotiator) where he offered nothing substantial.*^ This move 
threw the Porte into the arms of the alliance, discredited the French and forced the Cabinet
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to support the formation of an official alliance or coalition embodied in what came to be 
known as the London Convention.
In the same way that the Treaty of Chaumont cemented the alliance against France 
in 1813, the July 15th convention put the mechanics o f the balance of power in motion to 
remedy the disequilibrium in the system caused by the Egyptian Question. (See Section 
5.6) Also just as Castlereagh worked with Metternich to establish the Third and Fourth 
Coalition, Palmerston played a similar role regarding the Egyptian Question. His efforts to 
bring in accord and unity among the powers was unending.
The Treaty set the guidelines for the direction of the alliance.*“* The main stipulations
o f the treaty could be summarized as follows;
First, the alliance will act to force Mohammed Ali to accept arrangements offered 
by the Sultan (see below) according to the means available to each alliance member. But if 
Mohammed Ali refused to accept, the allies were to enforce the arrangement, if necessary 
by support to the Porte or others (e.g., Syrian rebels) or to sever his communication lines
with Syria.
Second, if Mohammed Ali moved towards Constantinople, then upon the request 
of the Sultan, the allies would furnish support to defend the capital, the Bosphorus and 
Dardanelles. Upon termination of the danger, their forces were to be withdrawn to the 
Black and Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, this defense would be considered exceptional 
and not a rule.
Third, the treaty members agreed to close of the Straits to all war vessels as long as 
the Porte was in peace and that the allies would follow the decision of the Sultan.
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Fourth, the Porte would grant Mohammed All the Vilayet o f Egypt for him and his 
family afterwards and, during his lifetime, the Vilayet of Acre and the southern parts of 
Syria, provided that he withdrew from all Ottoman territories and return the Ottoman 
fleet. If  he failed to accept these conditions within ten days, the offer o f the Pashalik o f 
Acre would be withdrawn. If  he failed to accept within twenty days, the Porte and the 
allies would be at liberty to take whatever action they deemed necessary.
As noted above, French attitude was critical to the implementation o f the London 
Convention of July 15th. Certainly France was outraged, isolated and confused, but still 
could intimidate some of the members of the alliance to force them out. The French 
rationale is easily understood if we contemplate her position in Egypt and Syria during the 
rule o f Mohammed Ali (See Section 5.2), as well as the moral obligations towards 
Mohammed AJi. The French attitude, however, should not be used as a means to discredit 
the theory o f balance of power, because it did not join the coalition in conformity with the 
premises of the theoiy, i.e., the membership in the alliance to face a disequilibrium. (See 
Chapter I). But it should be noticed here that, for the functioning o f balance of power 
mechanics, there is no necessity for all the actors in the system to join in, and there are 
many cases when states defected from joining a coalition to face the disturber o f balance. 
Russia committed the same act in 1800-1801 during the reign of Tsar Paul and once again 
during the rule o f Alexander II himself, at the time of Tilsit (See Chapter II, 2.2). Prussia 
did the same during the Third Coalition in the Napoleonic war, but in the two cases, the 
two states rejoined the alliance. By the conclusion of the Treaty of London in 1841, or 
the Straits Convention, France was a full member in the alliance. However, the
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establishment o f the coalition was only the first step in solving this problem and its 
maintenance proved to be a prickly task.
The French felt ignored in the process. Further Paris insisted that Mohammed Ali 
should retain Syria. French public opinion supported Mohammed Ali, not surprising since 
he paid numerous newspapers to print pro-Egyptian articles. The French government 
was forced to strengthen and consolidate her military strength and preparations. This 
sentiment produced discussions o f a possible French move in northern Italy against 
Austrian dominions and impacted on French participation in the intervention. 85
5.4 Intervention by the Coalition:
As mentioned earlier, Ottoman-Egyptian negotiations witnessed a sudden change 
as a result o f the presentation of the Note of July 27 to the Porte. Hiisrev was delighted 
with the turn o f events and Ponsonby played a very important role in the establishment o f 
the hard-line policy by the Porte, believing that time was in favor o f the Sultan 
Confronting these events, Mohammed Ali wrote to all the Valis in the Empire for their 
support to drive Hiisrev from power believing that departure of his enemy would open the 
way for a settlement.*® His attempts failed and he was forced to deal with both Husrev and 
the major powers, but he still believed that he had a chance, because he knew that the 
alliance was not yet put together, so he played on the disunion among the powers, 
something that did not last very long.
The European Consuls in Alexandria attempted to convince Mohammed Ali to 
surrender his claims to hereditary rule in Syria to avoid the crisis. But it was clear that
221
Mohammed AJi had the upper hand in this affair unless the European powers were willing 
to rescue the Porte. Each of the Consuls passed the position o f their respective 
governments. Whereas Campbell insisted on limiting hereditary rule to Egypt, Couchelet 
tried his best to secure both Egypt and Syria. These conflicting positions brought progress 
to a halt.
The status quo between the Porte and Egypt remained unchanged for nearly a 
year. But as Ponsonby suggested, time benefited the Porte more than Mohammed Ali. 
This was true, and it reflected on the position of the Egyptian army in Syria. It faced a 
wave of revolts in the major cities and in Arabian peninsula as well, and this had its effect 
on both demoralizing the Egyptian army, dispersing and weakening it. Such a situation 
was a direct result o f the fact that the Egyptians did not settle the matter and this 
encouraged the Syrians revolts, especially as they had the assistance o f Britain and the 
Ottoman Empire.
Ibrahim believed he had missed the opportunity after the Battle o f Nezib and he 
could not withstand allied attacks in future. His fetters to his father soon assumed a 
sarcastic tone. In September he requested additional military personnel so as to secure his 
defenses, but he added that knew that the "army in the Hijaz was worn off, and in these 
conditions what can they offer ?” He further stated that he felt unprepared to face foreign 
intervention. He wrote ....if the enemy would sent any ships to the coast of Beirut, Tripoli 
and Tarsus, their simple appearance would put the land in a state where we can not guess 
the consequences (revolt)." Advancing towards Constantinople was out o f the question.
He recognized that "if we advance to the North, we shall jeopardize not only receiving 
munitions and the food, but also a single letter of yours.
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While the status of his army was discouraging, Mohammed Ah remained 
obstinate. His main source of strength was his conviction that he was the only leader who 
could deliver the Porte from a state of anarchy. This was a repetition of the rejuvenation 
project he suggested during the first crisis (See Chapter IV, 4.2) and was emphasized by 
Campbell.** But this asset vanished once the Porte introoduced the Haiti Cherif de 
Gulhane, which Britain and Resit Pasha worked so hard to obtain. *® As Ponsonby stated, 
..."The enemies of Turkey and the friends of Mehmet are said to feel the weight of the 
blow that had fallen upon them.” ®^ This was true in as far as Mohammed Ali was 
concerned in that he lost any moral claims to reforming the Empire. Mohammed Ali’s 
response to the edict and Hiisrev was that most of what was stated in the Haiti Cherif de 
Gidhane already applied in Egypt.
The status quo continued but Mohammed Ali did not give up all his attempts to 
lead the Porte into accepting his terms without the consent of the powers. He wrote 
another dispatch to Hiisrev in February 1840 in which he stated that he was the faithful 
subject of the sultan and warned that foreigners were working to break down the Porte not 
the reverse, and requested hereditary rule of Egypt and Syria. Husrev refused and the 
deadlock continued. Moreover he reverted to his old practice of bribing Ottoman officials 
to influence the decision of the Sultan. His influence even reached the mother o f the 
Sultan. The role of the French Ambassador to the Porte, Monsieur Pontis, was not above 
suspicion, especially since France aimed at thwarting the alliance. Ponsonby and Strumer, 
the Austrian Ambassador to the Porte, played a major role in controlling his intrigues.
Upon the substitution of Husrev by Reşit Pasha, Mohammed Ali was claimed to 
have fallen to tears of joy that his old and intractable enemy had departed for good and
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that a more flexible Ottoman position may be on the horizon. As he came to realize, Reşit 
was more pro-British than old Husrev in dealing with him. Immediately, Mohammed Ali 
used a social occasion to send his envoy Sami Pasha to the Porte to open talks with Reşit, 
suggesting that Mohammed Ali would soon return the Ottoman fleet. But much to the 
Qp ^'lohammed All, Reşit saw the fleet as a secondary matter and focused on 
Syria. Moreover, he informed Mohammed Ali that if he had any suggestions, he should 
transmit them to the allies in accordance with the Note of 27 July 1839. Mohammed Ali 
responded to this saying, "If the Turks want to maintain the status quo, I shall remain as I 
am the attempts I tried with the Porte is proof of my sincere intentions to negotiate 
peacefully.
The situation in the European system did not favor Mohammed Ali. By July, his 
only ally France was faced with isolation as a result o f events taking place in London. 
Paris wished to improve its position forcing Mohammed Ali to show flexibility, especially 
with regard to the Syrian rule. They believed that he should remain content to receive a 
portion of the territory, although their public position was that Mohammed Ali should 
receive all o f Syria. To this end, Thiers dispatched Monsieur Perrier to Alexandria on the 
15th of July, the day the London Convention was signed. After failing to gain 
Mohammed Ali’s consent, he reported to Thiers that ....we have used all persuasive 
methods to persuade him but they were futile... he keeps saying that 'God is the prime 
mover o f everything and what he wants will h a p p e n . B y  then every Consul believed 
coercion was the only means available.
At the same time, Palmerston was steadfast in his call for intervention to implement 
the articles of the London Convention. Preparations began among the four powers. As
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Palmerston stated to his Ambassador to Vienna, "Great Britain has a large squadron in the 
Mediterranean which is to be applied to the purpose o f the alliance, Russia holds a 
considerable force in the Black Sea disposable...; while Austria contributes no troops, and 
her cooperation is to be confined to the employment of a few frigates and sloops. As for 
Prussia, she practically offered nothing to the intervention, and as her Foreign Minister 
stated, "Prussia would contribute nothing, nothing whatever. This could be attributed to 
the fact that she feared a possible French assault, and thus, confined herself to the defense 
of her own territories, in addition to the fact that she was not as directly threatened by the 
Egyptian Question. In other words, Prussia offered only moral support.
Austrian participation in the intervention did not come smoothly. Metternich also 
feared the outbreak of a war with France any declined from providing any significant 
assistance. He informed Beauvale th a t.... if war breaks out, France would probably be able 
to revolutionize and occupy Northern Italy as far as Po, and in this state...there are reasons 
not to dispatch even a small corps to Syria. Thus he embarked on a twin-pillar policy; 
ally himself to the coalition, while at the same time seek to accommodate France as much 
as possible. The application of the first policy was to be the factor o f the second, for 
though he joined in the preparation through his fleet, he made sure that this coalition 
would stand by him in case of war with France. Even in the intervention, he was cautious. 
He instructed Archduke Bandeiras, the captain of the Austrian squadron, that any action to 
be taken was to be within the context of the powers, as well as in the name of the Sultan.^’ 
He made sure that no Austrian action would provoke France.
This attitude did not satisfy Palmerston who was anxious to get things going and 
end the Egyptian Question. To make up for a lack of effective Austrian military support
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for the alliance, he requested from Metternich to provide the Porte a loan to strengthen 
Ottoman forces for the war to come, as well as riffles and munitions to the rebels in 
Syria.®* Even here Mettemich failed to show enthusiasm and delayed a response. 
Palmerston realized that he could rely only upon himself, the Porte and Syrian rebels. 
Worries that Russia would remain in the Mediterranean prevented the use o f its fleet in the 
coersive phase.
Ponsonby displayed considerable vigor in helping the Porte strengthen its army. Sir 
Charles Smith became the Ottoman Chief of Staff and under his command, the Ottoman 
army was gaining strength and stamina. Admiral Stopford, was the commander o f the 
British fleet in the Mediterranean and received strict orders from Palmerston to assist the 
rebel movement in Syria with arms and ammunition. He initially failed and Ibrahim gained 
the time necessary to quell the rebellion. Ponsonby sent Richard Wood to instigate 
troubles in Syria to help the war efforts of Britain, Austria and the Porte.®® He did not fail.
In the meantime, Palmerston dealt with French threats affecting the intervention 
process, as well as continued opposition in England and the Cabinet. It was a very delicate 
situation, leaving him no choice but to embark on a policy of coalition maintenance and 
prompt military activity to terminate the affair as swiftly as possible. He responded by 
criticizing the French, having come to believe it would not go to war for the sake of 
Egypt. He wrote to Bulwer stating that "I hope it will undeceive Thiers as to his notion 
that we are going to give up our Treaty of July 15. ...Does Thiers imagine that such 
menaces and reviling that he has been pleased to deal out through his irresponsible organs, 
have made the slightest change in our determination and intentions. I f  he does, he has yet 
to learn as to the character and habits of the English nation."^ ®® Moreover, he instructed
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Bulwer to inform Thiers in the most inoffensive manner "that if France throws down the 
gauntlet we shall not refuse to pick it up.*°* He was fully convinced that the French were 
not going to go to war, and he had strong reasons for this. The French army in Algiers 
faced strong resistance from Emir Abdul Kadir, and her navy could not match Britain's. 
Since war against all of Europe was unthinkable, it was clear that France was bluffing.
However many Europeans believed France would go to war over Egypt, making it 
better to sacrifice Syria than to risk a European conflict. Russia was not far behind 
Metternich in believing the dangers of possible French intervention. Nesselrode, was 
particularly worried about the possibility of French assault on the Dardanelles to force the 
Sultan to surrender Syria to Mohammed Ali. He wrote ....the French fleet might enter the 
Dardanelles...if this should occur, the allies would consider it a violation that would have
„  I I 102negative consequence.
Metternich shared the same worries of his Russian colleague but, in the end, was 
intimidated by the French. Immediately after conferences with St. Aulare, the French 
Ambassador to Vienna in August, he began talks with France, a formula we can call now a 
4+1 negotiations. Palmerston refused to consider such an arrangement, writing that "It 
does not appear to H.M. Government the existing circumstances require such an 
arrangement and H.M. Government is inclined to hope and to believe that the Peace of 
Europe will continue uninterrupted."'*’^  In the meantime, he urged Metternich to provide 
financial assistance to the Porte once again.
Following the failure of Mettemich's initiative, he began to secure his defensive 
lines against possible French aggression. He held a conference with the Prussian king in 
August to secure joint defenses and hoped that war could be contained. Prussia pledged an
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army to cooperate with Austria, for the defense of the lines from the north o f Prussia to 
Italy in the sou th /”“* Beauvale informed Metternich that Palmerston believed France 
would not go to war and succeeded in keeping Austria in the coalition.
As these developments unfolded, the Porte abiding by the articles o f the treaty 
dispatched Rifat Bey to Alexandria on the 8th of August to convey to Mohammed Ali its 
propositions in accordance with the London Convention o f July 1840.*”^  French attempts 
to block the ratification of the treaty and work on a settlement between the Sultan and his 
vassal failed. Mohammed Ali was faced with either accepting the will o f the powers or 
decline and face the consequences. By the 16th, the Ottoman envoy was received, and the 
following day the Consuls of the four powers as well. Mohammed Ali refused the terms o f 
the agreement. On the 19th, the Consuls drafted a joint communiqué to him endorsing the 
request and suggesting that he should accept the terms of the treaty. Mohammed Ali tried 
to outmaneuver Rifat by assuring him that he would accept hereditary rule in Egypt, 
provided that the Sultan would review his position towards the rule in Syria and that this 
was conveyed to the Sultan by a letter.*”^  Rifat and the Consuls viewed this position as 
refusal. In negotiations between Boughos Bey, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, and Sami 
Bey, Mohammed Ali's secretary, and the Consuls, the two advised that the Pasha 
accepted the terms of the treaty, but asked that the Porte allow him to retain Syria. They 
could not say what Mohammed Ali would do when the Sultan refused the request. 
Mohammed Ali was a shrewd politician and knew the consequences of his decision, but 
his intransigence may be attributed to his conviction that the crisis would be settled along 
the lines of the previous one. Moreover, he gambled on continued European disunity and 
French support. He was to be disappointed on all points.
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In the meantime, Thiers sent Count Walevvski to Egypt to assure Mohammed Ali 
of French support and to undermine the coalition efforts by gaining concessions from 
Mohammed Ali which his government would use in its maneuvers. He advised 
Mohammed Ali to increase Egyptian fortifications and quell any rebellion in Syria. 
Moreover, he succeeded in convincing Mohammed AJi to officially request the mediation 
o f France. The ultimate concession wrung from Mohammed Ali was his agreement to 
withdraw from Syria provided that it revert to his family after his death.*®* Waleweski left 
for the Porte to join Ponds and end the crisis in a manner favorable to Mohammed Ali.
These diplomatic efforts proved meaningless. On September 14, Re^t Pasha 
informed Mohammed Ali of the Sultan’s decision (supported by Ponsonby) to sack him 
from the Vilayet of Egypt. Mohammed All's intransigent comment to Couchelet was that 
"this is the fourth time they sack me and every time I come out stronger."*®® However, this 
time circumstances were different because the Porte had the support of the powers. By 
September 23, the Consuls of the four powers of the alliance left Alexandria understanding 
that Mohammed Ali was no longer the Vali over Egypt. He believed that this decision 
would provide a useful bargaining chip in future negotiations.**® Although greeted by 
some with surprise, the decision produced further intransigence on the part o f Mohammed 
Ali.
In addition to the pressures exerted by the French, Palmerston also endured calls 
by the Cabinet, to reconcile with Paris. Palmerston had no choice but to accept the 
Cabinet's decision, but he argued that any initiative required time.*** He increased his 
pressures on Egypt. Palmerston's instructions to Stopford was to begin a full blockade, 
with his Austrian colleague, against both Syria and Egypt. This was the step that Ibrahim
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feared most since it jeopardized his communication lines with Egypt. Ottoman forces 
under the leadership of Charles Smith began to penetrate Syria and the Syrian revolts 
weakened the Egyptian position.
Palmerston was winning, and he was aided by another event, the gradual 
transformation in the French position. By October, Louis Philippe indicated that he would 
not permit the France’s isolation to continue. He wrote to the allies on October 8th that he 
was pulling back. Instead of insisting that Syria should be given to Mohammed Ali, he 
was now interested in simply maintaining the Egyptian position. He wrote that, "the 
removal of the viceroy would be...a disturbance of the general equilibrium," and that 
France is "willing to participate in any acceptable arrangement based on the guarantee of 
the existence of both the Sultan and the viceroy of Egypt. France was now fighting for 
Mohammed Ali's existence and her place in the European concert. This attitude was 
followed by the resignation of the bellicose government of Thiers towards the end of 
October He was followed by a more flexible government headed by Soult where Guizot 
became the Foreign Minister and the real power. This reduced some of the pressures from 
Palmerston, especially by relaxing the fears of Metternich, but he still needed to move 
quickly. The impending arrival of winter might mean the delay of naval actions until the 
spring. Palmerston never allowed this to happen.
The military campaign (as everyone expected) resulted in a series of Egyptian 
defeats. Several small battles took place and the combined Ottoman-British army landed 
on the shores of Syria. Beirut fell and was followed by the fall of other coastal cities in 
October. The main reason for the Egyptian defeats was that their army was dissipated in 
order to confront the various rebellions by the Syrians, especially the Druze. In addition.
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the Egyptians were unable to predict where the Ottoman-British blow would fall. 
Moreover, the mere fact that the Egyptian navy was to confront the British and Austrian 
ones, turned the chances for its success very slim. Therefore, Mohammed Ali did not 
venture to risk his fleet which could be in much use in future if the alliance decided to 
attack Egypt itself
The Egyptian army withdrew from Tripoli, Adana and Latakia without a fight. 
Coalition forces defeated the Egyptian army and the fall o f Syria was only a matter of 
time. The only solid defense left was the Port of Acre, famous for its resistance to enemies 
since Napoleon. On the 29th of October Stopford, however received instructions to sack 
Acre A combined fleet of 20 ships bombarded the city and a shot exploded the entire 
ammunition dump, killing a number of infantry and making resistance impossible. On 
the 4th o f November, the allies occupied Acre. This compromised the position of the 
Egyptian armies in the Levant. Should the allies penetrate the desert towards the East, 
their lines of retreat would be cut, and surrender unavoidable.
The fall o f Acre had a spectacular effect on Metternich and his Prussian 
counterpart. The end of the Egyptian Question was in sight. Metternich transformed from 
timidity to a hard-line attitude towards Mohammed Ali and France. He joined his Prussian 
colleagues in establishing defensive lines and showing more audacity than expected against 
France. This prompted Beauvale to write home that, "We are now as bold as a lion and 
have forgotten that we were ever afraid.
The fall o f Acre also made it obvious that Mohammed Ali's resistance was near an 
end although any campaign against Egypt would be difficult. Egypt was not Syria, and the 
1807 campaign failed tremendously as before. A new campaign would be even more
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difficult given that the Egyptian coasts were very well fortified, totally unlike Syria."® 
Fighting home gave the defending army the leverage and for a full scale Allied campaign 
against Egypt to succeed, it had to be rather massive. Such a campaign was very difficult; 
Palmerston would have had many obstacles in obtaining the consent of the Cabinet to send 
a fully-equipped army into Egypt to confront an army of more than 150 thousand men. 
This fact gave Mohammed Ali his card to play against the allies. He recognized this as 
demonstrated by his famous comment to Hodges, the British Consul to Egypt; "The 
British threaten to land on (the) Egyptian coast! Let them fulfill this promise. They will see 
that we are ready to receive them. The embryos in their mother's wombs will join in the 
fight against them.""^
The circumstances and the situation required Palmerston to offer Mohammed Ali a 
way out. It was a simple equation, the more he pressures Mohammed Ali, the more 
desperate he shall become, and the more costly the results will be, especially in as far as 
the alliance was concerned. On the 14th of November, the allied powers presented to 
Sekib Effendi a note requesting that the Sultan reinstate Mohammed Ali, if he accepted the 
rules of the London Convention. The Porte had no choice but to accept this 
recommendation, though it procrastinated for months until it finally accepted."* 
Palmerston ordered Stopford to present this case to Mohammed Ali while, at the same 
time, provide a demonstration of British force to make him more prone to accept the 
settlement.
In the meantime, he needed to terminate the Egyptian Question as fast as possible 
so as to keep the alliance together. He was particularly worried about possible Austrian 
coolness if coercion was to continue. He summoned Esterhazy, the Austrian Ambassador
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to invigorate Metternich to continue in the alliance. The Ambassador wrote to Metternich 
that "Lord Palmerston ...reassured him his improbable conviction that France does not 
want and can not make war: ne pent faire la guerre.
In the meantime, Stopford complying with the orders of Palmerston dispatched 
Commodore Napier to Alexandria to undertake the early mentioned task. As lord 
Palmerston clarified latter to the Ambassadors of the four powers:*^ **
Commodore Napier arrived on the 21st o f November to Alexandria, and 
dispatched a letter to Boghos Bey that demanded the following:
1- To deliver the Sherif Prince o f the Drouses that Emir Bechir has sent.
2- Not to send troops to Syria ...and to give the order to Ibrahim Pacha to 
evacuate this Province.
3- To return the Turkish fleet to the Sultan.
Boghos ' replying in the name ofMohammed A li, has precisely refused... until he 
receives the official avis o f that the Sultan has conferred unto him the hereditary 
rule o f Egypt and that the powers would guarantee that. ...H e asked him i f  he was 
authorized to make a treaty ?
These were the orders given to Commodore Napier to transmit to the Egyptian 
side, and as is obvious, it contained nothing regarding his authorization to conclude a deal 
with the Egyptian Vali. Probably Napier's logic was that there was nothing in his orders 
that denied him the right to accomplish his mission as he saw fit
Still the old Pasha was unwilling to submit, but knew he had to decide quickly 
since his army in Syria was in danger. Napier was permitted direct contact with 
Mohammed Ali. In this meeting, he gave the Pasha one day to make his mind as to the 
acceptance of these conditions. The situation in Syria was hopeless, and it was only a 
matter of time before the Egyptian armies faced defeat. The main issues were settled 
quickly between the Commodore and Boghos Pasha by correspondence in the next few 
days.
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Napier followed his British colleagues, Barker and Campbell and eventually fell 
under the spell o f the charismatic Mohammed AJi. Together, both Napier and Mohammed 
Ali represented by his Foreign Minister agreed upon a treaty to settle the Egyptian 
Question and on November 27, 1840 it was signed. The terms of the treaty stipulated that 
Mohammed Ali was to recall his armies from Syria, restore the Ottoman fleet to the Porte 
immediately after the latter issued a Ferman reinstating him as Viceroy over Egypt. 
Moreover, it also approved the evacuation of the Egyptian army from Syria with all its 
weapons. The British navy would assist, after the cessation of all hostile activity, in 
implementing the administrative part of this deal.
Stopford refused to accept this treaty. He and Ponsonby were outraged at the 
Commodore's attitude. Stopford's opinion was that this was a "hasty and unauthorized 
convention," and refused to accept it until he had clearance from Palmerston. Increasingly 
the quarrels between the Commodore and his Commander played an important role in the 
developing crisis.
Palmerston was surprised but could ill afford to refuse this treaty since he would 
face the cabinet and the consequences of possible escalation to the ongoing war, possibly 
to the extent o f a full scale campaign against Egypt. Moreover, the weak Ottoman army 
was in no condition to face the Egyptian forces without continued allied assistance. 
Finally, the coalition could not withstand much more pressure, and the attitude of 
Metternich would have been unpredictable if France became more bellicose as events 
unfolded. Certainly the withdrawal of Austria would be followed by that of P r u s s i a , a n d  
Palmerston and the Porte would have lost the battle. Therefore, he opted for a half-hearted 
approval of Napier's convention and had to sell it to the representatives of the four powers.
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Palmerston's reaction to the situation was transmitted by a letter to the Admiralty in 
which he asked “To convey to Commodore Napier the approval of Her Majesty's 
government of the steps taken by him ...though without any instructions to that effect, and 
upon his own responsibility, to carry into execution the arrangements contemplated by the 
o f 15th o f July Treaty ..." He further assured them that “..which the four powers will do, 
is to recommend to the Porte to make the concession specified in the communication 
which ...Robert Stopford has been instructed to convey to Mehmet Ali."
Clearly these two statements indicate the state of confusion in which the British 
found themselves with regard to the final approval of Napier's Convention. That is why 
Palmerston approved his arrangement. Nevertheless, he continued to follow instructions 
previously delivered to Stopford. In other words, he did not take a final commitment in 
any regard. That could be understood in light of his position with regard to the 
representatives of the four powers. He was particularly embarrassed because Napier acted 
without the authorization of the four representatives, and therefore any approval was to be 
decided only in light with Thiers.
Palmerston immediately initiated a series of conversations with the representatives 
o f the four powers in London. As Neuman unequivocally asserted in his dispatch to 
Metternich, "Lord Palmerston dit ensuite qu'il fallait connaître la transaction du 
Commodore avant de porter un jugement sur son mérité.” *^ '’ Moreover, he convinced the 
other Ambassadors without much difficulty that the best solution would be to approve the 
convention and terminate the crisis, especially since it did not contradict the London 
Convention. As Neuman stated to Metternich, "it was an improvisation on the part of 
Commodore Napier," and suggested its acceptance.
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5.5 Equilibrium, Reciprocal Non Compensation and the Pacification of the Egyptian 
Question:
The principles of equilibrium and reciprocal compensation, or reciprocal non­
compensation were the main themes for the settlement of any dispute that was to be 
managed in accordance with the mechanics of balance of power. (See Chapter I, 1.6 and 
Chapter II, 2.3) The Egyptian Question, confronted throughout by these mechanics, was 
therefore subject to these vital principles. The solution had to maintain an acceptable 
distribution of power, to restore equilibrium and guarantee equal compensation or non 
compensation to all the members of the alliance. In this case, no state would gain any 
territorial privilege or preponderance without the others being subject to the same 
treatment. The settlement of the Egyptian Question did not fall outside this framework. 
When Egypt became the disturber of the balance, the allies, though differing in 
perspectives at various times, had to come to the settlement that would cease the menace 
to the equilibrium in the European system.
A- The Preservation of the Actors and the Territorial Balance:
The settlement of the Egyptian Question did not differ very much from the 
settlement with France after its defeat. Although some members in the coalition wanted to 
terminate the French threat by imposing numerous restrictions, indemnities and military 
ceilings, the alliance decided this would not be appropriate. (See Chapter II, 2.2) The 
settlement of the Egyptian Question followed the same principles. Although the Porte,
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Ponsonby and Stopford were unwilling to accept the conditions of Napier’s Convention, 
(just like Prussia in 1814) they were forced to do so by the rules of the system’s dynamic. 
The elimination o f Egypt would have caused a significant negative reaction from 
France. Moreover, France refused to reduce its forces on the Prussian and Austrian 
borders, unless the Egyptian Question was terminated and Mohammed Ali reinstated.*^® 
The French attitude was based on protecting its own interests and preponderance in the 
Mediterranean. Austria and Prussia wanting no problems and fearing French reaction, 
soon accepted Napier’s settlement. Metternich went as far as threatening to withdraw from 
the alliance if it were not accepted. Palmerston had to yield to his pressures and sent to 
Ponsonby to force the Porte to accept the deal.
At the same time, the fatigued Egyptian army withdrew from Syria and Arabia and 
Egypt returned the Ottoman fleet in January 1841. Palmerston had no choice but to 
present Sekib Effendi with a note from the four powers to the Sultan in January 1841 
requesting the Porte grant Mohammed Ali hereditary rule of Egypt. Ponsonby did the rest 
o f the job, but his animosity towards Mohammed Ali enhanced the harshness o f the 
Ferman.
The Ferman of 13 February declared Mohammed Ali to be reinstated as hereditary 
Vali over Egypt and the Sudan. However, the Ferman contained several conditions he 
refused to accept. To begin with, the Ferman gave the Sultan the right to choose the heir 
o f Mohammed Ali and 25% of total Egyptian income as tribute.*^’ Mohammed Ali refused 
these points outright, claiming this would lead to popular unrest.*^* The alliance intervened 
and presented a note to Sekib Effendi on March 13 suggesting that the Sultan accept 
hereditary rule in Egypt according to the wishes of Mohammed Ali and that the affair be
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settled in accordance with the London Convention. The Porte responded on April 19, 
1841 that it would grant the elder son of Mohammed Ali hereditaiy rule, that only 25 % of 
the government revenues will be taken in tribute and finally, giving Mohammed Ali the 
right to appoint military ranks up to the rank of Amiralai. Mohammed Ali accepted and a 
new Ferman was issued based on the above.
The Egyptian Question was settled in a very balanced manner as we can see. Egypt 
though under the dey wre jurisdiction of the Porte, maintained its de facto  sovereignty. The 
Egyptian position was unusual compared to the legal standards of this era. Though all the 
rules and laws of the Porte were applied in Egypt, including the Haiti Cherif de Gulhane, 
Egypt was granted hereditary rule and this in itself represented a characteristic of 
sovereignty by nineteenth century standards. In addition, Egypt exercised its own right to 
maintain relations with the other powers in Europe, again a display of limited sovereignty. 
This status continued uninterrupted, until the British declared Egypt a protectorate in 
1914 This seems to prove that Egypt was not eliminated as an actor in the international 
scene On the contrary, Egyptian independence was accepted in general and its relations 
with the European states functioned on a basis of semi-independence and limited
sovereignty.
As for the territorial balance in the region, the settlement of the affairs restored 
Syria and Arabia to the Sultan. But Mohammed Ali retained Egypt. Therefore, neither of 
the two powers at this stage could exercise a preponderant role over the other and Egypt 
would no longer pose a threat to the Ottoman Empire. Though the Egyptian army 
remained intact, it was reduced to about a hundred thousand in the next decades. Syria
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remained as Palmerston hoped, a buffer between the two powers, similar to the Rhineland 
in the Vienna settlement, mutatis mutandis regarding its legal status.
B: Non Compensation for All:
The European system was profoundly affected by the destabilizing role of the 
Egyptian Question in 1833-1841; but the alliance avoided altering power distributions in 
order to prevent further disequilibrium. Thus, it was decided that none of the actors would 
receive anything. This was established as a settled principle for all the members of the 
alliance to follow.
Realizing the dangers which would emanate from ignoring this principle in the 
outset, the different partners in the coalitions worked hard to achieve it. When the treaty 
establishing the coalition was drafted, it was obvious that the alliance was "animated by the 
desire to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire as a security of 
the peace of Europe."’^ ® In other words, the main object was the preservation o f a 
European power. That was the first sign of reciprocal non compensation.
To further ensure this goal, another protocol was signed between the members of 
the alliance in London on September 17, 1840. It stated that “..in the execution of the 
engagement resulting to the contracting powers for the above-mentioned [London] 
Convention, those powers will seek no augmentation of territoiy, no exclusive influence, 
no commercial advantages for their subjects which those of every other nation may not 
equally obtain."*^* In other words the powers committed themselves not to take an 
advantage on the detriment of the equilibrium in Europe, thereby guaranteeing not to 
make any alteration to the factors affecting the power distribution.
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The powers strictly followed this principle and therefore, gained no compensation 
for their efforts to maintain the Ottoman Empire. Immediately after the end o f hostilities in 
the region, the powers withdrew the majority of their forces from the Mediterranean and 
the Black Sea. In addition, this withdrawal did not include any advantages, as was the case 
for example during the 1833 crisis when the Russian withdrawal was paid for by the 
Treaty o f HiinkW Iskilesi.
It is true, however, that the British position in the Porte was enhanced as a result of 
its role as the prime architect of the alliance. The Porte needed Britain to balance the fact 
that it was a member in a heterogeneous system when its existence was threatened by 
Russia. The need to ally itself with another power became more apparent after the Treaty 
of Hünkâr İskelesi was revoked. Moreover, this was a natural continuation o f the trend 
that began in 1834 when Palmerston decided on a policy of preponderance in the Porte. 
But in general, none of the members of the alliance gained anything other than what they 
possessed prior to their joining the alliance.
C. The Reintegration of the Actors in the European System:
As was the case with the Vienna settlement, the actors in the system were 
reintroduced once the disturber of the balance was controlled by the mechanics o f balance 
of power. A stong emphasis was laid on the French role in the pacification of the Egyptian 
Question and how this forced her to withdraw from the arena. Since the victory of 
Mohammed Ali was viewed by all the members as a victory for France, Paris played a role 
by simply aiding the disturber of the balance. This became evident during the crisis itself
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when it appeared that France may move into northern Italy and the Rhineland to threaten 
the alliance and deter it from any coercive actions.
Though France was being viewed as so, she did not face the danger of isolation as 
a result o f this factor only, but there were other powers who were interested in alienating 
it. Nicholas I and his Secretary Nesselrode hoped to use this episode to achieve this. 
Nesselrode believed any attempt by France to broker a settlement through mediation with 
Mohammed Ali would bring France into the European concert and claim credit for settling 
the Egyptian Question.*^" By December Nicholas I made it clear to Clarnicarde in St. 
Petersburg that he preferred Britain "...not object to record and establish by some sort of 
act the alliance which happily exists between the four Powers to serve as a security against 
any efforts that France might make to awaken revolutionary feelings in Europe or, against, 
perhaps, revolutionary feelings in Europe or against perhaps a revolutionary war."'^^ 
Palmerston being conscious of the situation, Russian aims and the rules of the balance of 
power system, rejected this proposal promptly. He wrote to Clarnicarde that England 
viewed revolutionary issues in France as a matter of domestic concern that he does not 
wish to go into.” He added that in “..an attempt of one nation to seize and appropriate to 
itself territory which belongs to another...because such an attempt leads to a derangement 
o f the existing balance of power and by altering the relative strength of states,... the British 
Government holds to itself at full liberty to resist, upon ...the principle of self defense. 
Palmerston wanted France back in the European system, as did Castlereagh twenty-four 
years earlier.
Naturally, the allies- with the exception of Russia- wanted to restore France to the 
system. Russian efforts were frustrated. In a conference in London on July 10, the
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representatives of the four powers signed a treaty establishing the principle of prohibiting 
the entrance of war vassal through the Ottoman Straits in a treaty adhered to by all the 
powers of Europe, including France who officially rejoined the system on July 13, 1840. 
Certainly, France was a strong power and a member in the system that could not be 
marginalized or alienated, for this would represent a violation of the general rules of the 
balance of power mechanics.
D. Redressing the Disequilibrium of 1833-9:
As mentioned in Chapter IV, a state of disequilibrium in the affairs o f Europe 
resulted from the Egyptian Question in 1833, whereby Russia and to some extent Austria 
gained preponderance as a result of the Treaties of Hünkar iskelesi and Munchengratz. 
Now that the Egyptian Question was settled, something had to be done to redress this 
previous disequilibrium.
Palmerston realized that the core of the disequilibrium lay in Russia’s view that the 
Porte was alien to the system to the extent that it hoped to absorb as much of its territory 
as possible. But at the same time he realized that the international guarantee proposed by 
Soult in 1839 was something the Tsar would not accept. Therefore, it was imperative to 
ensure security for the Porte and at the same time nullify the Treaty of Hünkar iskelesi. 
Immediately after the settlement of the Egyptian Question in June 1841, he drafted a 
convention on the passage of the warship through the Ottoman Straits. But once again, 
Brunnow wanted to soften the principle declared in the London Convention, relating to 
whether the Sultan was at war or peace. Palmerston refused and believed that this would
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leave the Sultan at the mercy of the Tsar, restricting the ability of the British or allies to 
rescue the Porte in case it was attacked by Russia. Thus, Palmerston insisted on the phrase 
"peace," thereby allowing Britain and others to block Russian preponderance.*^®
Thus, the Convention of 1841 regarding the prohibition of war vessels through the 
Ottoman Straits was formulated and signed.*”  France joined at the insistence of Britain, 
and once again was reintegrated into the system and participated in the balancing process 
in the future. The treaty also played a major role in redressing the disequilibrium in the 
east. Hunkar Iskelesi, the nightmare of Palmerston, was replaced by a collective guarantee 
of the inviolability of the Straits. This automatically annulled the Treaty of Miinchengratz 
as well, and the fate of the Porte became the collective duty of all the states minus Russia.
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Conclusion
As emphasized in the introduction of this dissertation, this is not a purely historical 
study, but rather an interpretation of a series of events commonly referred to as the 
Egyptian Question o f 1831-1841 and their effect on European security and inter-state 
dynamics. The work followed the rise of the Egyptian Question from the French 
Campaign to Egypt in 1798 and elaborated on its various phases. Its main focus were the 
years of 1831-1841, since this period saw the Egyptian Question reach its most active 
phase when it affected the European system more than ever before. Moreover, we traced 
how the Egyptian Question created disequilibrium in the European system as a result of 
Mohammed All’s foreign policy. The pacification of the Egyptian Question by the major 
European actors was attributed to their execution of the mechanics of balance o f power 
to remedy the state of disequilibrium this question produced.
A significant portion of this study aimed to establish the relationship between the 
European System and the Egyptian Question, achieved in part, by linking the fate of the 
Ottoman Empire to the growing power and influence of an Egyptian Empire on the 
borders of the European System and eastern Mediterranean. The major emphasis, 
however, was given to the Ottoman factor since its strategic importance to the European 
powers doomed any Egyptian aspirations against it. Egyptian expansion on Ottoman 
territory and the threat this posed to Ottoman integrity, dominated events throughout the 
Egyptian Question since the failing Ottoman Empire had become the linchpin of 
European equilibrium in the east. This reality proved critical in the formulation of
collective action against Mohammed Ali by the major powers (excluding France). Perhaps 
the best illustration of this thesis may be found in the words of Palmerston during the 
Broadland Meetings in December 1839, when he cogently provided the essence of the 
Egyptian Question:
The usurped position ofMehmet Ali, is incompatible with the Sultan. A 
vassal too strong than his sovereign will end by destroying the 
authority o f the Sultan which is indispensable fo r  the maintenance o f 
the empire, fo r the general peace in Europe and political equilibrium 
o f the great European interests. *
Such a statement clearly explains that the Egyptian Question created systemic 
disequilibrium by threatening the Ottoman Empire and hence European peace. There 
remains little doubt from this research that this threat, triggered a reaction by the major 
European powers against Egypt, and resulted in the pacification of the Egyptian Question.
The portion of this study that linked the Egyptian Question, e.g., Egypt’s growing 
power and political aspirations vis-à-vis the European System, provided a secondary 
reason as to why the European alliance was roused into collective action. No doubt the 
Egyptian military and political expansion threatened European power and interests in the 
near-east and east Mediterranean, however, we contend that this was a secondary reason 
for European intervention. Palmerston in particular, mentioned this several times at the 
Broadland meetings, in which he feared Egypt might jeopardize trade routes to Asia and 
India, a fear shared by Mettemich and Nicholas I. Nevertheless, such concerns provide a 
catalyst but not a sufficient basis for intervention.
Though Egyptian historians such as Zaki, El Rafei, and Thabet presented the 
pacification o f the Egyptian Question as a conspiracy by the European powers, and 
believed that this policy was a natural outcome of British imperialism, this research
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demonstrates that the aims of the powers were neither imperialistic nor colonial. Further 
contentions of a concerted conspiracy crumble in light of any discussion of the 
considerable intra-alliance frictions each leader encountered. However, the European 
system did interact within the balance of power dynamic. This is the main thesis o f the 
work at hand.
Establishing that the Egyptian Question posed a threat to European equilibrium, 
permitted the use of the theoretical framework of the balance of power in this research. 
This theory was an important means by which one could simplify and analyze events 
within a logical framework. This analytical framework presented a new basis for 
understanding the Egyptian Question. The impact of the Egyptian Question within the 
European System, when viewed through the optic of this new approach, makes it clear 
that Egypt, in its capacity as a marginal actor in the European system, was more influential 
that any other marginal actor at that time. Further, the repercussions of the Egyptian 
Question lingered within the courts of Europe and played an important role in the 
development of European diplomacy in the third and fourth decades of the nineteenth 
century.
The rise of the Egyptian Question in the first decade of the nineteenth century (as 
recounted in Chapter III) was significant. Though Egypt fell under the nominal 
sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, in reality it had achieved independence. To recognize 
the ramifications of Egypt’s rise as a Mediterranean power, it is useful to recall that this is 
one of the few instances of the creation of a strong state in an age when European 
Empires dominated and even directed the development of the marginal states or
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territories. The unique nature of Egypt is all the more interesting in that it became a 
power that influenced the course of European diplomacy for almost a decade.
Egypt’s relations with Europe was strangely interdependent and deviated from the 
usual patterns of the Europeans controlling the weaker or marginal states outside the 
system. Instead it became a two-way channel in which the European system influenced an 
outside weaker state and vice versa. Egyptian moves encountered a reaction from Europe 
as demonstrated by the Egyptian involvement in the war in Morea, whereby the military 
scales shifted and created ripples of concern throughout Europe. Similarly, Egyptian 
victories in the First and Second Egyptian-Ottoman Wars sent shock waves through the 
European system. If  one focuses on the repercussions of the Egyptian Question on the 
European System, one can see that between 1831-1833 they exacerbated the polarization 
in the European alliance system (See Chapter IV, Section 4.5). However in 1839-40, the 
Egyptian Question produced harmony and depolarization in the European system (with 
the exception of France for some months). Brunnow illustrates these themes when he 
stated that the aim of collective action was to create "une entente entre les puissance".^ At 
the same time, this period saw the Egyptian Question and French intransigence threaten to 
split the powers causing the threat of war to loom throughout 1839-1840. All o f the 
above illustrates that there existed no better example of a state outside the nineteenth- 
centuiy European system that influenced European security as did Egypt.
The question of whether any other state outside the European system could have 
played this role in this period should also be considered. It is unlikely that any other state 
or territory in the region besides Egypt could have undertaken such a role. This may be 
explained by several factors, among the most important being that Egypt had become the
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region’s most homogenous entity, even more so than its sovereign, the Ottoman Empire. 
In addition, Egypt enjoyed an important geostrategic location as well as agricultural and 
trade advantages exploited by Mohammed Ali. Finally, Egypt was fortunate to be a vilayet 
headed by a shrewd and talented leader who elevated it from the ignorance, poverty and 
misery it suffered prior to his rule.
Despite Egypt’s important role in shaping the European alliances, its ultimate 
influence was displayed in the sub-system in which it existed. The Egyptian Question laid 
some foundations of the Middle Eastern sub-ystem that developed over the next century. 
Egyptian rule helped establish the resurgence of nationalism that become a part of this 
system and its cornerstone at certain intervals. Egypt contributed to the substitution of 
what we may call religious affinity or obedience by ideas of Arab or local nationalism. 
Certainly, the case of the Egyptian struggle against Ottoman rule, and the success it 
achieved accelerated the erosion of the Caliphate system, one of the main pillars of 
Ottoman legitimacy in the Arab region.
Egyptian rule triggered a sense of Arab nationalism in Syria more than any other 
vilayet, in the Ottoman Empire. Ibrahim Pasha identified himself with Arabism rather than 
any other ethnic background during his rule of Syria, often described as the throbbing 
heart o f Arabism. This sense of nationalism was a recurrent theme in the struggle between 
the Ottomans and the Syrians in the years to come and played an important role in the 
development of the state system that followed the demise of the Ottoman Empire.^
In addition, the Ferman o f 1841 gave Egypt the unique status of semi­
independence, especially after the adoption of hereditary rule. This special status fostered
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the rise o f similar aspirations in other Ottoman provinces as well. It is for these reasons 
that Egypt was a catalyst in shaping the sub-system of the Middle East.
A final issue to be mentioned is the impact of the Egyptian Question on Egyptian 
foreign policy. True, Egypt’s failure to retain its empire was attributed to systemic 
reasons, as a result o f Egypt's territorial and political over-extension in the region. The 
consequences of this over-extention caused the European powers to set limits for future 
Egyptian intervention and expansionism in the region. Brunnow was correct when he 
stated that the alliance should "...oblige Mehmet Ali to re-enter the territorial [acceptable] 
limits...where neither he nor his successors should be able to get out from".'* This was the 
essence o f the London Convention, as well as Palmerston's conviction to create a buffer 
zone between Egypt and the Porte. This limitation may still exist and it may be argued that 
even Nasser's projects failed because he tested this boundary.
The Egyptian Question’s impact on the European system and its contribution to 
the creation of a new sub-system in the years to come, explain why it deserves more 
attention than it had actually received. While many authors recognize the importance of 
this episode, perhaps this work will offer a new perspective on the Egyptian Question and 
its effects on Europe and the region and encourage further exploration of this pivotal
period.
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Appendices
A p p e n d i x  I;
The Convention of H ünkar İskelesi signed on the 26th of June  1833.'
In the Name o f God the Almighty.
His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of All Russias and His Majesty the Em peror o f 
the Ottoman Empire; wishing to protect the peace and good understanding already 
existing between the two Empires, have decided to strengthen the Existing friendship and 
full confidence, by the establishment of a mutual defence Agreement.
With this aim, both Majesties have selected and nominated the fully authorized 
plenipotentiaries....[their names ranks and titles]... Have agreed in accordance with their 
with their vested authority, upon the following articles;-
A rticle I  Peace, and Friendship and union will exist forever between His Majesty the 
Em peror o f All the Russias and His Majesty the Ottoman Emperor and between their 
Empires as well as between their citizens both in land and in sea. In light o f this and since 
this agreement has the only goal to protect their Empires against any kind o f aggression. 
Their Majesties have come to the agreement that they would consult each other sincerely 
on all matters concerning their mutual peace and security, and with the aim, to render a 
mutual support and strength to each other.
A rticle n  The peace Treaty signed on September 2nd, 1829 in Adrianopolis as well as all
other treaties which are mentioned in this Peace Treaty and also the Convention signed on 
' Unofficial Translation from The Oriental Question in Russian Foreign Policy (St. Petershnro· 1897).
the 14th o f April 1830 in St. Petersburg and the agreement reached in Constantinople 
regarding Greece on the 21st o f September 1832, are again fully confirmed by this present 
defence treaty, as if  they have been included word by word in this present Treaty.
A rticle i n  In line with the principles of mutual defence which form the basis o f this 
present treaty and stimulated with the sincere desire to secure the existence and the full 
independence o f the Sublime P o rte ; His Majesty the Emperor o f All the Russias in case o f 
the appearance o f conditions which would oblige the Sublime Porte to demand armed and 
naval help from Russia again, is promising to provide by land and by sea, all the quantity 
o f army and powers which would be deemed necessary by both parties o f this Treaty. 
Upon this, it has been agreed that in such a case, all land and naval forces which would be 
requested by the Sublime Porte for her own defences, would be ready at their disposal.
A rticle IV  In accordance with the above-mentioned, in case on o f the two Empires should 
ask for help from o f the other party, then the expenses for the preparation and readiness o f 
the land and naval forces, would be met by the Empire which demanded the 
aforementioned help.
A rticle V Although both parties have the sincere intentions that this present Treaty would 
remain in power till the furthest possible time, but taking into consideration that in case o f 
the change o f conditions, there might be the necessity o f making some alternations to this 
Treaty, then it is decided that the validity o f this present Treaty would be for eight years 
starting from the exchange o f ratification.
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Both sides will start negotiations before the expiration o f this Treaty in order to 
renew it in line with the conditions o f that time.
A rticle V I This present Defence Treaty has to be ratified by both the contracting parties 
and the exchange o f ratification would take place in Constantinople after two months or, if 
possible even earlier.
This act, which contains six articles and which will be certified following the 
exchange o f ratification, we being fully authorized, have signed and put our seals and have 
exchanged it with the authorized plenipotentiaries of the Sublime Porte.
Made in Constantinople, on the twenty sixth o f June, 1833, The Twentieth o f 
Safar, on thousand two hundred and forty nine.
(L. S) Butenev (L. S) Khusrow
A Separate and  Secret Article:
In virtue o f one o f the clauses o f article one o f the patent treaty o f defensive 
alliance concluded between the Imperial Court o f Russia and the Sublime Porte, the two 
high contracting parties are bound to afford to each other mutually substantial aid, and 
most efficacious assistance for the safety o f their respective dominions. Nevertheless,, His 
Majesty the Emperor o f all the Russias, wishing to spare the Sublime Porte the expense 
and inconvenience, which might be occasioned to it by affording substantial aid, will not
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ask for the aid if circumstances should place the Sublime Porte under the obligation o f 
furnishing it, the Sublime Porte instead of the aid which is bound to furnishing it, the 
Sublime Porte instead o f the aid which it is bound to furnish in case o f need, according to 
the principle o f reciprocity o f the patent treaty, will confine its action in favor o f the 
Imperial Court o f Russia to closing the Straits o f the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not 
allowing any foreign vessels o f war to enter therein under any pretext whatever.
The present separate and secret article will have the same force and value as if it 
were inserted word for word in the treaty o f alliance o f this day.
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Separate and Secret Articles of the Convention of Munchengratz
Article I. Les hautes parties contractantes entendent appliquer spécialement 
au Pacha d'Egypte les stipulations de Tarte. II de la convention patente de ce jour, et Elles 
s'engagent expressément a empecher, d'un commun accord que soit directement, soit 
indirectement Tautorite du Pacha d'Egypte ne s'entende sur les provinces Européennes de 
l'Empire Ottoman.
Article II: En signant la convention patente d'aujourd'hui, les dueux Cours 
Impériales n'ont pas du exclure de leurs prevision le case ou, maigre leurs voeux et leur 
efforts communs Tordre actuel des choses en Turquie viendrait a etre renverse; et i est de 
leur intention, que ce cas venant a se réaliser, n'apporte aucun changement au principe 
d'union pour les affaire TOriente que la convention patente est destinee a consacrer entre 
elles. Il est entendu en consequence, que le cas échéant, les deux Cours Impiriales 
n'agiront que de concert et dans un parfait espirit de solidarité: pour tout ce qui concerne 
Testablisseement du nouvel ordre de choses destine a remplacer celui qui existe aujord'hui 
est qu'elles veilleront en commun a ce que le changement, survenu dans la situation 
intérieure de cet Empire, ne puisse porter atteinte, ni a la surete de leurs propres Etats et 
aux droits que les traites leurs assurent respectivement, ni au maintien de Tequilibre 
Européen.
Les presents articles séparés et secrets ayant la meme force et caleur que la 
convention patente de ce jour, seront échangés a Vienne en meme temps que celles de la 
convention precitee.
Appendix IT:
278
Convention Between the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and 
Russia on the one Part and the Sublime Porte on the Other for the Pacification of 
the Levant. Signed At London, July 15, 1840. And Related Instruments.^
Appendix i n
In the Name o f the Most Merciful God;
His Highness the Sultan having addressed himself to their Majesties the Queen on 
the United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor o f Austria, King o f 
Hungary and Bohemia, the King o f Prussia and the Emperor of all the Russias, to ask their 
support and assistance in the difficulties in which he finds himself placed by reasons o f  the 
hostile proceedings of Mehmet Ali Pasha of Egypt -difficulties which threaten with danger 
the integrity o f the Ottoman Empire and the independence of the Sultan’s throne- Their 
said majesties moved by the sincere friendship which subsists between them and the 
Sultan; animated by the desire o f maintaining the integrity and independence o f the 
Ottoman Empire as a security for the peace o f Europe; faithful to the which they 
contracted by the Collective Note presented to the Porte by their Representatives at 
Constantinople, on the 27th o f July 1839; and desirous, moreover, to prevent the efifijsion 
o f blood which would be occasioned by a continuance o f the hostilities which have 
recently broken out in Syria between the authorities o f the Pasha o f Egypt and the 
Subjects o f the Sultan; Their said Majesties and His Highness the Sultan have resolved for 
the aforesaid purposes, to conclude together a Convention, and they have therefore named 
as their Plenipotentiaries that is to say,[There follow the list o f plenipotentiaries with their 
r^inted in Carrie, p.p. 134-136.
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titles.] Who having reciprocally communicated to each other their full powers, found to be 
in good and due forms have agreed upon and signed the following articles:
Article I. His highness the Sultan having come to an agreement with their majesties the 
Queen o f the United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor o f  Austria, King 
o f Hungary and Bohemia, the king o f Prussia and the Emperor o f all the Russias as to the 
conditions o f the arrangement which is the intention o f His Hhghness to grant to Mehmet 
Ali, conditions which are specified in the separate Act hereunto annexed; Their Majesties 
engage to act in perfect accord, and to unite their efforts in order to determine the 
Mehmet Ali to confer to that arrangement; each of the High Contracting Parties reserving 
to itself to cooperate for that purpose, according to the means o f action which each may 
have at its disposal.
Article I  I f  the Vali o f Egypt should refuse to accept the above-mentioned arrangement 
which will be communicated to him by the Sultan, with concurrence o f Their aforesaid 
Majesties; Their Majesties engage to take, at the request o f the Sultan measures concerted 
and settled between them, in order to carry that arrangement into effect. In the meanwhile, 
the Sultan having requested his said allies to unite with him in order to assist him to cut off 
the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria, and to prevent the transport o f 
troops, horses, arms and warlike stores of all kinds, from the one province to the others; 
Their Majesties the Queen o f the United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Ireland, and the 
Emperor o f Austria, King o f Hungary and Bohemia, engage to give immediately to that 
effect, the necessary orders to their naval Commanders in the Mediterranean. Their said
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Majesties further engage that the Naval Commanders o f their squadrons shall, in 
accordance to the means at their command, afford in the name o f the Alliance, all the 
support and assistance in their po^er to those subjects o f the Sultan who may manifest 
their fidelity and allegiance to their Sovereign.
Article 111. I f  Mehmet Ali, after having refused to submit to the conditions o f the 
arrangement above mentioned, should direct his land or sea forces against Constantinople, 
the High Contracting Parties, upon the express demand o f the Sultan, addressed to their 
Representatives at Constantinople, agree in such case, to comply with the requests o f that 
Sovereign, and to provide for the defence o f his throne by means o f a co-operation agreed 
upon by mutual consent, for the purpose of the two Straits o f the Bosphorus and the 
Dardanelles, as well as the Capital o f the Ottoman Empire, in security against all 
aggression.
It is further agreed, that the forces o f which in virtue o f such concert may be sent 
as aforesaid, shall there remain so employed as long as their presence shall be required by 
the Sultan; and when His Highness shall deem their presence no longer necessary, the said 
forces shall simultaneously withdraw, and shall return to the Black Sea and the 
Mediterranean, respectively.
Article IV. It is however, expressly understood that the co-operation mentioned in the 
preceding Article, and destined to place the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, 
and the Ottoman Capital, under the temporary safeguard o f the High Contracting Parties 
against all aggression o f Mehmet Ali, shall be considered only as a measure o f exceptions
281
adopted at the express demand of the Sultan, and solely for his defence in the single case 
above mentioned; but it is agreed that such measure shall not derogate in any degree from 
the ancient rule o f the Ottoman JEmpire, in virtue of which it had in all times been 
prohibited for sips o f war of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of Dardanelles and o f the 
Bosphorus. And the Sultan, on the one hand, hereby declares that, excepting the 
contingency above mentioned, it is his firm resolution to maintain in future this principle 
invariably established as the ancient rule o f his empire, and son long as the Porte is at 
peace to admit no foreign ships o f war into the Straits of the Bosphorus and o f the 
Dardanelles.,; on the other hand Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor o f Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the 
King o f Prussia and the Emperor o f all the Russias, engage to respect this determination o f 
the Sultan, and to conform to the above mentioned principle.
Article V The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratification thereof shall be 
exchanged at London at the expirations o f two months, or sooner if possible.
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have 
signed and have affixed thereto the seals o f their arms.
Done in London, the fifteenth of Day of July, in the year o f our Lord, one 
thousand eight hundred and forty.
(L.S) Palmerston. (L.S) Neumann. (L.S)Bulow. (L.S)Brunnow (L.S) Chekieb.
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Separate Act annexed to the Convention concluded at London on the 15th o f  
July, 1840, between the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia on the one Porte and 
the Sublime Porte on the other.
His Highness the Sultan intends to grant, and to cause to be notified to Mehmet 
Ali, the conditions o f the arrangement hereinafter detailed:-
1. His Highness promises to grant Mehmet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the 
direct line, the administration o f the Pachalik o f Egypt; and His Highness promises, 
moreover, to grant to Mehmet Ali, for his life, with the title o f Pasha o f Acre and with 
command o f the fortress o f St. John, the administration of the southern parts o f Syria, the 
limits o f which shall be determined by the following line of demarcation....
The Sultan, however, in making these efforts, attaches thereto the condition, that 
M ehmet Ali shall accept them within the space o f ten days after the communication 
thereof shall have been made to him at Alexandria, by an agent o f His Highness; and that 
Mehmet Ali shall, at the same time, place in the hands o f that agent, the necessary 
instructions to the Commander o f his sea and land forces, to withdraw immediately from 
Arabia, and from all the Holy Cities, which are therein situated; from the Island o f Candia; 
from the district o f Adana, and from all the other parts o f the Ottoman Empire, which are
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not comprised within the limits o f Egypt, and within those o f the Pachalick o f Acre, as 
above defined.
2. Within the space o f ten days, fixed as above, Mehmet Ali should not accept the above 
mentioned arrangement, the Sultan will then withdraw the oifer o f the life administration 
o f the Pachalick o f Acre, but His Highness will still consent to grant to Mehmet Ali for, 
himself the Pachalick o f Egypt, provided such offer be accepted within the space o f  ten 
days next following; that is to say, within the period o f twenty days, to be reckoned from 
the day on which the communication shall have been made to him; and provided that in 
this case also, he places in the hands o f the agent of the Sultan the necessary instructions 
to his military and navel Commanders, to withdraw immediately within the limits and into 
the ports o f the Pachalik o f Egypt.
3. The annual tribute to be paid to the Sultan by Mehmet Ali, shall be proportioned to the 
greater or less amount o f territory o f which the latter may obtain the administration, 
according as he accepts the first or second alternative.
4. It is moreover, expressly understood that in the first as in the second alternative, 
Mehmet Ali( before the expiration o f the specified period o f ten or twenty days), shall be 
bound to deliver up the Turkish Fleet with the whole o f its crew and equipment, into the 
hands o f the Turkish Agent who shall be charged to receive the same. The Commanders 
o f the Allied Squadrons shall be present at such delivery.
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It is understood, that in no case can Mehmet Ali carry to account or deduct from 
the tribute to be paid to the Sultan, the expenses which he has incurred in the maintenance 
o f the Ottoman Fleet, during any part o f the time it shall have remained in the ports o f 
Egypt.
5. All the Treaties, and all the laws of the Ottoman Empire, shall be applicable to Egypt 
and to the Pachalick o f Acre, such as it has been above defined, in the same manner as to 
every other part o f the Ottoman Empire. But the Sultan consents that on condition o f the 
regular payment o f the tribute above mentioned, Mehmet Ali and his descendants shall 
collect, in the name o f the Sultan , and as the delegates of His Highness, within the 
provinces, the administration o f which shall be confided to them, the taxes and imposts o f 
their receipt o f the aforesaid taxes and imposts, Mehmet Ali and his descendants shall 
defray all the expenses o f the civil and military administration o f the said provinces.
6. The military and naval forces which may be maintained by the Pasha o f Egypt and Acre, 
forming part o f the forces o f the Ottoman Empire, shall always be considered as 
maintained for the service o f the State.
7. If, at the expiration o f the period o f twenty days after the communication shall have 
been made to him (according to the stipulation of 2 ), Mehmet Ali shall not accede to the 
proposed arrangement, and shall not accept the hereditary Pachalick o f Egypt, the Sultan 
will consider himself at liberty to withdraw that offer, and to follow in consequences such 
ulterior course as his own interest, and the counsels o f his Allies may suggest to him.
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8. The Present Separate Act shall have the same force and validity, as if it were inserted, 
word for word, in the Convention o f this day. It shall be ratified and the ratification 
thereof shall be exchanged at London at the same time as those o f the said Convention.
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, an have 
affixed thereto the seals o f their arms.
Done at London, the fifteenth of July, in the year o f our Lord, one thousand eight 
hundred and forty.
(L.S) Palmerston. (L.S) Neumann. (L.S)Bulow. (L.S) Brunnow. (L.S) Chekieb.
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Appendix IV:
Convention between Commodore Napier, com m anding H e r B ritann ic  
M ajesty ’s Naval Forces before Alexandria, on the one p a rt and  H E Boughos 
Joussouf Bey, specially authorized by his Highness the Viceroy of E gypt on the 
o ther pa rt; signed a t A lexandria, the 27th of November, 1840.^
Article I  Commodore Napier, in his above-mentioned capacity, having brought to the 
knowledge o f his Highness Mehmet Ali, that the Allied Powers had recommended the 
sublime Porte to reinstate him in the hereditary government o f Egypt, and his Highness, 
seeing in this the communication a favourable occasion for putting an end to the calamities 
o f war, he engages to order his son Ibrahim Pasha to proceed immediately to the 
evacuation o f Syria. His Highness, engages, moreover, to restore the Ottoman fleet, as 
soon as he shall have received the official notification that the Sublime Porte grants to him 
the hereditary government o f Egypt, which concession is, and remains guaranteed by the 
Powers.
A rticle H  Commodore Napier will place a steamer at the disposal o f  the Egyptian 
Government, which will convey to Syria the officer charged by His Highness to carry to 
the Commander-in-Chief o f the Egyptian army the order to evacuate Syria. The 
Commander-in-Chief o f the British Forces, Sir Robert Stopford, will on his side appoint 
an officer to watch over the execution o f this measure.
 ^Printed in Carrie, 143-4.
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A rticle i n  In consideration o f what precedes, Commodore Napier engages to suspend 
hostilities on the part o f British forces against Alexandria, or any other portions o f the 
Egyptian territory. He will at the^am e time, authorize the free passage o f  the vessels 
appointed for the transport o f the wounded, the invalids, or of any other portion o f  the 
Egyptian Army, which the Government o f Egypt might wish to return to that country by
sea.
A rticle IV It is well understood that the Egyptian Army shall have the liberty o f retiring 
from Syria with its artillery, arms, horses, ammunition, baggage, and in general everything 
that constitutes the stores o f an army.
Done in duplicate, each Contracting Party to have an original.
(Signed) CH. Napier, Commodore. Boughos Joussouf
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